


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ÉMILE DURKHEIM'S CONTRIBUTIONS
TO SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

BY

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BY

CHARLES ELMER GEHLKE

To
MY FATHER AND MOTHER

PREFACE

As the title of this study suggests, the scope of it is relatively limited. "Sociological theory" has been taken to include the study of the psychological phenomena conditioned by man's social life; the method and scope of sociology; the problem of the conduct relations of the individual as a member of a social group; "social morphology"; the causes of social changes; in short, what is usually denominated "general" sociology. Into the field of Durkheim's specialized work on primitive social life no excursions have been made save for material illustrative of points coming up in the discussions of theory. Furthermore, no attempt has been made to attack the problem of the influences that have helped to shape our author's views. This question has been treated by M. Simon Deploige,¹ with the result of an acrimonious argument between Deploige and Durkheim.² This controversy will be considered later.³ It seems scarcely worth while to do more than to point out, in this connection, similarities between the thought of Durkheim and that of several other writers, and to accept his statement as to the origin of his ideas.

Professor Émile Durkheim was born April 15, 1858. From 1879 to 1882 he was a student at the *École Normale Supérieure*. From 1882 to 1887 he served as professor of philosophy in various lycées. In 1887 he became a member of the *Faculté des lettres* of the *Université de Bordeaux*, first as "*chargé d'un cours*", later, in 1896, as Professor of Social Science. In 1902 he was called to Paris, serving at first as "*chargé d'un cours*", and since 1906, as Professor of Sociology and the Science of Education in the *Faculté des lettres* in the *Université de Paris*. He is a member of

¹ *Le Conflit de la morale et de la sociologie*, ch. iv.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 393-413.

³ *Vide infra*, p. 83.

the "Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, section des sciences économiques et sociales".

Beside a large number of articles Professor Durkheim has published four important books: *De la division du travail social* (1893); *Les Règles de la Méthode sociologique* (1895); *Le Suicide* (1897); *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912). He is, in addition to this, founder of, director of, and collaborator on, the series of volumes appearing periodically under the title of the "*Année Sociologique*".¹

The author wishes here to acknowledge his indebtedness to a number of persons who have been of assistance to him in the prosecution of this study. To Professor Durkheim, himself, the author is under great obligation for the kindness of the former in personally revising the bibliography of his works, since without this assistance there would have been serious gaps in it. To Professor Henry L. Moore, of Columbia University, he is indebted for the suggestion of the subject, and for a criticism of the earlier drafts; to Professor Franklin H. Giddings, for continued advice and encouragement; to his colleague, Professor J. S. Moore, and to Professor G. G. Laubscher, of Randolph-Macon College for Women, for assistance in their respective fields; to his sister, Mrs. C. F. Miller, for aid in the reading of proof; to Mr. H. N. Shenton, of the Department of Sociology of Columbia University, for reading and criticising the study in the proof-sheets. His greatest debt, however, is to Professor J. E. Cutler, of the Department of Sociology of Western Reserve University. To the latter's unfailing encouragement and consideration, as well as to his kindness in reading and criticising the study in manuscript, its present appearance is largely due. However, the author wishes to assume all responsibility for its shortcomings, whether of matter or form.

C. E. G.

APRIL 27, 1914.

¹ *Vide infra*, pp. 122, 185.

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List of abbreviations of titles of books and articles to which most frequent reference is made.

Div. Tr.—De la division du travail social.

Méth.—Les Règles de la méthode sociologique.

Suic.—Le Suicide.


Vie Rel.—Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.

"Rep. Ind."—"Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives."

A. S.—Année Sociologique.

Rev. Phil.—Revue Philosophique.

Rev. Mét.—Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE aim and purpose of the study is to present in a reasonably detailed and yet compact form the essentials of Durkheim's sociological theory. Only one of his works, *Les Règles*, is purely theoretical and methodological; his system—so far as he may be said to have a "system"—is so scattered throughout his works that only a careful reading and collation of material from a number of them would give even the average technically interested reader a fair idea of his contribution. Durkheim's importance as one of the leaders of modern sociological thought and research in France makes an interpretation and summary of his works of some value to the English-speaking sociologist who cannot spare the time for a thorough reading. It is with the hope that it may serve this purpose, that this study is put forward.¹

Its plan is briefly to examine Durkheim's works with reference to his social psychology, his ideas of social causation, his conception of the field of sociology, of the method of sociology, and his treatment of the phenomena called moral. Little emphasis has been laid on tracing the development of Durkheim's ideas, largely for

¹ The general practice of the writer has been to translate the French, when quoting, as nearly literally as possible, adding the key words in the original when it seemed necessary. Sufficiently accurate references have been given to permit a more exact examination of the original than this text affords in its English versions of Durkheim's language.

the reason that, since the publication of his earliest articles, (which were merely reviews of books by several prominent German writers of that time), there has been no fundamental change in the views that he has published; and to analyze minutely each shifting of emphasis would not have been profitable within the scope of this study. This relatively static nature of Durkheim's theorizing has made possible the utilization of works of his different periods as a set of almost indiscriminately authentic sources. Whenever a change of position has seemed significant, it has been duly noted.

This introductory chapter will contain: first, a discussion of terminology; and second, a setting forth of Durkheim's conception of the mind of the individual, as preparation for the examination of his social psychology.

Several preliminary definitions are here in place. The terms "*société*", "*esprit*", "*âme*", as found in Durkheim's works, need to be clearly defined.

6 The term "*société*" Durkheim uses first of all in the sense of an aggregate, a group, of concrete individuals; e. g. "*dans toute société*",¹ "*les sociétés plus vastes*",² "*la structure politique d'une société*",³ "*d'une société à l'autre*",⁴ "*sociétés de même race*".⁵ The second use of the word is in a psychological sense. In these cases there is frequently some ambiguity. The emphasis seems at times to be on society functioning as a psychic whole composed of individuals, and at other times the word is used as an equivalent term for "*l'âme collective*", "*conscience collective*", "*vie collective*", "*vie sociale*"; i. e. for the system of social states of mind composing the unity expressed by these

¹ *Méth.*, p. vi, and p. 5.

² *Div. Tr.*, p. 339.

³ *Méth.*, p. 18.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 132.

Méth., p. 133, cf. *Div. Tr.*, p. 46.

terms. As illustration of this latter usage we have: "*cette synthèse sui generis qui constitue toute société*",¹ "*le composé, c'est-à-dire la société*",² "*La société a pour substrat*";³ of the former usage, with an implied contrast: "*de la société et de la vie collective*",⁴ "*La vie sociale est essentiellement spontanée et la société une chose naturelle*".⁵ To avoid confusion, then, the terms "social group" will be used when the emphasis is on the concrete nature of the aggregation; "social mind", "collective mind", "social consciousness", or "collective consciousness", when the aggregation of individuals is considered as a psychic unity; and the term "society" when the large, the national or integral, group is meant.

Durkheim's definition of the nature of the mind may well be indicated at this point although the discussion of it will appear later. "*La vie mentale*," he says, "*est faite de représentations*".⁶ (This means, almost, "of ideas"; the German term "*Vorstellungen*" is nearer the French than our word "ideas". The term "*représentations*" will be used throughout this study in its French significance, rather than the word "ideas".) This notion of the mental life is something like William James' conception of it as "the stream of consciousness", as these quotations from Durkheim will show: "For the psychologist the representative life is nothing else than an ensemble of representations";⁷ "There is no such thing as 'thought-substance'";⁸ "The psychic life is a continuous succession of representations."⁹ As for "*l'esprit*", he defines it:

¹ *Méth.*, p. xv.

² "Rep. Ind.," p. 293.

³ *Méth.*, p. 149.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

² *Suic.*, p. 351.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 148.

⁶ "Rep. Ind.," p. 274.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 280-281.

"the mind (*l'esprit*) itself, *i. e.*, the representations present and past which constitute it."¹ And again, "It is not necessary to imagine a soul (*âme*) separated from its body and leading in I know not what place (*milieu*) an existence shadowy (*rêveuse*) and solitary."²

Durkheim's words, "Society has for a substratum",³ suggests the need of indicating what this "substratum" is. By it is meant the social group or "social aggregate"⁴ whose mental interactions produce the states of the social mind. Concretely considered, this "aggregate" means for Durkheim, the political-social unit, either in its primitive manifestation as horde,⁵ clan,⁶ tribe,⁷ and confederation,⁷ or in its later forms as city-state,⁸ a civilized nation,⁹ and imperial state.¹⁰

The political society in its integrity is, however, not the only "social aggregate"; there are also the groups which it includes: "religious sects, political schools, literary schools, occupational organizations (*corporations professionnelles*)".¹¹ The general criterion by which to recognize a "social aggregate" is its tendency to act, as a group, coercively toward its constituent individuals. It is possible then to have "aggregates" concentric about the individual, all acting upon him, but in different and characteristic ways.

An "aggregate" differing from these just named, but

¹ "Rep. Ind.," p. 287.

² *Ibid.*, p. 297.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 293, quoted *supra*, p. 17.

⁴ Durkheim uses this term, *Méth.*, p. 103.

⁵ *Méth.*, p. 102.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 103, *Vie. Rel.*, p. 317.

⁷ *Méth.*, p. 104.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 46 (implied): *Suic.*, p. 357, *Méth.*, p. 8 (explicit).

¹⁰ *Méth.*, p. 105.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

still characteristically social in its nature, is the family. It acts coercively on its members; and as in other groups, its situation affects the form and intensity of this action.¹

It is clear then that Durkheim does not mean "Society", but rather, "a society", when he uses the term "*société*" as connoting a concrete aggregate of human beings. In this regard he differs from Comte and resembles Herbert Spencer;² though his thought is not always quite consistent as regards this principle.

Without an understanding, on the reader's part, of our author's conception of the mind of the individual, his social psychology would be comparatively difficult to grasp; and without a knowledge of his psychology, individual and social, his work as a whole would be almost completely unintelligible. If it seems that a disproportionately large part of this study is occupied with this discussion, the fact has its justification in this characteristic of Durkheim's work. Even the somewhat extended treatment of these topics to be found here can not be said nearly to exhaust the possibilities of the subject. At every point of the psychological theory interesting bypaths of investigation have had to be passed by. Part of the material for this preliminary discussion is scattered throughout his works; the larger part of it is, however, concentrated in one article.³ A citation in this article will serve as a starting point.

For if the sensations, which are the primary basis of the individual consciousness, cannot be explained save by the state

¹ *Suic.*, p. 213; *vide infra*, p. 72.

² *Rev. Phil.*, vol. iv, pp. 469-470, "Sociologie et Sciences Sociales."

³ "Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives," *Rev. Mét.*, vol. vi, p. 273 *et seq.*

of the brain and of the organs—otherwise, whence could they come?—once they [*sc.* the sensations] exist, they compound themselves according to laws of which neither cerebral morphology nor cerebral physiology are capable of rendering any account. Thence come the images, and the images, grouping themselves in their turn, become concepts, and, in the degree that new states thus add themselves to the old, since they are separated by more numerous intermediaries [*intermédiaires*] from that organic base upon which, indeed, the whole mental life rests, they are also less immediately dependent. Nevertheless, they do not cease to be psychic; it is rather in them that one can best observe the characteristic attributes of mentality.¹

We note here the following points:

(a) Sensations, the primary elements of the individual's states of mind, are referable, necessarily and directly, to cerebral states.

(b) Once existing, the sensations compound themselves in a manner impossible to explain in the terms of cerebral physiology, merely.

(c) The compounds thus formed are images; these may in turn be compounded into concepts; and the process does not necessarily end at that stage.

Let us take up these points in order. The first is evidence of an "interactionist" philosophy so far as the relation of mind to brain is concerned; *i. e.*, that mental processes are due to, are caused by, the cerebral processes. That is one phase of this philosophy; the other is that mental processes in turn may be the cause of physical (*i. e.*, physiological) processes. The origin of the most elementary process seems to be this: that by the interaction of the cerebral

¹ "Rep. Ind.," p. 300. Reference to the original will show the source of whatever obscurity this passage may possess.

cells somehow or other a sensation is produced. This is quite clearly expressed in the following excerpt:

Finally, it is also, it seems, the only way to comprehend how the sensation depends on the brain, while still constituting a new phenomenon. It depends on it because it is compounded out of molecular modifications: [otherwise, of what would it be made and whence would it come?] but it is at the same time something else, because it results from a new synthesis *sui generis*, wherein those modifications enter as elements, but wherein they are transformed by the very fact of their fusion.¹

This point, however, is to be carefully noted: that it is the mutual action of many cells, not the solitary action of one, that produces the sensation:² "But if then each idea or at least each sensation is due to the synthesis of a certain number of cellular states, combined according to laws and by forces still unknown, it is evident that it can be the prisoner of no particular cell."³ It is independent of the individual cell but dependent on the whole cerebrum as a functioning totality. This point is of considerable importance in the analogy which Durkheim draws between the individual and the collective representations, to be discussed in the next chapter. As for the action of the psychic elements on the body, Durkheim says: "A representation does not appear without acting on the body and on the mind [*esprit*]."⁴

That this interactionist theory is an hypothesis somewhat difficult to defend is a commonplace of psychology and philosophy. Durkheim rejects the "automatism" and "epiphenomenalism" of Huxley and Maudsley which make

¹ "Rep. Ind.," p. 296; see also *ibid.*, 297, "*L'âme est dans le monde*," etc.

² "Rep. Ind.," pp. 294-5.

³ "Rep. Ind.," p. 296.

⁴ "Rep. Ind.," p. 286, also 287, and *Div. Tr.*, p. 64, "*Une représentation*," etc.

of consciousness a mere glow from the cerebral process, a mere "epiphenomenon", and make of the individual conscious self a mere interested spectator, helpless to interfere in the automatic process that is being carried on in the brain.^{1 2} Consciousness, "the faculty of knowing what goes on within us," as Durkheim himself has defined it, increases *pari passu* with the decrease of the automatism of psychic life, and is therefore a reality. For it acts as a cause, decreasing the mechanism characteristic of physical phenomena. Here our author agrees with James and on practically the same grounds.³

James is, however, in Durkheim's estimation, just as "materialistic" as Huxley and Maudsley. This for two reasons. First, James makes the element of retention in memory a function of the cerebral tissue.^{4 5} Second, he makes association of ideas by similarity also a function of the brain-tracts, *i. e.*, makes it association by cerebral contiguity. Against the first view Durkheim urges the objection that it makes of memory, so essential a process in the building of character, a merely neural process. That, he says, is virtually an automatistic conception.⁶ Moreover, in his opinion, such a retention theory implies the necessity of the reappearance of images in the same order in which they were impressed on the cerebral substance.⁷ James' second proposition, that association by similarity is

¹ "Rep. Ind.," pp. 274-5-6.

² See Wm. James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 128, for an exposition and criticism of this view of Huxley and Maudsley.

³ James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 138 *et seq.*

⁴ "Rep. Ind.," p. 277.

⁵ James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 654-7.

⁶ "Rep. Ind.," p. 279.

⁷ But James refutes this type of argument, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 577.

explained by the simultaneous or immediately successive stimulations of the two different brain-tracts involved, Durkheim subjects to a criticism somewhat too detailed to be here reproducible.^{1 2} As a substitute he proposes the solution, that, like animate and inanimate entities, representations (or images) may have a tendency to group themselves by similarity. The similarity then has a dynamic value and exists in the ideas.^{3 4}

Durkheim is thus attempting to place his psychological theory on a "spiritualistic" basis,⁵ *i. e.*, to make it non-materialistic. But this lays him open to exactly the same suspicion of "materialism" that he holds against James. The latter adheres to the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism: that "the ascertainments of a blank, unmediated correspondence, term by term, of the succession of states of consciousness with the succession of total brain processes" is the "simplest psycho-physical formula" and the "last word" of a scientific psychology.⁶ James' assumption is one made for methodological reasons. With his philosophical position on this point we have nothing to do here.

In his criticism of James, Durkheim assumes a position much like that of Binet, who accuses the parallelists of being very cautious materialists.⁷ As a matter of fact, Durkheim, as was stated a few lines above, lays himself open to this

¹ "Rep. Ind.," pp. 281-3.

² James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 578 *et seq* and p. 590 *et seq*.

³ "Rep. Ind.," p. 286.

⁴ For James' criticism of this view see *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 554, 578, 590. See also A. Binet, *Mind and Brain*, pp. 111-112.

⁵ Cf. his commendation of the *spiritualiste* psychology in *Div. Tr.*, pp. 340-1, and *Méth.*, pp. vii-viii.

⁶ James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 182; see also Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 80; and Titchener, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 360 *et seq*.

⁷ Binet, *Mind and Brain*, p. 215.

charge of adhering to a materialistic philosophy. The definition of Renouvier: "One calls materialistic every philosophy which defines thought as a product of a compound whose elements do not imply thought,"¹ applies to Durkheim without qualification. To call his theory "*spiritualiste*" (in the philosophical, not the sectarian sense of the term, of course) is then to give an unusual meaning to that word. He bases his claim to being "*spiritualiste*" on the fact that he makes thought a form of energy different from that exhibited in the physiological processes of the brain-cell; and he endeavors to bolster up his theory by comparing the transformation of brain energy into mind energy with the transformation of energy of motion into energy of heat. Disregarding the fact that both motion and heat are forms of kinetic energy, can we not say that Durkheim is making of mental energy a form of physical energy merely?² Mental processes are caused by the functioning together of physical units; in turn the former affect the latter. The only way in which Durkheim can satisfactorily vindicate his claim to being "*spiritualiste*" is by proving himself to be in philosophy an "idealist". In that case the brain-cell would no longer be matter; it itself would be mind.

After this metaphysical excursus let us next consider the second and third points in Durkheim's psychological theory:³ namely, the compounding of sensations into images, and the compounding of these into concepts which

¹ Quoted by Binet, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

² Durkheim almost admits this in "Rep. Ind.," p. 293: "There is no realm in nature which is not related (*tienne*) to the other realms. Nothing would then be more absurd than to erect the psychic life into a kind of absolute which sprang from nowhere and was attached in no way to the rest of the universe. It is quite evident that the state of the brain affects all the intellectual phenomena, and is the immediate factor among certain of them [the pure sensations]."

³ *Vide supra*, p. 20.

are, in turn, compounded into still more complicated products. This theory of the compounding of mental states has been called by James the "mind-stuff theory";¹ it is, he says, the theory used by the evolutionists, notably Tyndall and Spencer.²

Wundt has stated it quite explicitly, as the following extract shows:³

In the first place, the psychical elements unite to form composite *psychical compounds* which are separate and relatively independent of each other in the continual flow of psychical processes. Such compounds are, for example, ideas. . . . Other examples are composite feelings, emotions, or volitions. . . . Thus, ideas unite to form larger simultaneous ideational complexes or regular successions, while affective and volitional processes form a variety of combinations with one another and with ideational processes. In this way we have the *interconnection of psychical compounds* as a class of synthetical processes of the *second* degree, consisting of a union between the simpler combinations. . . . The separate psychical interconnections, in turn, unite to form still more comprehensive combinations. . . . In this way combinations of a *third* degree arise, which we may designate by the general name *psychical development*. . . . The ascertainment of the *laws of psychical phenomena* depends upon the investigation of all the combinations of different degrees, the combination of elements into compounds, of compounds into interconnections, and of interconnections into developments.⁴

The similarity between this statement and that of Durk-

¹ James, *Pr. of Psych.*, vol. i, p. 145 *et seq.*

² Spencer, *Pr. of Psych.*, par. 60, quoted by James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 151-3.

³ See also Durkheim's review of Wundt's *Ethik*, in *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, p. 113 *et seq.* of the article "La Morale en Allemagne."

⁴ Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 25-26: italics are Wundt's or the translator's.

heim¹ is strong enough to warrant our considering them as parallel. A more detailed discussion will be devoted to this theory in connection with the views of our author on the nature of the social mind. Another feature of the psychological position of Durkheim, his intellectualism, must also be postponed as a topic of discussion.²

We may now be in a position better to understand our author's criticism of James' theory that retention in memory is a neural process, not a psychic one, and that association by similarity is likewise a function of the cerebral substance.³ Durkheim defends the theory that representations persist as such, *i. e.*, as psychic rather than merely physiological entities.⁴ This follows readily from the mind-stuff theory. Since only the sensations are the direct, immediate product of the molecular action of the brain-cells, and since all elements of mind-process higher than sensation are the products of an autonomous interaction of simpler elements, there is nothing to tie them to the cerebral substance, although James attempts to do so. Why should they not "soar in the vast void", free from cellular shackles? Only by liberating the representation from the physical substratum does Durkheim seem to be able to conceive of a "spirituality". Moreover, to explain the continued absences of these representations from the field of consciousness (from one active recalling of them to the next), he makes the assumption that consciousness is not a necessary condition for the existence of a representation.⁵ This position is somewhat reminiscent of that of Paulsen

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 20.

² *Vide infra*, p. 96.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 22.

⁴ "Rep. Ind.," pp. 289-292.

⁵ "Rep. Ind.," pp. 291-2.

and of Fechner also.¹ Durkheim also suggests the possibility of secondary centres of consciousness,^{2 3} whose functioning goes on without the cognizance of the consciousness connected with the central nervous system; a slight adumbration of a pan-psychist philosophy.⁴ So that the absence of the empirical evidence of the presence of representations that are, so to speak, "not in use" is no proof that they do not exist. They may simply be hiding in that vast space, the unconscious, or perhaps better, the extra-conscious or the sub-conscious.

We may then summarize Durkheim's psychology as follows: he rejects automatism and parallelism as well; is an interactionist on the question of the relationship of mind and brain; mental processes are, in his view, largely representative rather than affective or volitional; representations persist as such, when not in the field of consciousness, in the area of the extra-conscious; and, finally, and most important of all, the representations are the integrations of more elementary psychic units and may themselves combine into higher compounds.

¹ Paulsen, *Intr. to Phil.*, p. 120 *et seq.*; on this point see also, James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 162 *et seq.*

² "Rep. Ind.," p. 292.

³ James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 65 *et seq.*

⁴ Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 90 *et seq.*, and p. 131 *et seq.*

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL MIND

WE have examined, in the first chapter, Durkheim's conception of the representations of the individual mind as compounds of mind-elements which may ultimately be resolved into sensations; and of these sensations as produced by the interaction of cerebral cells, though not each a product of any one cell. A representation may be considered, according to this view, as of the brain-cell though not in it. "It is something new, to produce which certain characters of the cells have of course contributed, but to the constitution of which they are not sufficient, since it survives them and manifests different properties."¹

This explanation of the origin of the state of consciousness (or, to be more exact, of the representation) of the individual mind Durkheim compares with his theory of the origin and nature of the state of the social mind.²

Society, he says, has for its substratum the ensemble of the associated individuals. The system formed by their union,³ which varies according to their number, their disposition over the surface of the territory, the nature of and the number of ways of communication,⁴ constitutes the base upon

¹ "Rep. Ind.," p. 293.

² For an early statement of this analogy see *Méth.*, p. 136 and p. xvii.

³ See also *Suic.*, p. 350; *Méth.*, pp. 125-9; *Vie Rel.*, pp. 22-23; *Div. Tr.*, p. 46.

⁴ Cf. *Div. Tr.*, p. 342.

which the social life arises. The representations¹ which are the woof [*trame*] of it are derived from the relations established between the individuals thus combined, or between the secondary groups that are intercalated [*intercalé*] between the individual and the whole society. Now if one sees nothing extraordinary in the fact that these individual representations, produced by the interactions of neural elements, should not be inherent in these elements, what is there surprising in the fact that the collective representations produced by the interactions of the elementary consciousnesses of which society is made, should not be derived directly from these latter, and, as a result, should extend beyond them [*les débordent*]? The relation which, in this conception, unites the social substratum to the social life, is at all points analogous to that which one must admit [to exist] between the physiological substratum and the psychic life of the individual, if one does not desire to negate all that which is properly called psychology.^{2 3}

Durkheim thus sets up an analogy between the relation of the representations in the individual mind to the functioning brain-cells, and the relation of the representations in the social mind to the individuals in the social group. Having discussed the former relation, let us now examine the latter a little more closely. Durkheim says:

The collective representations are exterior to the individual consciousnesses because they are not derived from the individuals taken in isolation but from their convergence and union [*concours*]. . . . Doubtless, in the elaboration of the common result, each [individual] bears his due share; but the private

¹ This idea is repeatedly expressed by Durkheim; cf. *Suic.*, p. 352-3, *Div. Tr.*, p. 99, *Méth.*, p. xvi, *Revue Bleue*, July 2, 1898, in the article: "L'Individualisme et les intellectuels," p. 12.

² "Rep. Ind.," pp. 293-4.

³ Cf. Durkheim's review of Schaeffle's *Bau u. Leben*, etc., *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xix, p. 92.

sentiments do not become social except by combining under the action of the forces *sui generis*¹ which association develops. As a result of these combinations, and of the mutual alterations which result therefrom, they [the private sentiments] become something else [*autre chose*]. A chemical synthesis results, which concentrates, unifies, the elements synthetized, and by that very process transforms them. . . . The resultant derived therefrom extends then beyond [*de-borde*] the individual mind as the whole is greater than the part. To know really what it is, one must take the aggregate in its totality. It is this that thinks, that feels, that wills, although it may not be able to will, feel or act save by the intermediation of individual consciousnesses. This explains also why the social phenomenon does not depend on the personal nature of the individuals. It is because, in the fusion through which it evolves, all the individual characters, being divergent by definition, are mutually neutralized and cancelled. Only the most general properties of human nature remain unsubmerged; and because of their extreme generality they would not be able to account for the very special and complex forms which characterize collective facts.²

The general principle that a whole is greater than its parts (which appears in this quotation) may be illustrated by the biological conception that the phenomena of life are more than the mere physics and chemistry of the cell.³ The individualistic sociology, which explains society as a function of the characteristics of individuals, is simply a recrudescence of the old materialistic metaphysics; an explanation of the "complex by the simple; of the higher by the lower; of the whole by its parts; which is a contradiction in terms."⁴ Nor is the idealistic method, that, namely,

¹ See also *Méth.*, p. 15 and pp. xv, xvi; also *Vie Rel.*, p. 331.

² "Rep. Ind.," p. 295.

³ "Rep. Ind.," pp. 297-8.

⁴ "Rep. Ind.," p. 298.

which explains parts by wholes, preferable to the opposite method. Rather must the whole explain the whole, the complex the complex, society the social fact, etc.

Durkheim's adherence to the mind-stuff theory was discussed in the first chapter. This theory is carried over into his conception of the social mind. He says, for example:

Moreover, while indeed residing in the collective substratum by which it is attached to the rest of the world, the collective life does not, however, reside in it in such a way as to be absorbed thereby. It is at the same time distinct from and dependent upon it, as the function is related to the organ. Doubtless, since it springs from it [*sc.*, the substratum] — for whence would it otherwise come? — the forms that it assumes at the moment that it frees itself [*sc.*, from the substratum] and which are, as a result, fundamental, bear the mark of their origin. This is why the first matter of all social consciousness is narrowly bound to the number of social elements, the manner of their grouping and distribution, etc., *i. e.*, to the nature of their substratum. But once the first store of representations has been thus accumulated, they become, for the reasons we have mentioned, partially autonomous realities living their own lives.¹ They have the power of mutual attraction and repulsion, of forming all sorts of syntheses, which are determined by their natural affinities and not by the state of the milieu in which they evolve. As a result, the new representations, which are the product of these syntheses are of the same nature; they have for proximate causes other collective representations, and not this or that characteristic of the social structure.² ³

¹ Cf. *Vie Rel.*, p. 605.

² "Rep. Ind.," p. 299.

³ Perhaps this series of syntheses may be made more intelligible by a somewhat schematic summary that may be reminiscent of certain tables of measures that have troubled the school-boy. This arrangement is the following:

It must be remembered that Durkheim means by the term "mind" (*âme, esprit*) no metaphysical entity, but merely the stream of mental states considered as a unity.¹ Therefore the fusion, blending, interaction of individual minds in social contact with each other must ultimately be a blending of states of mind of the individuals; and of these states of mind Durkheim emphasizes the representations as most important.²

Let us proceed to the examination of the specific characteristics of the social representations, the general relations of which to the individual mind we have just been considering. The first of these characteristics is the exteriority of the social representation with reference to the individual mind, upon which something has already been said. By the "exteriority" of the special representation to the particular mind is meant the property it possesses of coming to this mind from outside it. The social representations are of two sorts, those produced by the interaction of individual minds;³ and those produced by the autonomous interaction of these products of this first sort with each other.⁴ Logically then, such represen-

WITHIN THE INDIVIDUAL MIND

Many brain-cells produce (by their interaction) a sensation.

Many sensations produce (by their interaction and combination) an image.

Many images produce (by their interaction and combination) a concept.

Many concepts produce (by their interaction and combination) a representation.

WITHIN THE SOCIAL MIND

Many individual representations produce (by their interaction and combination) a social representation.

Many social representations produce (by their interaction and combination) a social representation of a higher, more purely social kind.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 17.

² *Vide infra*, p. 96.

³ "Rep. Ind.," p. 295, "*si l'on*," etc.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 299-300, "*mais une fois*," etc.

tations must be exterior to the individual mind, which is only one of the constituent units of the social mind. No individual consciousness can contain more than a "*parcelle*" of the social mind.¹ Religious ideas come to the individual from without;² *e. g.*, totemism.³ Science⁴ is a great ensemble of ideas coming to the individual scientist from the outside; it is knowledge socialized, "the product of a vast co-operation". Likewise, "social currents", such as those which drive individuals to suicide,⁵ do so because they come from without the particular minds. This characteristic of exteriority is considered by Durkheim as one of the two chief criteria of "social" facts.⁷ The other is constraint; it is closely related to exteriority, and is based on the superiority of the social representation to the individual representation.

Aside from its exteriority to the individual consciousness, the social representation is also different in kind from the individual representation. "The group thinks, acts, feels quite differently than its members would, were they isolated."⁸ "When individuals are associated, their association can give rise to a new life."⁹ "By aggregating, interpenetrating, fusing, the individual minds give birth to a being, psychic if you will, but which constitutes a psychic individuality of a new sort."¹⁰ The collectivity is spoken

¹ *Suic.*, p. 357.

² *Vie Rel.*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 246 *et seq.*, and pp. 256-7.

⁴ *A. S.*, vol. xi, p. 44.

⁵ *Méth.*, pp. 9, 10, 13.

⁶ *Suic.*, pp. 353-4.

⁷ *Vide infra*, p. 60.

⁸ *Méth.*, p. 128.

⁹ *Ibid.*, also "Pédagogie et sociologie," *Rev. Mét.*, vol. xi, p. 46.

¹⁰ *Méth.*, p. 127; see also *Div. Tr.*, p. 46 "the psychic type of society"; *Vie Rel.*, p. 22, "Society is a reality *sui generis*; its representations have a content altogether different from that of individual representations;" also *Suic.*, p. 352.

of in another place¹ as a "fecundating" force. Objectively considered, too, the collective representations differ from those of the individual. This is illustrated by the contrast between the thoughts, emotions and actions of a mob and the characteristic thoughts, emotions and actions of its members when isolated.²

Durkheim is profuse in his description of states of the social mind, "social facts", as he calls them.³ Their heterogeneity with regard to states of the individual mind is, we have just seen, an oft-repeated idea.⁴ But to make the distinction perfectly clear, he should have discussed the specific nature of the state of the individual mind. This he has not done. Only by indirect methods can we gain an idea of this profound difference.

If social representations are of the same general order of entities as that to which individual representations belong, *i. e.*, if both are representations in the same sense of the word; if the social are produced originally out of the fusing, blending, interacting of individual representations, then any difference which may exist between the two types must be referable to their substrata, respectively the individual brain, and the aggregate of interacting individual minds. Durkheim states this by implication in several places. He speaks of the "special mechanism of collective thought";⁵ "Society has different passions, habits, *needs*."⁶

Indeed, what the collective representations translate is the way

¹ "Péd. et soc.," *Rev. Mét.*, vol. xi, p. 49.

² *Méth.*, p. 10.

³ *Vide infra*, p. 58.

⁴ *E. g.*, *Méth.*, p. 130, "*quel abîme*," etc.

⁵ *A. S.*, vol. xi, p. 45.

⁶ *A. S.*, vol. ii, p. 25, "De la Définition des phénomènes religieux," see also "Rep. Ind.," p. 299, "*c'est pourquoi*," etc. (Italics in the text are mine: C. E. G.)

in which the group conceives itself [*se pense*] in its relations with the objects that affect it. Now the group has a different constitution than that of the individual, and the things that affect it are of a different nature. Representations expressing neither the same objects nor the same subjects can not depend on the same causes. To understand the way in which the society represents itself and the world surrounding it, one must consider the nature of the society and not that of the individuals.¹

In other words, since the true inwardness of an entity is in its relations, the social mind is other than the individual mind because it has other relations. Its mental life is then of necessity different from that of the particular consciousness.

Not only do social representations differ from individual representations, but they show marked variations among themselves. Here again Durkheim points out the nature of the substratum as the determining factor. Each aggregate of men is composed of a greater or smaller number of individuals; it is spread in its own peculiar way over the surface of the earth; it has certain kinds and degrees of communication.² All of these are significant features of the substratum. The states of the social mind vary according to these conditions of the substratum.

"There are," says Durkheim, in criticizing Tarde's "*interpsychologie*", "crowds of all sorts, publics of all sorts; each has its own manner of reacting [*réagir*]"'.³ "It remains the truth that moral, juridical, economic institutions are infinitely variable."⁴ The idea of a universal society, or of a universal civilization is foreign to Durkheim's

¹ *Méth.*, pp. xvi-xvii.

² "Rep. Ind.," pp. 293-4 and *Div. Tr.*, p. 342.

³ *A. S.*, vol. ix, p. 134.

⁴ *Méth.*, pp. 95-96.

method.¹ He is consistent, then, when he studies societies and civilizations by grouping them into types,² and discusses them within narrower limits of classification, even to the extent of making them mere tribal classes.³ Each society has its own set of ideas; *e. g.*, the moral cosmopolitanism of to-day could not have arisen in the Roman city-state.⁴ Each social group displays its own characteristic form or degree of such general tendencies as, for instance, that of suicide. The simplicity of primitive religious phenomena is correlated with the simplicity of the primitive social groups in which they arise.⁵ We shall see, in Chapter VI, the importance of this conception for Durkheim's sociological method.

We turn next to the question of the superiority of the social mind, *i. e.*, of its representations, to the individual mind and its states. First of all, society is superior ("infiniment", Durkheim says) to the individual in time and space.⁶ Keeping in mind his frequent use of the term "society" as synonymous with the "social mind" we may accept this paraphrase of the statement; that the system of representations called social surpasses in time as it does in space the representational systems which are called individual. This superiority is concretely symbolized in education, which is the conscious impressing upon the individual mind of the content of the group mind, its ideas, habits, judgments, emotions, most of them productions of the past.⁷

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 139.

² *Méth.*, ch. iv.

³ *A. S.*, vol. xi, p. ii, "*au contraire*," etc.; *ibid.*, vol. xii, p. 46.

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, Pref. to the first edition, p. xxxviii.

⁵ *Vie Rel.*, p. 7.

⁶ *Méth.*, pp. 126, 128-9; also *Vie Rel.*, pp. 22-23, 633 *et seq.*; also "La Détermination du fait moral," *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, vol. vi, pp. 131-2.

⁷ *Méth.*, p. II.

The individual is furthermore inferior to the society, because it is manifold, and he is single. This sounds like an empty truism; but expressed in the modified form that the influence of the group over the individual is proportional to the size of the group, it is not so empty of real significance. It is illustrated by the fact that the impotence of the individual in a crowd increases with the numbers of the crowd. ". . . In the heart of a less numerous family the sentiments, the common memories, cannot be very intense."¹ The reason for this is that "the intensity which collective sentiments attain depends on the number of minds (*conscienc*es) experiencing them in common".² Expressed in the terms of modern psychology, the individual's impression is proportional, *ceteris paribus*, to the number of repetitions of the suggestion or to the number of sources of such a repeated suggestion.³

Out of Durkheim's conception of the way in which collective representations originate, there develops also the idea of their superiority due to their hierarchical position. They are, as it were, at the top of the psychic scale. They are the final product of the representation-making process. First come the representations of the individual mind, themselves a product of compounding of lesser elements; then the combinations of the former into social representations; and finally the highest type of all, the combinations of these purely social mind-elements into states of mind far removed from the cerebral cell and its functioning. An illustration of this last type and its formation is the mythology which once formed, keeps on growing, apparently by its own inherent power of combining and

¹ *Suic.*, pp. 213-4.

² *Ibid.*, also *Vie Rel.*, p. 297.

³ For a statement of this explanation in somewhat the same way see *Div. Tr.*, pp. 66-67.

recombining its elements, independently of the situation of the social group within which it has arisen.¹ It exists in the high altitude of a pure mentality, a "hyper-spirituality", as Durkheim calls it.² There are a number of specific statements of this idea. "The collective consciousness is the highest form of the psychic life, since it is a consciousness of consciousnesses."³ "Beyond the individual [*sc.* in the psychic order] there is the society."⁴ "It [*sc.* the society] is infinitely superior to each individual force, because it is a synthesis of individual forces."⁵ "The highest reality of the intellectual and moral order—society."⁶

Durkheim is fond of repeating the idea that society is an entity morally superior to the individual—"morally", in the sense of having a "power which dominates him, and before which he bows".⁷ The submission of the individual to certain rules of conduct is a submission to a "moral" authority.⁸ This is an essential part of the relation of the individual to the collective mind. Again he says: "The individual is dominated by a moral reality that surpasses him; it is the collective reality."⁹ This is illustrated by the phenomenon of suicide; the individual suicide succumbs to a social tendency to self-murder. The majesty of society, its moral impressiveness, is clearly evidenced in those phenomena called religious. Not only are religious phenomena

¹ "Rep. Ind.," pp. 299-300.

² "Rep. Ind.," p. 302.

³ *Vie Rel.*, p. 23.

⁴ *Vie Rel.*, pp. 637-8.

⁵ *A. S.*, vol. ii, "De la Déf. des Phén. Rel.," p. 23; also *Méth.*, p. 15, "et s'il retentit," etc.

⁶ *Vie Rel.*, p. 23.

⁷ *Méth.*, p. 150.

⁸ *A. S.*, vol. ii, "De la Déf. des Phén. Rel.," p. 23.

⁹ *Suic.*, p. x.

of strictly social origin (*i. e.*, arising not out of the particular mind, but out of the interaction of many minds¹), but they are also expressions of the individual's relations to a reality. Otherwise they would be simply "a vast hallucination and phantasmagory of which humanity has been the dupe."² This "reality" is the social reality.³ The contrast between "sacred" and "profane", which our author considers as characteristic of all religions, is at base a contrast between the ideas, feelings, and actions having respectively a social and an individual origin and significance.⁴ The "sacred" has its prestige because of the fact that the reality in which it is inherent is a reality of a kind superior to that of the individual. It is a consistent part of Durkheim's conception of religion that a deity expresses in a personal form the power of the society, a power clearly felt, though not so consciously defined. God is society "apotheosized"; society is the real God.⁵ This identity is adumbrated in the totem animal, a "sacred" object; and more clearly shown in the personal deity, Jahveh, or Zeus. The tribal god is, like the totem animal, often confusedly conceived of as a member of the group; another evidence of the close relationship between group and deity.

The importance of these two characteristics of the collective representations, namely, their exteriority and their superiority with reference to the individual mind and its states, will be more evident when, in the next chapter, we consider the two "criteria" of "social facts": their exteriority and their constraining power.

Another important phase of Durkheim's conception of

¹ *A. S.*, vol. ii, "De la Déf. des Phén. Rel.," p. 24.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Vie Rel.*, p. 23; also *Suic.*, p. 352. See also *infra*, p. 91.

⁴ *Vie Rel.*, pp. 49-67.

⁵ *Vie Rel.*, p. 295; *Suic.*, p. 352; "Rep. Ind.," p. 294.

the nature of the social mind and of its representations requires a somewhat detailed examination at this point: it is the idea that the social representation is internal to the individual mind.

Before beginning this discussion, however, a preliminary problem must be solved, namely, what proportion of the individuals of a social group are affected by the social representations. On this point Durkheim is not altogether clear. In one place he says that the collective consciousness is "diffused throughout the whole extent of the society."¹ Speaking of the social sentiments, the doing violence to which constitutes a criminal act, he remarks "they are found in all the consciousnesses",² and describes them as: "the ideas and tendencies common to all the members of society".³ Again: "It [*sc.* a collective sentiment] resounds in each of them [*sc.* individual consciousnesses]".⁴ "There are in the consciousnesses of each of us two consciousnesses," one of which "we have in common with our whole group."⁵

So far it seems to be the whole group that is involved in the functioning of the social consciousness. But Durkheim makes several statements that seem to contradict that idea. He says: "It, the social representation, is exterior to each average [*moyen*] individual taken separately."⁶ "Then, of all the particular minds that compose the great mass of the nation, there is none to which the collective current is not exterior."⁷ "The average man is not without something of this same sentiment."⁸ "The ensemble of beliefs and sentiments common to the average [*la moyenne*] of the members of the same society forms a system clearly

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 46.

² *Ibid.*, p. 70.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 15.

⁵ *Div. Tr.*, p. 99.

⁶ *Suic.*, p. 356.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

⁸ *Ibid.*

defined and having a life of its own; it might be called the common or collective consciousness." ¹ "Observe at that same moment the average of the individuals. You will find indeed in a great number of them something of that moral state [*sc.* a patriotic disinterestedness at times of national crisis], but infinitely attenuated." ²

These last five quotations seem to indicate that not all, but the average, the great mass, the majority, of the members of the social group share the social representations. However inconsistent this may be with what precedes, the inconsistency is still not a matter of any fundamental importance. The difference between the two groups of statements may indicate merely a difference of emphasis; in the first the stress falls on the generality of the social states of mind; in the second a more accurate view of the situation is expressed.

Having disposed of this preliminary question, let us now examine what we may for the sake of convenience call the "internality" of the social representation. An appropriate statement of our author may be quoted here: "the aggregate in its totality . . . thinks, feels, wills, though it could not will, feel, or act save by the intermediation of particular minds." ³ This is by no means the only expression by Durkheim of the idea that the social representation is in the individual consciousness. "There is nothing," he says in *La Division du travail social*, "in the social life that is not in the individual minds." ⁴ And in *Les Règles*, he writes: "It is a state of the group [*sc.* mind] repeated in the individuals." ⁵

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 46.

² *Suic.*, p. 357.

³ "Rep. Ind.," p. 295.

⁴ P. 342.

⁵ P. 14. In this connection see also: *Suic.*, pp. 352-3 and 357 (the sentence in italics).

These social representations, then, are very much of the nature of materials which not only can but must exist in the particular containers, the individual minds.

Let us now consider the relation of the individual and collective mental elements to each other in the mind of the individual. Durkheim strives to keep this dualism of the two kinds of representations intact throughout his theory.

There are [he says] in each of us two consciousnesses; the one, which we have in common with our whole group, which, as a result, is not ourselves but society alive and active within us; the other, which represents, on the contrary, only ourselves in what we have of personality and distinctness, in what makes us individuals.¹

What is the nature of these individual representations that share the occupancy of the individual's mind with the social representations? It was noted above² that there are marked differences between the two types of representations, and the nature and origin of the social representations were explained. A quotation will serve to open the subject:

There is a sphere of psychic life which, however developed the collective type may be, varies from man to man, and belongs to each one in particular; it is that formed by the representations, the sentiments, and the tendencies relating to the organism and its states; it is the world of internal and external sensations and of the movements thereto directly bound. This

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 99; also *Rev. Mét.*, vol. xi, "Pédagogie et sociologie," p. 46; also *Vie Rel.*, p. 386, *et passim*; the extreme statement of this view is given *in extenso* in the *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, March, 1913, in the article "Le Problème religieux et la Dualité de la Nature humaine."

² *Vide supra*, p. 33.

primary basis of all individuality is inalienable and does not depend upon the social state.¹

Another statement is as follows:

In each of us, we may say, there exist two beings [*êtres*], which, while being inseparable save by abstraction, are none the less distinct. One is composed of all the mental states which are related only to ourselves and to the events of our personal life. It is this that one could call the individual being.²

Again he says: "Aside from the vague and uncertain tendencies which can be due to heredity, the infant, entering life, brings only his individual nature."³ This idea is repeated a few pages later: "but between these vague and confused predispositions, mingled moreover with all sorts of contrary predispositions, and the definite and particular form they take under the action of society, there is an abyss."⁴ There is in none of these excerpts a clear and explicit statement of the nature of the individual mind. Representations are mentioned; but the mental elements stressed seem to be sensations, "motions" (impulses?), and predispositions. This would seem to make the content of the individual mind of slight importance. In fact, even in one of the earliest statements of this view, Durkheim makes the "psychic" facts (*i. e.*, the states of the individual mind) "in large part only the prolonging of the former (*i. e.*, the social facts) in the interior of the consciousness".⁵ On the same page he adds: "The majority of our states of consciousness would not be produced in isolated

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 175.

² *Rev. Mét.*, vol. xi, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁵ *Div. Tr.*, p. 342, footnotes 1 and 3.

beings, and would be produced quite otherwise in beings grouped in another way.”¹

Undoubtedly, the psychic processes of the individual as such are facts of no very great importance to Durkheim.² The individual's mental life seems to come, after all, principally from the social environment in which he exists.³ In the essay “*Pédagogie et sociologie*”, Durkheim points out that even so intimate and personal a thing as the attitude of the individual toward his own body has been the subject of social regulation; from time to time we have had ideals of ascetism, athleticism, aestheticism, and hygiene, each exerting in its turn an enormous influence over the conduct of the individual in this attitude. In a recent article, “*Le Problème religieux et la Dualité de la Nature humaine*”,⁴ as well as in his most recent book,⁵ Durkheim has continued this minimizing of the individual elements in the psychic life of the individual. A quotation will illustrate: “Even more generally, I have shown that the mind [*âme*] is the collective consciousness incarnated in the individual, and that, for that reason, it is opposed to the body, the basis of our individuality. The duality of man is then reduced to the antithesis of society and the individual.”⁶

The individual mind is not, however, a wholly passive receptacle for the impressions coming to it from the social environment. The “social” states of mind “would not be possible, if the individual constitutions did not lend them-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 342. Another though not so explicit a statement is found *ibid.*, pp. 99-101.

² *Méth.*, p. 130.

³ *Vie Rel.*, pp. 388-390.

⁴ *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, March, 1913.

⁵ *Vie Rel.*

⁶ *Bull. soc. fran. phil.*, March, 1913, p. 74.

selves to them.”¹ Not only is the individual’s psychic nature needed for the social representation, but it also affects the nature of the latter. “Each of them constitutes a special *milieu* where collective representations tend to be refracted and differently colored.”² These refractions are, according to a statement of our author, really dual in their nature, belonging to two different fields; they are at the same time psychic (*i. e.*, of individual origin) and social. They might be called “socio-psychic”.³ They are like the phenomena of a border or “mixed” science such as biological chemistry.⁴

The very wide scope of the representations having a social origin will be more evident after the discussion of the definition of “social facts” in Chapter III. Compared with those of individual origin, they are apparently, for Durkheim, the sole content of the individual’s mind, so far as that content is more than a mere set of physiological processes. The social mind consists, as we recall, of the system of representations, tendencies, sentiments, produced by the interaction of the individual minds and by the continuation of the process of combining the mental elements that are known as “social”. But if the scope of the individual mind be confined to the narrow limits given by our author, where are the individual representations out of which, by the process of fusion and blending, the social representations are to be compounded? Is it fair to call such an elementary complexus of psychic processes a “mind”, in the sense of a system of representations?

Not only does society (or better, perhaps, the “social

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 342; see also *Méth.*, 130.

² *Vie Rel.*, p. 387, top; cf. also *Méth.*, pp. 12, xxiii, footnote.

³ *Méth.*, p. 14.

⁴ On the use of this term “socio-psychic” see also *Div. Tr.*, p. 341, “*par consequent*,” etc. See also *infra*, p. 154, footnote 3.

mind") seem, in Durkheim's theory, to furnish the material for the mould, as we may call the individual mind, but it also shapes the mould. To put it in concrete psychological terms, the categories of the individual mind, such as those of time, space, and causation, are not inherent in it; *i. e.*, they have no hereditary physiological origin; they are, like religious ideas, customs, laws, and morals, given to the individual by his society. This is an idea that is prominent in our author's more recent works. He has advanced the thesis that the forms of social organization have provided the classificatory forms existing in the mind, namely, the "categories"; and that, furthermore, the hierarchical nature of logical classes is due to the hierarchical nature of the social groupings from which they are derived.¹ One is far from being on safe ground (*fondé*, Durkheim says) when admitting, as evidence, a statement that men classify quite naturally, by a sort of internal necessity of their individual understanding; one ought, on the contrary, to ask what it is that could have led them to arrange (*disposer*) their ideas in this form, and where they could have found the plan of this remarkable arrangement.² Only a vague consciousness of the resemblance between objects is the original psychic basis of the power of classifying. The very fact of the hierarchical order in classifying evidently corresponds to nothing in the world of sensible experience, nor in the sensory processes of the consciousness. It is to the hierarchical order of society that we must go for this conception; "does not the word for 'kind' [*genre*] designate originally a family group- 'γενος'?"³

¹ "De quelques formes primitives de classification," *A. S.*, vol. vi. This article (done in collaboration with M. Marcel Mauss, a frequent contributor to the *Année Sociologique*) is the first formal statement of Durkheim's position on this problem.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

To illustrate this general principle, Durkheim cites the fact that among the Australian natives, things are classed in different phratries; *e. g.*, the sun may belong to one of two phratries, the moon to the other.¹ We have here a simple bipartite classification, an elementary dichotomy. Each phratry may again be subdivided into two matrimonial classes, which in their turn will serve as class categories for things.² The social importance of these social classes is carried over to the non-social things in the corresponding logical classes.³ We have here, then, a clear case of hierarchical sort. A similar system exists among the Zuni.⁴ All things of the universe are divided into seven regional classes, those of the East, West, North, South, zenith, nadir, and the middle (*milieu*). Exactly the same classification is followed out in the divisions of the tribe within the pueblo; each of these seven tribal divisions is further sub-divided into three clans (except that of the "*milieu*", which has but one); each division has its own area, which is determined with reference to this scheme of classes. The evidence cited by Durkheim seems to show that the social classification was antecedent to the regional; and that the latter is therefore an application of the former. This same spacial classification of non-social as well as of social entities is repeated among the Siouan Omahas, the Osages, the Ponkas.⁵ It is found among the Wotjoballuk,⁶ studied by Howitt in Australia, and also in other primitive societies the world over, though often in somewhat variant forms. The Chinese system of divination, which is at the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 45, 48, 50.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

basis of Taoism, also has as a foundation a regional classification of the things of the physical universe.¹

Thus the tribe is the logical ancestor of the genus; and the phratry of the species. Out of the association of certain things with members of certain social groups (tribes, phratries, clans, etc.) came the classification of these things with these human beings; out of the hierarchy of tribe, phratry, and clan came the hierarchy of genus, species, class; out of the unity of society was imagined the universe of things, the supreme logical whole.² The reasons for the association of things with this or that social grouping is to be sought in the manifestly affective nature of the states of the social mind from which these associations have evolved. There is a basis for it in the emotional values inherent in all psychological associative processes which involve elements of the social life.³ This explains why primitive classifications seem illogical to us; logic has to do with clearly defined concepts—this primitive classification has its lines of demarcation of classes blurred by the emotional nature of the representations expressed in it.⁴ The advance of our modern science is accomplished partly, at least, by the ever-increasing subjection of categories and conceptions having such emotional values to free and rigorous examination.⁵

This general argument with some unimportant modifications is stated at considerable length in the latest and longest of Durkheim's works, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. This book has a dual purpose: to determine, by the analysis of the simplest religion known, what are the elementary forms of the religious life; and to show how the logical categories have a religious, and therefore a

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-3 and 55-62.

Ibid., pp. 66-68.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

social, origin. The religious origin of social phenomena does not appear in this latest work as a new conception of our author.¹ The question arises, also, whether this is the most accurate way of expressing the place of the religious in the history of social development. It is a commonplace in the study of primitive life that religion in primitive societies is not highly specialized as a social activity. It is *solidaire* with morality, with the social organization. Is it really better to assign it to a prior stage in the evolution of human collective life, to say that all activity and thought of primitive man develop out of religion, or to say that all these phases of primitive life are colored by an emotional tone which in that way, and to varying degrees, makes them "religious"?

The particular categories which Durkheim in *la Vie Religieuse* names as of social origin are those of time and space, kind, force, efficacy (causation), and, possibly, contradiction.

Time, Durkheim holds, is not conceivable except by a process of distinguishing its different moments. The private memory of each individual is a part, but not the whole, of the continuity of time. The time-category is an "outline (*cadre*), abstract and impersonal, enveloping not only one individual existence but that of humanity. . . . It is not my time that is so organized, but time as it is objectively thought of by persons of the same civilization."² The indispensable points of reference in time are borrowed from social life. The periodicity of rites and fêtes is reflected in the units of time,—weeks, months, etc.

A similar view holds good for space. Space is not

¹ See *A. S.*, vol. ii, p. iv. Moreover this same idea seems to be contained in Wundt's *Ethik* according to Durkheim's review of that work in *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, pp. 118-119.

² *Vie Rel.*, p. 14.

homogeneous, but differentiated. The marks of differentiation are of social origin, as we have seen in the essay on classification.¹ The category of kind or class was also treated there. The *Vie Religieuse* summarizes the points made in the essay,² emphasizing the fact that the "affinity" that determines the attraction of things into social categories has an emotional element that is religious in its collective manifestations; *i. e.*, that the associations of non-social things with social groups arises through a process of giving the former a "religious" significance.³

The category of force is the logical formulation of the "mana", "orenda", "wakan" of primitive man's practical cosmology.⁴ "Mana" is, to Durkheim, simply an objectified collective force projected into things.⁵ His conception of causality implies a really productive force. This causal relation is clearly found in the primitive man's conception of the efficacy of his magic.⁶ And magic is simply the utilization of this "mana" force which the savage has imagined as existing in the physical universe.⁷ Attempts to derive from this conception of causality a category originating in the observation of an empirical universe have fallen down, since the external world can show only co-existence and sequences, but not causes.⁸ Nor can the will-power of the individual be its source; for that would mean personifying force, and the primitive conception of force is not as personal, but as impersonal; in addition, this impersonal force is communicable; a property which personality does not possess. The only forces that we can really know must be forces which act upon us

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

² *Ibid.*, p. 211 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 519.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 205 *et seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 290-2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 518.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 519-520.

within our consciousness; and the truly primitive conception of force demands impersonality; both these requirements are satisfied by forces that are "collective", in the sense of coming to the individual's mind from without, and originating (as was discussed above) not in one, but in the many minds.

But the category of causality is more than the mere affirmation of the existence of a force.¹ It implies a necessary bond between what we call the cause phase of force and the effect phase of force. This necessary connection is supplied *a priori* to the specific phenomena under consideration; but it is in reality, in its general form, derived from the authoritative dictum of the society, that phenomenon B always follows phenomenon A; as, for instance, that the mimetic rites of the Australians' "intichiuma"² are invariably followed by the increase of the totem animal or plant; which is the accepted and approved conviction of each member of the totemic group.³

And, finally, the all-inclusive category of totality, as was stated also in the earlier essay (that on primitive classification), is the logical formulation of the best known (to the savage) of all totalities, the whole social group.⁴

Both the traditional empiricist and apriorist conceptions of the origin of the categories are thus discarded by Durkheim.⁵ His "social" origin of these mental forms is offered as a substitute for these explanations. The impression of "necessity" which they seem to give when ex-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 524.

² See Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, ch. vi.

³ *Vie Rel.*, p. 525.

⁴ *Vie Rel.*, p. 629. We might, with fairness, ask for a "social" origin for that other well-known category, namely that of number.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

amined objectively is really due to the fact that they are social representations,¹ with all the prestige that such an origin gives (as was indicated above); they are therefore, for the individual mind, *a priori*: and their origin outside the individual mind satisfies the empiricist's requirement of objectivity.²

The question now arises, as to whether Durkheim is talking about the "categories" of space, time, causation, etc., or about the concrete images which must represent them in the mind. Is the "category" of space a power of the mind, one of its inherent capacities, or a part of the content of the mind? James, for example, seems to consider the categories as such powers of the mind, features of its inherited structure, rather than as the actual forms into which impressions coming to the mind from without are fitted.³

Durkheim himself has admitted the essence of this principle held by James.

Doubtless, the relations which they [the categories] express, exist in an implicit way, in the individual consciousness. The individual lives in time, and has, as we have said, a certain sense of temporal orientation. He is situated at a definite point in space, and it has been maintained, with good reason, that all sensations have something spacial about them. . . . However, all these relations are personal to the individual concerned in them, and, consequently, the notion which he can acquire of them cannot extend beyond his narrow horizon.⁴

This quotation seems to strengthen our contention that

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³ James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, ch. xxviii, pp. 617-619, 629 *et seq.*; also Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 102-158, on spacial and temporal ideas.

⁴ *Vie Rel.*, pp. 628-9.

Durkheim uses the term "category" in its formal, not in its functional sense. The capabilities of the use of categories exist within the individual mind, inherent in it; the specific categories are the result of experience—either, we may say, the experience of the individual mind in the physical universe, or that of the individual mind receiving ready-made, or at least partly worked out, the concepts which the society has used in the classification of the world of things and relations. This view of the categories as a content of mind rather than as a capacity of mind, is, we need hardly remind the reader, quite consistent with Durkheim's conception of the mind as a system of representations, rather than as a functioning whole.

We may, at this point, introduce the conception that our author has of education and its social function.

"All education," he says, "consists in a continuous effort to impose on the child ways of seeing, feeling, and acting to which it would not spontaneously come."¹ And again: ". . . the child, entering life, brings with it only its own individual nature. Society faces then, so to speak, in each new generation a *tabula paene rasa* upon which it must construct from the beginning. . . . It (*sc.* the education) creates in man a new man."² It is, then, the function of education, using that term in its largest significance, to construct on the foundation of an individual mind itself lacking almost completely in content, that vast superstructure of ideas, feelings, habits, that the society has developed out of its situation in the physical universe.

In brief form we may thus summarize our author's conception of the relation of the social mind (*i. e.*, the complexus of mental states arising in the first instance from the

¹ *Méth.*, p. 11.

² "Pédagogie et sociologie," *Rev. Mét.*, vol. xi, pp. 46-47.

interaction of individual minds) to the individual mind (*i. e.*, the complexus of mental states arising within the cerebral system of the individual): the individual mind furnishes the sensation elements, the impulses to activity, the emotional tendencies, and some representations (though these latter are neither many nor important); the social mind furnishes the great mass of the representations, of the ways of feeling and the ways of acting. These social representations must exist within the individual mind, but their origin is outside of the individual mind, to which they come with force, impressive because of the varied superiority of the source whence they spring, over the source of the individual representations. In its most extreme form this view makes of the mind or soul (*âme*) of the individual merely the incarnation of the social mind in the individual.¹

Aside from its psychological orientation, this theory of Durkheim's as to the relation of the individual and the social minds is somewhat like the view of the relation between the social environment and the individual mind that is held by a group of American anthropologists and psychologists, numbering, among others, F. Boas, W. I. Thomas, John Dewey, and A. A. Goldenweiser. This view has been expressed by these men usually in connection with the discussion of the differences between the mind of primitive man, and the mind of civilized man.²

¹ Quoted *supra*, p. 44.

² F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, ch. iv; also *Journal of American Folklore*, vol. xiv, pp. 1-11, title of article same as of book just named.

W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, pp. 251-303.

John Dewey, "Interpretation of Savage Mind," *Psychological Review*, vol. ix, pp. 217-230.

It is worth while to note also the agreement of Wundt with this view; see *Völkerpsychologie*, vol. i, p. 18, "So betrachtet, erscheint das geistige Leben des primitiven Menschen von dem des Kulturmen-

Briefly expressed, their view is as follows: there is a uniform structure of the human mind that is shared by all the races of men. This structure is considered as the "characteristic faculties of the human mind, perception, memory, inhibition, abstraction," in Thomas' words:¹ or, according to Boas, as the "organization",

the group of laws which determine the mode of thought and of action irrespective of the subject-matter of mental activity. Subject to such laws are the manner of discrimination between perceptions, the manner in which perceptions associate themselves with previous perceptions, the manner in which a stimulus leads to action, and the emotions produced by stimuli.²

This conception of the structure of the mind is in most respects like that of Durkheim concerning the nature of the individual mind. Though none of these writers may share our author's psychological presuppositions of the mind-stuff theory, there is still a marked resemblance here. The most explicit statement by any one of this group of the importance of the environment, social and material, in furnishing the actual subject-matter of the mind, is in one of Dewey's articles. He discusses in this article the "pattern" of mind which the occupation of primitive man tends to produce.

schen, abgesehen von dem Einschlag, den dort von aussen zugeführte Kulturgüter, hier Rudimente früherer Stufen bilden, nicht weniger verschieden wie der Bumerang des Australiers oder der primitive Pfeil des Buschmanns von der Schnellfeuerwaffe der heutigen Gewehrtechnik. Doch jene geistigen Unterschiede sind nicht sowohl formaler als realer Art. Sie beziehen sich nicht auf die Formen der Vorstellungen, Gefühle, Triebe, und Willenshandlungen, sondern auf den Inhalt des geistigen Lebens, von dem aus nur schwache, eben durch die übereinstimmenden Grundeigenschaften der Seele gesponnene Fäden die höheren Stufen der Kultur mit ihren Anfängen verbinden."

¹ Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

² Boas, *Jour. American Folkl.*, *art. cit.*, p. 2.

Occupations determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control the formation and use of habits. These habits, in turn, are something more than practical and overt. "Apperceptive masses" and associational tracts of necessity conform to the dominant activities. The occupations determine the chief modes of satisfaction, the standards of success and failure. Hence they furnish the working classifications and definitions of value; they control the desire processes. Moreover, they decide the sets of objects and relations that are important, and thereby provide the content or material of attention, and the qualities that are interestingly significant. The directions given to mental life thereby extend to emotional and intellectual characteristics. So fundamental and pervasive is the group of occupational activities that it affords the scheme or pattern of the structural organization of mental traits. Occupations integrate special elements into a functioning whole.¹

He adds, on the same page, "we may well speak, and without metaphor, of the hunting psychosis or mental type". We have in this quotation from Dewey clearly a difference in psychological approach from that of Durkheim. But we have also a clear recognition of the importance of the environment, social and material. For the technique of hunting is in every savage group a socially preserved and a socially transmitted body of procedure, as well as a means of adaptation to the physical environment.

In his review of M. L. Levy-Bruhl's *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*,² Goldenweiser has expressed his approval of Levy-Bruhl's insistence on the importance of the social *milieu* as furnishing the materials (the "collective representations") of the individual mind. Levy-Bruhl has in this work, as in his earlier work, *La*

¹ Dewey, *Psychological Review*, art. cit., vol. ix, pp. 219-220.

² Goldenweiser, *American Anthropologist*, (New Series), vol. xiii, pp. 121-130.

Morale et la science des mœurs, accepted the general point of view of Durkheim as to the nature and origin of social phenomena.¹ Goldenweiser notes also the resemblance, in this matter of general position, of Levy-Bruhl to that of Hubert and Mauss, in their "Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie",² and to that of Durkheim and Mauss in the article on primitive classification which we have cited earlier in this chapter.³

It is not intended by this comparison between Durkheim and this American group to have it appear that they are identical in their views. But it is worth while to point out the fact that our author represents another phase of the tendency to consider the rôle of the environment, whether it be the strictly social or the physical milieu, as one of fundamental if not of supreme importance in the explanation of social phenomena.

¹ See Durkheim's slightly qualified approval of the position of L.-B. in the work on primitive mentality in *A. S.*, vol. xii, p. 35.

² *A. S.*, vol. vii, pp. 1-146.

³ *A. S.*, vol. vi, pp. 1-72. It may also be noted here that the above-mentioned book of Levy-Bruhl is published in the series known as the *Travaux de l'Année Sociologique*, published under the direction of Durkheim. Levy-Bruhl is one of the group of French sociologists who have been associated with Durkheim in his adherence to the theories that are being examined in this study. For a statement of the former's allegiance to our author, see *La Morale, etc.*, p. 14, footnote.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL FACTS AND SOCIAL CAUSATION

WE have previously considered the psychology which is not only the foundation, but in many respects also the superstructure, of Durkheim's sociological theory. We shall now examine a phase of that theory which is, to a certain extent, methodological in its nature, but which is nevertheless so intimately connected with his psychology that the two may not be separated in the discussion. This phase is his conception of the nature of social phenomena—of "*faits sociaux*", as he calls them.

- J They are defined in these words: they consist in ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, exterior to the individual and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they impose themselves upon him. Consequently they could not be confused with biological [*organiques*] phenomena, since they consist of representations and of actions; nor with the psychic phenomena, which have existence only in the individual consciousness and through it. They constitute thus a new variety [*sc.*, of phenomena], and it is to them that ought to be given and reserved the epithet "social".¹

This definition shows, in the light of what has already been said, that "social facts" and "social representations" are in fact simply two terms for the same phenomena; with the emphasis in the case of the first on the quasi-material, and in the case of the second on the purely psychic (though

¹ *Méth.*, p. 8.

still objective) features of this type of phenomena. The statements in Durkheim's works in which the two terms seem to be used interchangeably are too numerous to be cited in full. In the lines immediately following the statement last quoted, Durkheim says that these "social facts", having not the individuals but the society (*i. e.*, the social group) for a substratum, are correctly so named. This, it will be remembered, is exactly what is said concerning the social representations.¹

This is a decided limitation of the scope of social phenomena, as usually defined. It does not admit, as do so many definitions, that everything in society is "social". Durkheim thinks that to define "social" in the latter way takes away from "society" all the individuality that it may possess as a separate field of scientific investigation.²

The special characteristics of social phenomena, exteriority to the individual, and power of constraint over him, are for our author merely criteria, not explanations. He has been accused of attempting to solve the problems arising out of the interactions of men in social groups by means of the principle of social control. That is not his aim. His theory of social causation is, as we shall see later in this chapter, something quite different from that. Repeatedly he wards off the attempts that have been made to saddle on him a theory so "*simpliste*" in its nature. It is repugnant to his entire methodological attitude.³ He aims to delimit the field of research, not to include in it too many kinds of phenomena, nor to explain them by a single, all-inclusive principle.

The basis of his choice of these characteristics or criteria

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 34, 35, see also "Rep. Ind.," p. 294, middle of page.

² *Méth.*, p. 5.

³ *Méth.*, p. xx. See also ch. vi.

of "socialness" is a purely practical one. They ought to be, he says, "immediately discernible" and evident preliminary to the research.¹ But while he admits mere utility to be the reason for their use, he has apparently not discovered any new criteria since selecting these. Consistently throughout all of his writings "exteriority" and "constraint" are emphasized as the criteria par excellence of social phenomena. Many of the facts that he studies are, of course, those studied by other writers who do not accept this delimitation which he demands; but he studies them because they answer to his description of the social fact.

The psychological reasons for the exteriority of social representations to the individual mind were discussed in the preceding chapter.² A phase of his conception of social facts that is intimately related to his psychology may next concern us. It is this: the social fact must be considered as strictly "social"; *i. e.*, not as the appearance in the individual of the "refracted" social representation, but as the social fact itself, viewed from the collective side, not in its individual manifestation. Two or three quotations will make this point clearer.

What constitutes them [*sc.*, social facts] are the beliefs, tendencies, practices of the group taken collectively. As for the forms which the collective states take, in being refracted in the individuals, these are things of another sort. . . . Indeed, certain of these [*sc.*, social] ways of acting and thinking acquire, by reason of their repetition, a sort of consistency, which, so to speak, precipitates them and isolates them from the particular events which reflect them. They thus take a body, a sensible form which is their own, and constitute a

¹ *Méth.*, p. xxi.

² *Vide supra*, pp. 32, 33.

reality *sui generis*, quite distinct from the individual facts which manifest this reality. The collective habit exists not only in a state of immanence in the successive acts which it determines, but by a privilege of which we find no example in the biological realm, expresses itself once for all by a formula which is repeated from mouth to mouth, which is transmitted by education, which is fixed even by writing. Such is the origin and the nature of juridic and moral rules, aphorisms and popular proverbs, articles of faith wherein the religious or political sects condense their beliefs, codes of taste [*gôut*] which the literary schools prepare, etc. None of these can be found quite entire in the applications that are made of them by the individuals, since they can exist even without being actually applied.¹ . . . One can define it [*sc.*, a social fact] by the diffusion it presents in the interior of the group, provided that one take care to add, as a second and essential characteristic, that it exists independent of the individual forms it takes in so diffusing.²

Where this critical mark of dissociation of the social fact from its individual manifestations is not evident, it can often be revealed by artifices of method. Statistical rates do this very well for certain kinds of phenomena. Treating, as they do, the mass phenomena and not the individual, they show by their regularity the existence of, *e. g.*, social tendencies to marriage, to divorce, to suicide, that are wholly independent of the individual cases that go to make up the mass result.³

Not only do we have social facts that have acquired a degree of "consistency", such as codes, morals, etc., but there are such social facts as currents of enthusiasm, indignation, pity, that pass through even the least organized of

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 12-13.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

³ *Suic.*, p. 360 also p. 349.

societies, the crowd. These, too, originate, not in any individual mind, but in the minds of all and come to the individual from without.¹

The other criterion of the "social fact", constraint, has its psychological basis in the superiority of the social representation over the individual representation. It will not be necessary here to repeat any part of the discussion of constraint which occupied us in the preceding chapter.² An interesting point presents itself in connection with this second criterion. The mere generality which has so frequently passed for the criterion of a social fact is, of course, for our author, no criterion at all. More than that, wherever it is found, it is only the expression of the obligatory—i. e., collective—character of a phenomenon. A custom is general because it is imposed; not imposed because it is general.³ "It is in every part because it is in the whole; not in the whole because it is in every part."⁴ Occasionally the seeming absence of the criterion of constraint may be shown to be only apparent and not real, by reason of the generality of the phenomenon, which may indicate its strictly "social" character.

The invariable presence of the element of obligatoriness in social facts is best illustrated by morals, "*mores*" (*moeurs*), customs, conventions, codes of taste and style, religious dogmas and beliefs, as well as ritualistic acts, economic phenomena,⁵ and the material instilled by education.

Are all facts that are social according to Durkheim's

¹ *Méth.*, p: 9.

² *Vide supra*, p. 36.

³ *Méth.*, pp. 14, 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ On economic phenomena as "social" in the Durkheimian sense, see *Méth.*, pp. 6, 7; also "La Détermination du fait moral," *Bull. de la Soc. franç. de Phil.*, vol. vi, p. 134.

definition of an exclusively psychic nature? To admit this would mean the exclusion of the facts of social morphology, of the structures of social groups of all kinds, from the field of investigation of the sociologist. For them Durkheim makes room in these terms:

These ways of being are imposed on individuals quite as the ways of doing of which we have spoken. Indeed, when one wishes to know how a society is divided politically, of what these divisions are composed, how complete the fusion existing between them is, it is not by the aid of a material inspection and by geographical observations that one can succeed [*sc.*, in learning]; for these divisions are moral [*sc.*, social] at the same time that they have some basis in the physical nature. It is only on the pages of the public law that this organization can be studied, for it is this law which determines it [*sc.*, the organization], quite as it determines our relations domestic and civil. It is, then, no less obligatory. If the population crowds into our cities, instead of spreading over the rural districts, it is because there is a current of opinion, a collective impulse which imposes on the individuals this concentration. . . . The roads determine in an imperious way the directions of internal migration and exchange, and even the intensity of these exchanges and migrations, etc. Consequently there would be room to add, at the most, to the list of phenomena which we have enumerated as presenting the distinctive sign of a social fact one category more [*sc.*, the morphological]. . . . But this addition is not even useful; for these ways of being are only consolidated and integrated [*consolidées*] ways of doing. The political structure of a society is but the way in which the different component segments have become accustomed to living one with another.¹

Whatever we may think of this analysis of the relation of the structure of society to its functioning, it is certainly

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 17-18.

difficult to see wherein roads, and the mechanism of transportation are imposed by the will of the social group upon the individual. The line of the least physical resistance is by far the most important factor in determining methods and routes of transportation and communication. The social mind decrees the location of roads and the means of transportation (if it does so at all consciously) according to the social needs and these in nearly every instance are satisfied by the arrangement based on the principle of the minimum expenditure of effort.

Our next task is to consider a topic of dual importance, namely, Durkheim's conception of the nature of social causation and with it the closely related one of the differences between sociology and psychology. Each of these phases might be treated in a separate chapter, the first in a chapter on method, the second in a chapter on the field of sociology. But, as will be evident, both these phases are so intimately interrelated, and so closely tied up with the psychological discussion that has preceded that they may well be treated together and at this point.

The single question underlying these two phases is this: what is the source of change in social phenomena? Is change due to the individual innovator, imitated by his fellows, as Tarde has explained it? Or, is the source of change outside of the individual? If change in social phenomena is individually initiated, then sociology, in its explanatory, which is also its scientific, phase becomes a mere continuation of the psychology of the individual mind.¹ Any social change is then *ipso facto* explainable by the psychology that can explain the mind of the individual in which this change originated. If the source of change lies outside the individual mind, then the fields of sociology and

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 124-5 and *Suic.*, p. ix.

of psychology are distinct. Sociology then has its own explanatory function.

Let us first present Durkheim's criticism of "utility" as an explanation of social phenomena. A good example of this is the Spencerian explanation of the formation of society by the demonstration of the utility of co-operation.¹ The sole situation, however, in which utility can be of significance for causation is where the individual observes the utility of a still non-existent entity, and brings it into existence. Now if social facts, like material phenomena, or psychological phenomena, were within the power of the individual to modify, the cognizance of utility could lead to modification. But being "social" facts which impress themselves on the individual from without, they can be changed only by forces affecting the social mind directly.²

Moreover, in further criticism of this theory of utility, Durkheim notes that facts may exist without a function, as, *e. g.*, a custom which has survived that state of society in which it had a useful rôle.³ Any attempt to bolster up the utility hypothesis by appealing to a "fundamental tendency" which has utility, is a vain proceeding. There is no necessary connection between tendency and utility. A tendency is a "force which has its own nature; for that nature to be aroused [*suscité*] or altered, it does not suffice that we should find it of some advantage". A tendency like the mis-named "instinct of self-preservation" requires the concomitance of certain conditions before it can be a cause.⁴ Another proof of the weakness of the idea of utility as an explanation of social phenomena lies in the fact that, despite the diversity

¹ *Méth.*, p. 111.

² *Méth.*, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

of individuals and of the ends that they pursue, social facts continue to fall into great resemblance classes. The cultural uniformities among widely separated groups of men is evidence to that effect. The cause of social facts is not, then, to be sought in their utility or function; though the former can account for their survival, if not for their arrival.¹

Another type of explanation of social facts *solidaire* with the explanation by utility, is in great favor with sociologists, says Durkheim.² This is the "psychological", using this term as referring only to the processes of the individual mind. It is found in two forms; both based on the hypothesis that social life is an outgrowth of the individual's life. The one form conceives the individual as consciously modifying the social thought and structure to certain ends; the other assumes that there are certain fundamental and inherent tendencies in human nature, from which the society's mental processes are a necessary growth.

This latter was the explanatory principle of both Comte and Herbert Spencer. The former states it thus:³ "The social phenomenon is, fundamentally a simple development of humanity, without the creation of any faculties". For Comte the dominant fact of social life is progress; and progress springs out of a tendency of self-development. So simple and inevitable is this process, that mere deduction could determine the phases of progress in the earlier stages of history. For Spencer there were two factors—the physical *milieu*, and the moral and physical constitution of the individual. Society was the product of the interaction of these two groups of factors. Its characteristics were, therefore, directly dependent on the nature of the individual. The

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³ Quoted by Durkheim, *Méth.*, p. 121.

social processes could all be interpreted as modified individual activities and social structures as the products of these individual activities.^{1 2} The method followed by Spencer and others is to make the family a result of the reproductive instinct; punishment the result of individual resentment; economic activity the result of the instinct of acquisitiveness, etc. Durkheim disagrees with all of this. Throughout his works he insists that this type of explanation is fallacious.³ He writes very positively concerning this point: "Every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychic phenomenon, one may be sure that the explanation is false."⁴

This principle follows as a logical consequence to Durkheim's conception of the differences in origin, and

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 122-3-4.

² For a criticism of the "inherent sociability" of man as a social force, see *ibid.*, p. 132.

³ It may be worth while to cite a number of these criticisms.

Suic., pp. 107, 117; 350-1; *A. S.*, vol. ix, p. 133; criticisms of Tarde's explanation of the social process as imitation. Imitation, D. says, presupposes society. Imitation is really the simultaneous functioning of a number of members of a social group in response to the stimulus of a social fact impressed on the individuals from without, by the society, (a conception not wholly unlike that of Giddings' "Like response to the same stimulus," *Inductive Sociology*, p. 57 *et seq.*).

Div. Tr., p. 341 and footnote, p. 342, a criticism of Spencer, as above.

Vie Rel., p. 246 *et seq.*; criticism of the derivation of the group totem from the individual totem, a view held by Boas, Swanton and other ethnologists. D. would reverse the derivation.

Vie Rel., p. 320 *et seq.*; criticism that religion grew out of fear of the individual (*cf.* criticism of Spencer on same point, *Méth.*, p. 123).

A. S., vol. ii, p. 24. "Déf. Phén. Rel." Religion not derived from an individual sentiment, but from a state of the social mind.

Rev. Phil., vol. xl, p. 609. Criticism of Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* for the "impropriety of the method which consists in explaining the social by the psychic."

Suic., pp. ix, x, criticism of psychological explanation of the family, and religion. On the latter point see *ibid.*, p. 352.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 128.

hence in nature, between the social and the individual representations. The social representation (to recall a point already fully treated) is different from the individual representation because it arises out of the interaction of a different system of units. It springs, not from the individual mind, but from the fusion, the blending of that mind with other minds like itself. To admit a "psychological" explanation of the social phenomenon would be to waive the central requirement of the whole Durkheimian sociology. To do this would be, in the phraseology of our author, "to denature social facts".¹ The "exteriority", to the individual mind, of the social representation is clearly inexplicable on a "psychological" basis; while any attempt to make the other characteristic of a social fact, namely, constraint, a "psychological" factor, by assimilating it to "self-control", is also a failure. Self-control, inhibition, is the means whereby the social constraint acts in the individual; but it is only the means and is not identical with social constraint.²

Since the nature of the individual is thus eliminated from consideration as a cause, or originative centre of social phenomena, the social mind is left as the single psychic source of the new in social life.³ This position is not unlike that of the biologist who refuses to explain the facts of life solely by a reference to the principles of physics and chemistry.^{4 5} Indeed, Durkheim discusses the question as

¹ *Méth.*, p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 128 and *Suic.*, p. 350.

⁵ It is worth while to note here that a marked trend of biologists, in the United States at least, is strongly in the direction of the very principle that Durkheim considers quite unsound, namely of explaining life by the processes of non-living matter, making of biology, in part at least, mere physics and chemistry.

to whether his method is in harmony with a fundamental principle, that all aggregates, being, upon final analysis, resolvable into the same ultimate units of matter, differ only in the nature of the arrangement of these fundamental units.¹ In other words, it is to the individuality of the aggregate that one must appeal for the explanation of the facts arising within it, and not to the characteristics of the component units.²

The objection may be raised that, while society, once formed, may thereafter be the sole source of the new arising within it, this theory of Durkheim falls down when the origin of society is considered. This latter, surely, must be referable to the nature of the individuals coming together to form the society. But this objection is, in our author's opinion, merely specious.³ When, he asks in substance, was society formed? Everywhere and at all times of which we have knowledge we find it antecedent to the particular individual,⁴ impressing on him its mass of tradition, its standards of all kinds, with a pressure, sometimes unfelt, like that of the atmosphere, but always present. Any questioning of this as a condition of all time in the past leads merely into vague guessing as to what might have been the case in times of which we know, and can know little or nothing, with scientific accuracy.⁵ Now so far as we consider "society" in the sense of forms of association of any kind whatever, this position of Durkheim may be tenable. We do not know of any "pure" individual, in the sense of a person who is a member of no

¹ *Méth.*, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 128.

³ *Méth.*, pp. 128-9; also *vide supra*, p. 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

social group. There may easily never have been such a monstrosity. But there are social aggregates which have been formed in historical times, by the voluntary coming together of individuals on the basis of common faith or mutual profit and protection. Among these there must have been a stage of association in which the group mind was not yet formed, in which the individual was the deciding factor. Is it justifiable to leave out of consideration in sociology the problem of the formation of the group mind?

So much then for the negative phases of Durkheim's theory of social causation. What are its positive features? He tells us that "The determining cause of a social fact ought to be sought among the antecedent social facts, and not among the states of the individual consciousness". "The function of a social fact cannot but be social; *i. e.*, it consists in the production of effects socially useful."¹ These statements indicate the general outlines of the theory. Its more detailed analysis may now be taken up.

As a preliminary step we may recall the fact that Durkheim regards the facts of social "morphology" as so closely related to those of social "physiology"²—*i. e.*, the structure as *solidaire* with the process—that no special attention need be given the former. The following rule then states the principle to be followed: "the first origin of all social process of any importance ought to be sought in the internal constitution of the social milieu."³ This is clearly in accord with what was said above.⁴ The individuality of the group is an individuality constituted by the particular mode of organization of the units. The units of this inter-

¹ *Méth.*, p. 135.

² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁴ *Vide supra*, pp. 34, 35.

nal social *milieu* are persons and things. "Among the things, beside material objects incorporated in the society,¹ must be included the products of former social activity, the law, established customs, literary and artistic monuments."² Of whatever apparent importance these incorporated things may be, they are in reality not of fundamental significance. At most they may modify, in a somewhat inert manner, the speed and direction of social evolution.³ It is the truly human *milieu* that is the active factor in social change.

The principle task of the sociologist is to discover which properties of this *milieu* are most significant in affecting the course of social phenomena. Our author informs us that two of these have been discovered: the number of units in the social group, or the "volume" of the society; and the degree of concentration of the mass, the "dynamic density". "The dynamic density of equal volumes can be defined as a function of the number of individuals who are effectually in relations with each other not merely of a commercial sort; *i. e.*, who not only exchange services, . . . but who live a common life."⁴ To use an economic term, it is a sort of "rapidity of circulation" of social representations. The degree of coalescence of the social segments is a most significant index of the dynamic density of a people. An atomic condition of these units implies a slight dynamic density.⁵

The physical density of the population, in the demographic sense of the term "density", is ordinarily, though not invariably, a measure of the dynamic density. Ease

¹ See also *Méth.*, p. xiv, footnote; and *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xix, p. 87, for a similar statement in a review of Schaeffle's *Bau u. Leben*, etc.

² *Méth.*, p. 138. See also *Suic.*, p. 354.

³ *Méth.*, p. 139.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 139.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

of travel, high degree of communication between regions, may serve the purpose of increasing dynamic density quite as well as a massing of population.¹

The social *milieu*, and, especially, the human part of it, is not an ultimate causal fact. Depending, as it does, partly on its own inherent properties, as causes, and partly on its relations with other social groups, it is a primary cause of social phenomena only in the sense of explaining scientifically a large number of the latter.² What is true of the society in its totality, as, *e. g.*, the nation, is true also of the smaller, special *milieux*, the family or the professional group. The family life, the professional life, will vary accordingly as the volume and the dynamic density of their respective groups vary.^{3 4}

"If we reject this conception of the social *milieu* as the determining factor of the collective evolution, sociology is unable to establish any relation of causality," says Durkheim.⁵ The sole contribution it can then make is an ascertainment of the succession of social states. A mere knowledge of succession gives no basis for scientific prevision. What is needed is a demonstration why a certain state succeeds another certain state. Comte and Spencer in their conception of social evolution, were, practically, limited em-

¹ The principal use of these characteristics of the social *milieu* is found in *Div. Tr.*, the discussion of which is to be found below, in chapter vii.

² *Méth.*, p. 142.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-3.

⁴ The effect of internal conditions of the family *milieu* on the strength of the family's influence over its members is illustrated in a statement in *Suic.*, pp. 211-214. It is there maintained that suicide varies inversely as the density of the family (*i. e.* its average size); and that this is due to the weakening of the family's power as a group because of its decrease in density.

⁵ *Méth.*, p. 143.

piricists,¹ for they stated only the order of succession of social stages.

Mere ascertainment of succession having given us no clue to the real nature of social causation, we are driven outside of the simply rectilinear series of social facts in our search for an explanation of the changes that take place in social life. Can the environment exterior to a given social group be the determining, the "critical" factor? Of the environment of the group, one element, the other social groups, can have an effect only on the defensive and offensive military phases of the group life.² All the physical influences of the environment can affect the group only through its internal social *milieu*. So in the nature of the latter we must seek the determining elements that make state B follow state A.

It is in place here to point out a possible inconsistency between Durkheim's theory of social causation and his definition of social facts. A social fact, we recall, is a way of thinking, acting, or feeling, exterior to the individual and endowed with a power of coercion.³ That is, it is a "state of the collective consciousness". Durkheim says, moreover, "the determining cause of a social fact ought to be sought among the antecedent social facts, and not among the states of the individual consciousness".⁴ But in the elaboration of the theory of social causation we find the basis of the argument changed. We read:

Indeed, if the determining condition of social phenomena consist, as we have shown, in the very fact of association, they ought to vary with the forms of that association, *i. e.*, accord-

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 145-6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

ing to the ways in which the constituent parts of society are grouped.¹ . . . The principal effort of the sociologist ought to be then, to discover the different properties of this [*sc.*, "social"] *milieu* which can exert action on the course of social phenomena.²

"Determining cause" and "determining condition"; these two terms refer respectively to antecedent social facts and to the constitution of the social *milieu*. In the one case we have a psychic phenomenon, a state of consciousness A which is the cause of the state of consciousness B. In the second, if "determining condition" is equivalent to "determining cause", the state B is caused, not by state A, but by the constitution of the social *milieu*—which is a morphological, not a psychic, fact; certainly not a "social" fact, in the strict Durkheimian sense of that phrase. To take refuge in the distinction between "condition" and "cause" would be a possible way out. But a clear statement of the difference between these two terms is lacking.

* The working out of this theory of social causation is illustrated in *la Division du travail social* and also in *le Suicide*. In both these works, as is indicated in Chapter VII, we have the explanation of a social fact. In the former it is the division of labor, in the latter, suicide. The development of the argument in each book seems to indicate that Durkheim does mean to distinguish between "cause" and "condition". The division of labor is not "caused" by the increased "dynamic density" of the population; that is a "condition" of its increase.³ Furthermore, suicide is caused by "*courants suicidogènes*"; its quantity varies as the strength of these currents,⁴ which

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³ *Div. Tr.*, p. 237 *et seq.*

⁴ *Suic.*, p. 336.

varies from group to group. This variation in strength is inversely correlated with the strength and cohesiveness of the social group. We have here, then, "conditions" quantitatively modifying the "cause", though they do not actually appear as the cause of the phenomenon under consideration, namely, a suicide.

In "la Prohibition de l'inceste" ¹ we have this statement of social causation: "If new states [*sc.* of the social mind] are produced, it is largely because the old states have been grouped and combined." But in a footnote Durkheim mentions the changes in the social substratum as part causes. Here, too, we have, then, both conceptions, of cause and of condition, introduced.

Another noteworthy feature of Durkheim's theory of social causation is its mechanistic tendency. We have seen that the inherent characteristics of the individual as such are barred by our author from playing a part in the social process. The individual as a conscious innovator was also dismissed from the consideration ² of the sociologist. The latter phase of Durkheim's theory is closely related to the idea of the social process as a mechanically-caused evolution, in the sense of one that depends not on a consciously directed working out toward certain ends, but on forces that work blindly as do those of the physical universe. There are a number of examples of this "mechanism" in Durkheim's work. The cause of the increase of the division of labor is in the increase of the dynamic density of society, which is accurately measurable by the fluctuations in the density of population, a phenomenon not of the consciously willed type, surely. The size of the family affects the suicidal tendency of the members of the family, as we saw above. In another article he says: "But we have just

¹ *A. S.*, vol. i, p. 69.

² *Vide supra*, pp. 67, 68.

seen how these groupings [sc., of states of the social mind] could have a totally different cause than the anticipated representation of the result flowing from them".¹ And in another: "Such is the cause which has determined the progressive weakening of penalties. We see that this result has been produced mechanically. . . . This great transformation has not taken place in view of a preconceived end, nor under control of utilitarian considerations."²

This mechanism is not logically required by Durkheim's general sociological position. The social group thinks;³ therefore there is nothing to hinder its thinking out ends and acting upon them. The objections that may, consistently with Durkheim's theory, be raised against the conscious action of the individual as a source of the new in social life, do not hold against conscious action by the group. However the logic of the situation may stand, as a matter of fact, Durkheim does not treat society as a self-directing, but rather as an automatically directed, entity.

Despite his strong opposition to the individual causation theory, our author still finds it difficult to keep "psychological" explanation entirely out of his reasoning. There is, of course, some room for admitting the nature of the individual, as the unit of the society, to be at least a secondary factor in social causation. The very fact of the existence of the social representation in the mind of the individual means that there must be some interaction between the two. For example, in order to explain the intensity of some of the states of the social mind, Durkheim shows that their violence is due to the re-enforcement, in the mind of each individual, of the latter's own state of mind, by a

¹ *A. S.*, vol. i, p. 69. "La Prohibition de l'inceste," etc.

² *A. S.*, vol. iv, p. 92. "Deux Lois de l'évolution penale."

³ *Méth.*, p. xvi; and "Rep. Ind.," p. 295.

similar state of another or of other members of the group.¹ This is such an explanation as even the most "individualistic" psychologist might have given.

Occasionally, too, we find that our author forgets that his "individual" is so thoroughly dependent on the social mind for his mental content; for example, he says: "If, as we may say, this synthesis *sui generis* which constitutes every society is evolved out of new phenomena, different from those that take place in the isolated [*solitaires*] consciousnesses. . . ." ² "The group feels, thinks, acts, quite differently from the way in which its members would feel, think, and act, if they were isolated".³ The explanation of this apparent inconsistency lies in the fact that these quotations are from early works.⁴ The individual then loomed larger in Durkheim's estimation. The elements of the over-emphasis of the social nature of the individual mind were present in the theory at that early date; but they were as yet undeveloped to their full possibility.

There is a sense in which our author admits the individual to some slight share in the origination of social states, without being inconsistent. It amounts to saying, however, that human society is what it is because it is composed of human beings, each one of whom has a certain fixed, and definite, psychic nature. This may have a certain conditioning power over the rate of social change: but it can in no wise introduce new elements into the change-process.⁵ A seeming exception to the exclusion of the individual from social causation is worth noting. The public official, the statesman, the genius, all may be innovating

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 67.

² *Méth.*, p. xvi.

³ *Méth.*, p. 128.

⁴ See bibliography.

⁵ *Méth.*, pp. 113-4 and p. 130.

members of the social group. But it is after all only apparently that they introduce new social elements. In reality they are merely expressions of the power of the society, lent to them for the ends of society.¹

The distinction between the fields of sociology and of psychology needs little discussion after what has been said concerning Durkheim's idea of social causation. The sharp lines of demarcation between the social phenomena and the psychological phenomena imply a similar separation of the sciences treating these two groups of fact.² Sociology cannot be a development out of psychology, for the social fact is as distinct from the psychological fact as is the biological from the physical or the chemical. But Durkheim does not forbid the use of psychology to the sociologist. It should, like biology, serve as a propaedeutic. It is to be used for interpreting facts, or, at least, the explanation of the sociologist may not violate the laws of psychology.³ In the field of education the two sciences meet at a common task.⁴ Education, says Durkheim, is not, as according to the etymological common-place, a mere "drawing-out" process. It is also a filling-up process. The individual, in order to live in a certain social environment, must have the ideas and habits of action appropriate and general to that environment. It is the task of sociology, then, to determine what is appropriate for the member of a certain social group to know and to do; that is, to determine what shall be the material put into the individual's mind. Psychology decides how the actual process of education may best be carried on; it has to do with the technique of edu-

¹ *Méth.*, p. 137, footnote. For a criticism of this view see *infra*, ch. iv, pp. 98, 99.

² *Suic.*, p. ix and p. 352.

³ *Méth.*, p. 162.

⁴ *Rev. Mét.*, vol. xi, "Pédagogie et sociologie."

cation; with the methods of getting into the mind of the immature member of society what sociology has decreed suitable for that member.¹

One group of phenomena falls within the border-land between sociology and psychology, namely those that he calls "socio-psychic" facts. These are

the private manifestations of social phenomena, partly social, since they reproduce in part a collective model. But each of them depends also, and in large part, on the organic-psychic constitution of the individual, on the particular circumstances in which he is placed. They are not strictly sociological phenomena. They belong to two realms at once, one could call them socio-psychic.²

An illustration would be the fact that each individual, while getting his religion, his morals, his technique, from the social mind, nevertheless so modifies them that they become "*his* religion, *his* morals, *his* technique".³ Elsewhere⁴ Durkheim mentions them again; they are the subject-matter of what may be called the "mixed" science of "*socio-psychologie*", which resembles such sciences as biochemistry. He does not, however, put any emphasis, theoretical or practical, on either these phenomena or the science that treats of them.

In conclusion we may say that Durkheim is revealed as a psychological sociologist par excellence (using that adjective in the accepted, not in the Durkheimian, sense). For him all phenomena in man's social life are *psychic*. There are two kinds of psychic phenomena, however; those arising in the system of the individual mind, and those

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

² *Méth.*, p. 14.

³ *Méth.*, p. xxiii, footnote. Italics are Durkheim's.

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, p. 341.

arising in the system of the social mind. The former are studied by the science of "individual" psychology, or psychology, simply; the other kind are treated in "collective" psychology, or sociology.¹

It is interesting to compare the theory of social causation and that of the relation of sociology to psychology held by Durkheim with the theories held by the German psychologist Wundt. The resemblance between the theories of these two men concerning the compounding of mental states was noted above.² In the introductory chapter of his *Völkerpsychologie* Wundt expounds those principles of his psychology, which, applied to the collective life, are denominated in the title of that book. The views of Durkheim and Wundt on these topics are in general parallel, though at points they converge and again diverge. A few quotations will suffice to show this. Wundt says:

The psychic life of a society is inextricably interdependent with the life of the individuals belonging to it, and therefore all psychic phenomena [which we refer to the society as such, even though they would not be possible without association and its interactions,] still have their final source in the individual characteristics.³

Here we have more importance ascribed to the individual than that with which Durkheim credits him. Our author does not seek the "final source" in the nature of the individual but in the nature of the reactions between that individual and others like him. The individual nature is a "condition" of the psychic life of society. But Wundt, it must be admitted, does not come far from Durkheim's position when he says, a few lines below, in presenting his criteria

¹ "Rep. Ind.," p. 302, footnote.

² *Vide supra*, p. 25.

³ W. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, vol. i, p. 4.

of a collective phenomenon as opposed to an individual creation: "The first [*sc.*, criterion] is that an indefinite number [*unbestimmt viele*] of members of a society have collaborated upon it in such a way that the reference of it to any particular individual is excluded." As to the individual as an initiating force in society Wundt and Durkheim are in close accord. "Rather is it," says the former, "... society that sets free [*auslöst*] in the individual psychic powers through which he himself reacts upon it [*sc.*, society]; and of all that he may contribute to the collective accumulation only that remains effective which was already preconstructed [*vorgebildet*] in the society."¹ This is much like our author's idea that society furnishes the content of the individual's mind. Again Wundt says: "*Völkerpsychologie* is based on the fact that society creates independent psychic values which are rooted in the mental characteristics of individuals, but are themselves of a specific kind, and provide the individual mental life with its most important content."² The relation between psychology and *Völkerpsychologie* as indicated in the statement of the latter as: "an extension and continuation of psychology to the phenomena of the collective life"³ is not unlike Durkheim's essentially psychological approach to the social phenomena; *e. g.*, see the statement concerning "*psychologie individuelle*" as opposed to "*psychologie collective*" or "*la sociologie toute entière*."⁴ Another quotation from Wundt: "*Völkerpsychologie* would be impossible if the society did not continually create new values for the psychological understanding of which the means of individual psychology are inadequate."⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴ "Rep. Ind.," p. 302, footnote.

⁵ Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

* At the same time it should be noted that Wundt does not draw the same sharp line between psychology as individual and as collective, that Durkheim insists upon. The former says in another work, that the two are

not so much different departments as different methods. The so-called "*Völkerpsychologie*" corresponds to the method of pure observation; the objects of observation in this case being the mental products that have been developed in the course of history, such as language, mythological ideas and customs. . . . The necessary connection of these products with social communities, which has given to "*Völkerpsychologie*" its name, is due to the fact that the mental products of the individual are of too variable a character to be the subjects of objective observation. The phenomena gain the necessary degree of constancy only when they become collective. . . . "*Völkerpsychologie*" is distinguished from individual, or as it may be called because of its predominant method, experimental psychology.¹

There is a noticeable similarity between the treatments by these two writers of the problem of social causation. Wundt, like Durkheim, recognizes the individualistic interpretation of history usual with historians as intimately connected with their frequent explanations of the social evolution process as thought-out development of a plan, or of many plans.² The principle shortcoming of this individualistic theory of social change lies in the fact that those who hold it have not freed themselves from the conception of a metaphysical soul-entity, which makes any soul but an individual one an impossibility; in that case, all psychic phenomena must be referred to the individual soul. But if the soul is considered in its "actuality" as "a unity of psychic

¹ Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 23.

² Wundt, *Völk.*, p. 19.

phenomena", the group-soul ("*Volkseele*") becomes intelligible and necessary.¹

Tarde's insistence on imitation as the predominant social activity, Wundt, like Durkheim, rejects as unsound; and, like the latter, he makes the simultaneous appearance of a new social element in a number of members of a group a result of some influence affecting at once the many individuals of the society, but emanating from no particular individual of the group.^{2 3}

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, p. 22, also *Suic.*, p. 117.

³ Deploige's view that Durkheim's working hypotheses are largely, as the former says, "made in Germany" (see *Le Conflit de la morale et de la sociologie*, p. 151, for this statement and ch. iv, pp. 122-151 for the elaboration of the argument) was mentioned early in the preface (see *supra*, p. 7). It may be worth while at this point to summarize Deploige's statement.

From Comte, he says, Durkheim has inherited the "positivist" spirit, the disdain for metaphysics, for the search after final causes, and the idea of natural causation in society. Espinas contributed the idea of the social reality as of the psychic order (p. 126). The remaining important elements of Durkheim's system are derived from the Germans (p. 127). Wagner, Schmoller, Schaeffle, have furnished him his fundamental postulate of the reality of the society apart from its existence as a mere grouping of individuals. Durkheim's visit to Germany (about 1886) explains how he came under the influence of these economists. Furthermore the conception of sociology as a method which the special social sciences ought to adopt (*vide infra*, ch. v) is taken from Schaeffle. Wundt has inspired Durkheim's disdain for the psychological and finalistic theory of social causation, and his enthusiasm for the sociological and mechanistic causation principle; and Wundt's *Ethik* furnished the basis for Durkheim's ethical theories, as set forth in "la Détermination du fait moral", (*Bull. de la soc. fr. de Phil.*, vol. vi); that from Simmel's *Einleitung in die Moralkwissenschaft* came the idea of society as God.

While Deploige does not actually accuse our author of claiming all these elements of his system as the products of his own originative genius, the general impression made, (and apparently intentionally made) by this analysis is equivalent to such an accusation. Durkheim answered these statements about his system in the columns of the

The question of Durkheim's philosophical position is to such a marked degree involved in the criticisms that have been made of his work that it seems well to briefly consider it.

By many of his critics our author has been accused of reviving in his sociology a realism akin to that of the Scho-

Revue Néo-Scholastique (the journal in which this attack had first appeared), and the letters of Durkheim as well as the replies of his critic are reprinted in the "Appendix" of Deploige's work.

Durkheim defends himself in the following points: that while in Germany he did not come under the influence of the "Socialists of the Chair". That he got his "social realism" (*vide infra*, in this chapter for a discussion of the philosophical bearings of Durkheim's theory) from Comte, Spencer, Espinas, and not from Schaeffle and the German economists. That he gives Wundt's *Ethik* credit in the essay on the moral fact. That he did not get the idea of society as God from the above-mentioned book of Simmel, because he did not know that book. That, while admitting a similarity between his and Wundt's views on sociology as related to psychology, he had really gotten this idea of the separation of the two fields from his master at the *École Normale Supérieure*, Boutroux.

In the latest volume of *A. S.* no. xii, in reviewing this book of Deploige, our author claims that his "social realism" goes back to Renouvier. (See p. 326). That he furthermore denied all claim to originality of his ideas, except the claim to having been the first to introduce these views into France and into French thought. And that whatever influence the Germans may have had on him, it was not of the sort that Deploige has claimed it was.

Deploige's book, (as the writer showed in a review of it in the *Political Science Quarterly* of March, 1913) is an apologetic for the social philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, involving a severe criticism of the Durkheimian sociology. Its statements are not always free from *ex parte* bias; nor are its quotations of Durkheim, as the latter has illustrated in the review in the *A. S.*, vol. xii, always accurate: the writer has had occasion to verify this for himself. Many of the criticisms that Deploige makes of Durkheim seem, however, reasonable. On the question of the German origin of Durkheim's theories, Professor Durkheim has, of course, the final word. The most fundamental resemblance of Durkheim to Wundt, that of the common psychological assumptions, Deploige has not emphasized, if he mentions it at all. It is evident certainly, that there is a marked resemblance between these two writers; and beyond pointing this out we may scarcely go.

lastic philosophers. The idea that a society is not a mere sum of individuals, but that the system which their association produces has a specific reality;¹ that social facts are to be considered in their collective, not in their individual aspects;² that they can exist as social facts, without being actually manifested in individual cases;³ all these statements of our author have been severely criticised by Tarde and others. Tarde cites, as the height of Durkheim's realism, the remark, "Eliminate the individual and society remains."⁴ Durkheim, whatever his extremities of position, has not gone as far as this misquoted line would seem to indicate. His social psychology, as we have examined it, in theory, at least, does not wholly discard the individual; though there is a decided under-emphasis of the latter in his causation theory, as will be shown in the succeeding chapter. The individual, reduced even to the mere body with a brain, is, at its lowest terms, still a modifying power over the social representations.⁵

The most vulnerable point that Durkheim presents to the attack is that involved in his statement that social facts exist apart from their individual manifestations.⁶ As Tarde points out, this "rests on an *equivoque*".⁷ Language, cus-

¹ *Méth.*, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁴ Tarde, *La logique sociale*, p. viii. This is quoted out of its context; Durkheim has been discussing the individual as a causal factor in society, and after eliminating him by logical process, he says: "Or, l'individu écarté, il ne reste que la société;" the meaning of the statement is certainly not what Tarde ascribes to it. (See *Méth.*, pp. 125-6 for the whole argument.)

⁵ See "Rep. Ind.," pp. 295, 298; also *Suic.*, p. 350 and *Méth.*, p. 127.

⁶ *Vide supra*, p. 60.

⁷ Tarde, "La Sociologie élémentaire," *Annales de l'Institut International de Sociologie*, 1895, pp. 219-220.

✓ toms, law, religion, come to each member of the social group from without; but does this mean that a language, *e. g.*, could exist without any of those who use it? Does it not mean merely, that, though any given individual may disappear, the language still lives on the tongues of his co-linguists? The fact that a social fact may become crystallized into a definite, more or less invariable, form, such as a proverb shows, or may even be written down and so fixed for all time, is, as Giddings long ago showed, no evidence for its independent objective reality. "The written page is meaningless apart from the knowledge of the living reader. . . . But at any given moment they [*sc.*, the laws in a code] exist in a multitude of interacting minds, and are therefore objective as well as subjective to each individual."¹

Now Durkheim is not a realist in the extreme Scholastic sense of that word, as was, *e. g.*, William of Champeaux.² He does not make of society, of the objective French or English nation, the reality, while the individual Frenchman or Englishman is only an attribute, a modification, or variation, of this "universal". That the functioning whole, like a chemical compound or a living cell, or an organism, has reality, and unity, different from that of its constituents is a statement that not even Tarde, Durkheim's sharpest critic, denies.³ But psychologically Durkheim is a realist; and he has become quite extreme in his psychological realism, as was pointed out above.⁴ So far as the individual appears at all in Durkheim's later theory, he has become only a body; he is no longer a soul (*âme*). His soul is the

¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 146-7.

² See Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy, etc.*, *loc. cit.*, "realism."

³ Indeed, Tarde admits this kind of "reality" in an article, "La Réalité sociale"; *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lii, pp. 457-477.

⁴ *Vide supra*, p. 44.

mind of society incarnated in his body. The social mind is all the mind that exists; and in this sense the social is the only real. →

It is not difficult to locate this theory philosophically. Tarde¹ and Dunan² both accuse our author of being a Platonic realist; and to that extent metaphysical in his presuppositions. Of this accusation Durkheim has admitted as true the resemblance between his social representations and the Platonic ideas. "Face to face with this system of ideas [*notions*], the individual mind is in the same situation as the *νοῦς* of Plato, before the world of ideas. It [*sc.*, the individual mind] is compelled to absorb them [*se les assimiler*], for it needs them in order to be able to have communion with its fellows; but the absorption is always imperfect."³ And he notes a difference between his "social representation" and the "idea" of Plato. "The ideas of Plato are self-sufficient. They have no need of matter in order to exist; they cannot mingle with matter without undergoing a kind of degradation. On the contrary, society has need of individuals in order to exist."⁴

We have then in this theory a type of realism, differing somewhat from that of Plato, and much from that of the Scholastic realist; but one which, based on a certain modern psychological assumption, still presents the essential characteristics of a realism: it makes, in its extreme form, the universal (*i. e.*, the social), consciousness the reality, and the individual consciousness, except as the incarnation of this social mind, is not much more than a name.

¹ Tarde, "Soc. élém.," p. 216.

² *Bull. de la Soc. fr. de Phil.*, vol. vi, p. 169.

³ *Vie Rel.*, p. 622.

⁴ *Bull. de la Soc. fr. de Phil.*, March, 1913, p. 74, "Le Problème religieux et la dualité de la nature humaine."

In a recent history of French literature¹ the suggestion is made that Durkheim represents in sociology the same tendency that Bergson shows in philosophy. There is of course a possibility that from Boutroux, under whom both Durkheim and Bergson studied at the *École Normale Supérieure*, may have come an impulse driving both in the same direction. Durkheim has acknowledged his indebtedness to Boutroux for the idea of the sharp distinction between the phenomena of different fields;² (e. g., between the social and the psychological, like that between the biological and the physical or chemical). The emphasis which our author lays on this heterogeneity; his insistence on explaining facts of each order of combination by the principles of that order, and not in terms of a lower order; these characteristics of Durkheim's theory may be compared with Bergson's idea that the physico-chemical explanations of life, despite their high development, include only a small part of the reality of life-processes: and that the same defect is to be found also in the cerebro-physiological explanations of mental states.³ The context of these statements of Bergson should, however, be kept in mind; he is endeavoring to show that the mechanistic hypothesis of the sciences dealing with inanimate matter is wholly inappli-

¹ Wright, C. H. C., *History of French Literature*, p. 832. "The ease with which Bergsonism adapts itself to nearly all the active tendencies of today has made it extremely popular among those interested in new religious, ethical, social, political, or aesthetic questions. . . . Here it falls in with the tendencies of unconscious pragmatists. The French lay sociologist gets over moral and religious instability by the idea of a social organism, which may impose its own sanctions, whether of law, public opinion, conscience or reason: Durkheim, an extreme positivist, argues that God is society, and that society furnishes to morals all the support it gets from revealed religion."

² *Vide supra*, footnote to p. 83.

³ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 354-5.

cable to the sciences of life, so far as explanation goes. The true understanding of vital phenomena comes through intuition, says Bergson. Durkheim, on the other hand, has nothing but scorn for those attempts to know social phenomena by any other means than the most scientific methods; in other words, what Bergson would call "mechanistic" methods.¹ And when our author studies the social mind, he breaks it up into dead particles, such as law-codes, moral regulations, religion, etc., just as the scientist must always (and according to Bergson, rightly) do.² Possibly one might interpret in a Bergsonian sense the conclusion of *La Vie religieuse*, namely, that religious phenomena express a true reality, that of society, as an "intuitive" judgment by mankind, full of vital truth.³

On several minor points there is some correspondence. For example, both writers conceive of consciousness as a force decreasing psychic automatism, or at least accompanying such a decrease.⁴ But on other points they differ widely. There seems to be little similarity between the kinds of psychology to which they hold. Durkheim is an intellectualist; Bergson certainly is not. Durkheim makes the higher mental processes independent of, the lower dependent on, the brain processes. Bergson, on the other hand, denies the necessity of a brain for the existence of consciousness,⁵ and denies that consciousness springs from the cerebral process.⁶ To the layman in philosophy the similarity between these two thinkers is not very striking. One more adept in the philosophical field might discover

¹ *Méth.*, p. 43.

² Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179, and "Rep. Ind.," p. 274; see *supra* ch. i, p. 22.

⁵ *Creat. Evol.*, p. 110.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

greater likenesses, but there are none that are preëminently outstanding. Only so far, however, as there is a relation between Bergsonism and pragmatism can we assume any profound likeness between our author and his fellow-countryman.

This is put forward as a possible bond of similarity between them, but it is one on which the writer is free to admit his inability to give a definitive statement. The connection has been suggested by an interesting comparison that may be drawn between certain phases of Durkheim's theory of the nature of religion, and the pragmatic theory of religion put forward by William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Religious phenomena are expressions, Durkheim says, of a reality—the social reality.¹ The objective content of these phenomena is of fundamental significance only because of this fact.² The universal distinction in all religions between the sacred and the profane, is after all, a distinction between the class of entities that are social and those that are individual.³ “It [*sc.*, religion] is, above all, a system of ideas by means of which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members.”⁴

In other words, religious elements have a value apart from their mere objective content. They have a pragmatic value. They “work”. They are an expression of the inner oneness of the individual with the mind of his group.

For James also the concrete manifestations of religion may not be significant in themselves. “It does not follow,” he says, “because our ancestors made so many errors of

¹ *Vie Rel.*, p. 322.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

fact and mixed them with their religion, that we should therefore leave off being religious at all. By being religious we establish ourselves in possession of ultimate reality at the only points where reality is given us to guard.”¹ This ultimate reality is mediated to us through the subconscious self.² What it is, the very term “ultimate” bars our knowing; but each interprets it in his own way; so we have James’ own personal belief that “. . . the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness; . . . the two become continuous at certain points and higher energies filter in.”³

Both Durkheim and James, then, make of religion a means of laying hold of reality: the former sees this reality in the social mind that he postulates; and the latter in postulated other worlds of consciousness; both show that these realities are usually expressed in terms of a God or of Gods. More than this: James speaks of the actual energy that flows into the worshipper in the “faith-state” or in the “prayer-state”,⁴ just as Durkheim says: “Above all, the religious life presupposes the putting into play of forces *sui generis* which elevate the individual above himself, and which transport him to another *milieu* than that in which is unrolled his profane existence, and which make him live a very different life, higher and more intense.”⁵

More than this, Durkheim’s conception of the moral fact as a social fact, and hence as the product of the activities of the group mind, rather than as a supernatural, or metaphysical rule, is in harmony with the pragmatic tendency

¹ James, *Var. Rel. Exp.*, p. 500.

² *Ibid.*, p. 511.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 519.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 519 and p. 509.

⁵ *Bull. de la Soc. fr. de Phil.*, March, 1913, p. 63, “Le Probl. Rel. et la dual. hum.”

in modern ethical study. For in this field the connection between actual conditions of life and the resulting conduct regulations, has led in the work of such men as Sumner to an acceptance of the principle that the "folkways" and "mores" of a group, can be judged by no arbitrary criterion: that what the group permits or prescribes is *ipso facto* the good. The only test here is the "workability" of the particular rule or code of rules.

We may assume, then, that there is a possible resemblance between the philosophical orientation of Durkheim and that of Bergson, if we are justified in admitting as evidence a connection between the pragmatism of James, for example, and the Bergsonian philosophy.

James himself has expressed his agreement with the fundamental philosophical position of Bergson in a number of essays.¹ And while their approaches to the problems they deal with are in many respects diverse, they still represent the same basic tendency away from the expression of experience in the terms of an absolutism which is not inherent in the universe of experience, but purely the product of man's conceptual life and method.

¹ See James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, Lecture vi, *passim*.

Some Problems of Philosophy, pp. 37, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 200, 219.

Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 156, 188.

Bergson has commented on his similarity to James in *Rev. Phil.*, vol. ix, p. 229; and in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, 1910, p. 385. In the latter he approves the statement which James had made in the *Pluralistic Universe* of Bergson's views.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAJOR PREMISE IN DURKHEIM'S THINKING

THE objections to Durkheim's views which have been advanced from time to time are, in the main, directed at statements which are in reality logical conclusions. Durkheim's premises have not been examined by his critics. The earlier criticism, down to the appearance of "*Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives*", was justified in this method; for the psychological basis of our author's theories as revealed in that essay was, up to that time, implicit and not explicit. Tarde, as we saw, called Durkheim an "ontologist", a "scholastic" and a "medieval realist".¹ On the basis of what the latter had published up to the time of this classification of him, it seems not undeserved. Deploige in his book,² published in 1911, makes no advance over Tarde's criticism in this respect, for he does not go back to the psychological assumptions on which Durkheim's work is based, but criticises it as it appears. Tosti, in 1897 and 1898, subjected the social causation theory of Durkheim, as it appears in *Le Suicide*, to a severe and just criticism; but he did not go behind this theory.³ More recently Leuba has questioned the theory of the purely "social" origin of religious phenomena, as put forward in Durkheim's earlier statements (*i. e.*, those antedating *La*

¹ Tarde, *La Logique sociale*, p. viii.

² *Vide supra*, ch. iii, p. 83.

³ *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. iii, p. 464, and vol. iv, p. 171.

Vie religieuse) without, however, attacking the source of the fault criticised.¹ Fouillé adopted² the same type of critical examination as the others cited.

Durkheim's theories can be fairly evaluated only if they are considered in relation to his fundamental theory of the compounding of mental states. In this process of combining and recombining, a system of mental states is evolved, which is the final and highest³ product—the social mind. Wundt⁴ offers this process in explanation of the nature and origin of all the more complex mental products. On the other hand, James insists that this theory is incorrect. He devotes an entire chapter of the *Principles of Psychology* to a statement of his position with reference to it.⁵ And while he is free to admit the difficulties involved in a theory of the unitary functioning of the mind, he still believes the other theory quite untenable.

The theory of the compounding of psychic states is, in so far as concerns the states of the social mind, decidedly metaphysical. To talk about souls or minds fusing and uniting, when the souls are simply streams of consciousness, is either a mere figure of speech, or metaphysics. The simplicity of it, however, makes this a very seductive theory. It accounts for the more complex mental states so easily that to reject it seems a hypercritical proceeding. The acceptance or the rejection of this fusing theory is indeed not a question which the sociologist can decide, if Wundt accepts it, and James rejects it.

Durkheim's attempts to support his conception of the social mind, the *âme collective*, by analogy are not suc-

¹ *Am. Jour. Soc.*, vol. xix, p. 322-342. See especially p. 333 *et seq.*

² Fouillée, *Les Eléments sociologiques de la morale*, p. 158-174.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 37.

⁴ *Vide supra*, p. 25.

⁵ James, *op. cit.*, vol. i, ch. vi.

cessful. He says that this *âme collective*, because it is a system of representations produced by the interaction of individual minds or of the states of individual minds, is therefore different from the individual mind, just by reason of its being a compound, in the same way that water is different from hydrogen and oxygen, or the organism from the individual cells that compose it, or the representation within the individual mind from the physiological process of the brain-cell from which it is ultimately derived. An analogy, to be useful as an explanation, should be moderately exact; term for term there should be some marked similarity between the elements compared. In what respects, aside from the merely specious one of their both being compounds, is the social mind or the social representation like the organism or the chemical compound? Where is the similarity of the individual mind to the chemical element or to the cell, apart from their being constituent parts of a larger whole? An acquaintanceship at first hand with the mind puts our knowledge of it on an entirely different basis from the knowledge which we have of a cell or a chemical element. We are our minds. If we know anything directly, it is our minds. So that in knowing *what* the cell is, or what the element is, we are in an entirely different situation from that in which we are when knowing the mind.¹

Even the analogy between the production of the social states of mind by the combination and interaction of individual states of mind and the production of the individual state of mind by the interaction of the brain-cells is a weak one. Even if, according to the mind-stuff theory, the social states may be decomposed logically into the most elementary processes of the individual mind, the analogy is

¹ Cf. Tarde, *La Sociologie élémentaire*, p. 221 *et seq.*; also Leuba, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-5; also Deploige, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

certainly open to objection. Is it justifiable to compare the material brain-cell with the individual state of mind, at the same time that one compares the individual state of mind with the social? We see here another evidence of Durkheim's materialistic conception of the origin of mental processes, which was noted in Chapter I.¹ To insist so vigorously on a distinction between the individual-psychic and the social-psychic and then calmly to derive the psychic in its elementary form from matter, seems, to say the least, to be straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.

✓ A phase of Durkheim's psychology which needs passing notice is his intellectualism. The social mind for him, like the individual mind, is a system of representations; *i. e.*, of the intellectual, as opposed to the emotional and the volitional elements of the mental process. The latter two phases of mind are not wholly disregarded, but they are seldom, if ever, stressed.² In this respect Durkheim is out of touch with the modern tendency of psychology away from intellectualism. Psychologists are inclining more and more toward a conception of the state of mind as a complexus of simultaneously coexisting phases, the cognitive, the affective, and the volitional; and that furthermore the volitional, or motor phase, and the emotional phase are more significant of mental processes in their fundamental nature than is their cognitive phase.³

We must remember (to come back to the direct line of

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 23, 24.

² The intellectualist bias of the main arguments is by this time quite evident to the reader. A few citations of the admission of emotional elements into his discussion of the social psychology will suffice. "Rep. Ind.," p. 295; *Méth.*, p. 9; *Div. Tr.*, pp. 70-71; *Vie Rel.*, pp. 453 and 595; *A. S.*, vol. ix, p. 159; *A. S.*, vol. vi, pp. 69-71.

³ On this point, *cf.* Titchener, E. B., *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 359; James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 526; Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 14-18; Höffding, H., *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 100.

our argument) that Durkheim reduces the principle of human individuality to the simple and fundamental basis of biological difference. The mind of the individual being in its entirety a part of the social mind, the body becomes the sole differentiating factor.¹ This contention of our author was criticized in an earlier chapter.² It is an overstatement, to say the least, of the importance of the social mind as against the individual mind. Wundt, the resemblance of whose theory to Durkheim's has been suggested, does not seem to relegate the individual mind to so unimportant a rôle. His voluminous works on physiological psychology indicate that he considers the structural and functional phases of the individual's mental apparatus quite as important as the content phase. That Wundt is primarily the psychologist and Durkheim the sociologist accounts in part for this difference of emphasis. A considerable part of Durkheim's opinion may be traced to the inexorable logic that drives him, apparently, to the conclusion that, since no element of the content of the individual's mind can be wholly free from the modifying influences of the social mind, the whole content of his mind must be ascribed to these influences; thus leaving room for the individuality only in the purely physiological processes and structures.

But by far the most vulnerable side of this theory is its treatment of the individual as a causative factor in the social process. Durkheim's position on this question was considered earlier in this study,³ along with that of Wundt. According to the former, no individual can be the originator of social facts. There are, it is true, certain objec-

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 86, 87.

² *Vide supra*, ch. ii, p. 45.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 68.

tions, valid on general grounds, against this view, that fall down if we accept, with Durkheim, the mind-stuff hypothesis. That is, they are not sound arguments against the theory (of social causation) unless we disregard this major premise. For example, it may be urged that a social mind, being a part of the universe, must be related to the rest of the universe. (This is implicit in Durkheim's philosophy.) The rest of the universe consists of other social minds, of individual minds, and of physical phenomena. With the relation of a social mind to its constituent individual minds we are familiar. The relation of a social mind to other social minds and to the physical world, ought then to be a relation mediated through the individual minds. For how could changes in the physical world get into the social mind save through, ultimately, the sensations of the individuals? Would not the individual mind then be an originative centre with reference to the social mind? In reply Durkheim might say that while the individual mind may be affected by the change in the physical world, the social representation that would be produced because of this cosmic change would be a combination of former states of the individuals' minds modified by their combining with the new state traceable to the cosmic change; and in so far as it was a truly social representation coming to the individual from without it could not be individually originated. In other words, our definition of a social fact (itself really a restatement of the psychological hypothesis) automatically bars any fact from consideration as social unless it be clearly not individual in origin.

The strongest case against a purely social causation theory is that presented by the study of the genius. Whether we accept the Durkheimian major premise or not, the genius is an unanswerable argument against barring the individual as a causal factor in the social life. Durkheim does not

admit this importance of the genius; though the specific references to the genius are very rare in his writings,¹ they are of one tenor.

The genius, it must be remembered, is, consistently with Durkheim's most recent statements, only a superior kind of mould for the reception of social representations. He has simply a finer cerebral endowment than the mediocre or inferior individual. His mental content, like that of the lowest member of his social group, is entirely derived from the social mind of the group. Whatever superiority he may seem to have is really only lent to him by the society in which he lives. Naturally such a "genius" cannot be an originative factor in society. Now this view, which is the logical conclusion from Durkheim's premise, is for practical reasons untenable. To admit that a "genius" exists, means nothing unless it means that he has originative power in society. To say that Goethe or Napoleon merely expressed the social tendencies of their age is scarcely an explanation of why those tendencies were not as well expressed by any Saxon peasant or French grenadier. Granting even that the essence of genius is merely the superiority of a particular cerebral cortex, that cortex is then an originative factor in society. And what about those men of genius that are born too soon—a Galileo or a Socrates? What social group's tendencies do they express? It is certainly true that the genius may, and usually does, speak the tongue of his age and group—but that he adds no new words to that tongue cannot be admitted,—unless we desire to say that he is no genius.

The weakness of this theory of social causation lies in an implied intellectual equality of an unreal and impossible kind. To say, as Durkheim does,² that the differences in

¹ A passing reference, *Méth.*, p. 137, footnote.

² *Suic.*, p. 363-4.

the characteristics of various individuals neutralize each other is more or less nonsense. Does the criminal neutralize the philanthropist, the imbecile the genius? Even if we grant that the "collective" state of mind is produced by the fusion of individual states, must we necessarily conceive of the individual states, regardless of their individual, and varying sources, as being all of equal value and force in the fusing process? If mentality be at all correlated with physical endowment, it is fair to assume the same variability in the products of different minds. Why should not the mental products of the genius then be of superior importance in that fusion out of which comes the social state of mind? How else can we explain the dominance of an individual, a phenomenon common in the assembly, in the committee, if not so frequent in the larger group of the nation? For surely the rule passed by the assembly, or the committee, and designed to govern its individual members is a "social fact" in the Durkheimian sense. The basic weakness of the group psychology of our author is to be found then in its mechanistic assumption of the automatic co-operation of a number of equal forces, the product of which is naturally not more imputable to any one of these forces than to any other. That in a society the contribution of a genius is not unmodified by the contributions of the rest of the members of the society is easily granted; but that it may not be the deciding influence in shaping a collective judgment seems founded neither in fact nor in logic. Social mind is of the nature of a living entity; such a theory of its origin is, to use a favorite term of Durkheim's, a "simplisme".

It is possible then, to conceive of the individual as an originaive force in the production of social phenomena even while granting the major premise of Durkheim that the social mind is a compound of individual mental states.

The individual becomes of the first importance, however, when we abandon this premise, and attack the problem of the social mind from a different psychological vantage-point. Let us start frankly with the "individual" mind, while admitting with our author that no "pure" individual ever existed.

The individual whose mind we make the point of departure for our analysis of the social mind, brings with him into his mundane existence an organic cerebral structure, correlated with which are certain psychic predispositions: the instincts, their accompanying emotions, and other innate tendencies, like suggestibility, imitateness, sympathy; a plasticity that is of vital importance in habit formation; some power of choice (whether scientifically or pragmatically verifiable). Every individual of normal inheritance has a sort of standard equipment for the mental life; but the sizes and qualities of the various parts of the equipment differ among the various individuals, sometimes over a considerable range of variability. This makes possible, by a mere chance combination of these elements in their various grades and quantities, an indefinitely large variety of inherited mental structures.

The process of development of this inherited mental structure of the individual is in part a ripening of these tendencies through their functioning when the proper stimulus from the environment impinges upon the nervous system. This environment is ultimately physical; but it is mediated to the growing infant by other members of the social group. With some few things the infant is in direct contact; but his environment is principally that of persons. His conduct is regulated at first by a more or less automatic establishment of pleasure-pain associations with various acts and later by the approval or disapproval of his social group. Some elementary conceptions, like that of

space, he may get directly through sensation, unmediated by the educative processes of the social group. But by far the largest part of his mental content he gets from his social environment; either unconsciously, as when he absorbs the conviction that his family or tribe or nation is preëminently distinguished and superior; or consciously, through the direct teaching of his elders in the home, the school, or the workshop. There is no point, however, at which one can say: here the inherited mental structure stops; beyond this only the content of the mind, social in its origin explains the state of the individual mind. The two, structure and content, are *solidaire*. The structure is modified according to the nature of the material on which it practices. The material is modified according to the nature of the structure that seizes hold of it. When this process has been completed in the sense that the original plasticity of the mind has been somewhat decreased, and the mind has become a relatively permanent arrangement of habits, impulses, memories, the result is an adult individual. If this be a correct analysis of the process of development of the individual mind, then the individual mind is largely of social origin. That is, its content is formed chiefly of material which the individual has received from other individuals of his social *milieu*, and its form has been modified by the character of this material.

Up to this point in our analysis we have been considering the individual as an absorptive centre in the social group. He has also another function; he is active, influences others, as he himself is influenced. His mind, as formed by the *milieu* of his infancy, childhood and adolescence, has attained a certain consistency. His sphere of activity widens with his approach to and entrance upon adult life. He becomes an active instead of a merely passive unit of the social group. He influences strongly those

fellow-members of his group who are in immediate contact with him. Through these immediate neighbors his influence is passed with weakened force to those other members of his group not in the same close touch with him as are his neighbors. He is a radiating centre of psychic influence. And such, in greater or less degree, is every other normal member of the same group. Each individual mind is therefore a function of all the other minds, though of course not the same function of each one of them. There are qualitative differences in the effects that minds have upon each other: in one case the effect is largely wrought through the intellectual phase of the interaction; in another through the affective and volitional phases. Two minds may have an unequal effect, within the same phase of mind-activity, upon a third mind, *e. g.*, one of the two may be a much stronger centre of suggestion than the other is. This highly fragmentary and merely suggestive statement of the interaction processes of the minds of individuals in social groups, does, in spite of its brevity, show how infinitely complex the social situation is on its psychic side.

At this point may be suggested a possible justification of the principle upon which Durkheim lays so much emphasis; namely, that social phenomena should be objectively considered, as concrete products of the "social mind". In his theory, the genesis of these phenomena is quite simple, once his psychological premise is granted. On the other hand, in the conception of the social mind as directly explainable by the mental processes of interacting individuals, which we have here briefly sketched, there is an enormous complexity, which can be resolved only by attacking the problem of the nature of the individual mind and its functioning in society. In its entirety the social-psychic process baffles all but an attempt at broad generalization. Durkheim cuts this Gordian knot by referring

the interaction of minds in society and the process of deriving from this interaction a product in the form of a social fact to a psychological theory that is highly metaphysical. He then starts, as it were, *in medias res* with this social fact, the product. Thus the entire emphasis of his psychology (individual as well as social) is on the content of the mind. The functional side of the mind's activities interests him but little. However satisfactory such a method may be from the point of view of actually attacking concrete problems in sociology, it falls short at the most difficult and crucial point: that of explaining the origin of the social facts in a way that is scientifically verifiable.

An analysis of the origin and products of the social mind has been the principal content of some of the most significant work in sociology. Le Bon and Tarde, as well as other psychologists, have studied the psychological mechanism of the crowd, and of the social groups greater and more stable than the crowd. Often this explanation has been one-sided; *e. g.*, Tarde's insistence on the social process as being imitation alone; but, when balanced by other explanations, it has usually been very useful and illuminating. Psychologists like McDougall have analyzed the psychic apparatus of man and its significance for social life. Giddings has analyzed the process of formation of mental coherence in society, and of consciously directed coöperation. Baldwin and Cooley have studied the logical and psychological relations of the self and the other-than-self within the consciousness. Ross has treated descriptively the conditions that are antecedent to, and the accompaniment of, the harmonious functioning of men living in association. All of these workers have made contributions in the field of genetic social psychology; they have explained how the mutual interaction of minds in society results in the formation of a functioning unity, which may be called the "social mind".

It is significant that when Durkheim attempts to explain just how the individual minds interact to produce the social mind, he lapses into something almost like that individual psychology which he so utterly condemns.¹ He said (early in his career, it is true)² that general sociology ought to study the formation of the collective consciousness. Aside from the essay on individual and collective representations, he has studied the formation of the collective consciousness only to the extent of repeating as a theme with slight variations, "that it is formed by the interaction, the fusing, the mingling of the individual minds." Concrete illustrations of how the minds of individuals A, B, C, D, have produced the social mind (ABCD) or its products (abcd) he does not explain—because he cannot so explain them and remain true to his premise. On the other hand, given the premise of the mind-stuff theory, the whole problem is solved.

This brings us to the question: what is the social mind, if we may not or can not conceive of it in the Durkheimian sense?

Our minds, as individual members of a group of associating minds, are in constant interaction; each mind is a function of all the others. There is thus a basic oneness in diversity. Out of this socially produced oneness, plus natural psychological uniformity, springs, in reaction to common stimulation, a like response. Without going into a prolonged analysis of this phenomenon, such as Giddings has made, we can summarize the process by saying that it eventuates, on its functional side, in a uniformity of action consciously perceived and directed by the agents, with a value heightened, by reason of the magnitude of the

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 67.

² *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxii, p. 80 (1886).

reciprocal suggestive processes involved, far beyond the limits of the value of the purely individual act. Out of this fact of superior valuation comes the prestige of our author's "social" fact (as he himself has indicated).¹ These social types of action acquire an emotion-tone, and a volitional force (due to the effect of the repeated and voluminous suggestions from other members of the group) which set them apart from the specifically individual actions that have not been thus accentuated.

There is nothing in any type of activity which *ipso facto* makes it social. Any element of the individual's activity (as Durkheim himself has pointed out)² may be so stressed—witness the fact that every type of man's action has at one time or another, in some group or other, been the object of social prescription, *i. e.*, has been a social fact in Durkheim's sense of the term.

The content of the social mind then is that common area of all the individual fields of consciousness on which the social emphasis falls. At the same time this content is an integral part of the content of the individual mind. The mutual strengthening of the volitions, emotions, and ideas that are peculiar to this area, gives to the individual that sense of oneness with his fellows which we pragmatically regard as the consciousness of the social mind in which the individual minds are actively functional parts.

Therefore it is not necessary to accept Durkheim's conception of the nature of mental processes in general in order to explain that reality which is in so peculiar a way both outside us, and within us: namely, that system of interacting minds the objective side of which we call the social group.

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 67.

² *Vide supra*, p. 44.

This view allows just as much objectivity to the concrete products of social interaction as does Durkheim's theory. For example, why should laws or customs be any less objective if we deny that they exist as entities outside of their individual manifestations? In fact, it is a remarkable paradox that a semi-Platonic idea should be, by virtue of its pure detachment from the individual manifestation, objective!

Moreover, we are thus enabled to free ourselves from that one-sided intellectualism which is so integral a part of Durkheim's psychology. The volitional and affective phases of the mental process can, consistently with our theory, receive the full emphasis that they are now recognized as deserving. These phases are neither adequately evaluated in Durkheim's theory, nor are they accounted for in his fundamental hypothesis.

CHAPTER V

SOCIOLOGY AND THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

DURKHEIM's conception of the relation between sociology and psychology was discussed in Chapter III. The point to be considered in this chapter is that of the relationship between sociology and the other social sciences, economics, political science, history, public and comparative law, *Kulturgeschichte*, etc. How distinctly does our author consider that the field of sociology is marked off from that of these special sciences? If there is an overlapping of fields, how extensive is it? Are the methods of sociology or its points of view different from those of these other sciences?

In one of the earliest formal articles over his name,¹ Durkheim expresses his views as to what sociology is and as to what it ought to be.

Sociology [he says] has often been reproached with being very vague and ill-defined; it must be admitted that it has more than once merited this reproach. If, indeed, it ought to study all phenomena occurring within societies, it is not *a* science, but *the* science. . . . We, for our part, believe that it has a more limited scope, and a more precise object. For a fact to be sociological, it must interest not merely all the individuals taken separately, but the society itself, *i. e.* the *être collectif*.²

Religion, considered merely as a set of beliefs and prac-

¹ *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxii, 1886, "Les Études de Science sociale," a critical review of works by Spencer, Regnard, Burdeau, Coste, Arreat, and Schaeffle.

² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

tices referring to a supernatural being, as mere products of the imagination, has no value for the sociologist, though it has for the psychologist. The sociologist and the historian of religions have two different tasks. "Not that religion has not a place in sociology. But the sociologist ought to undertake solely to determine its social rôle." He also says: "The sociologist ought then to consider economic facts, the state, morality, law, religion, as so many functions of the social organism, and he will study them as phenomena taking place within the limits of a circumscribed and definite society".¹ This will mean that economics, political science, the study of law and morals, shall lose their autonomy, cease to be summaries of logical concepts of *a priori* reasoning, and shall become what they really should be, studies of various phases of the social whole, the nation.

Sociology, then, includes three particular sciences: the first, which studies the state; the second, which studies the regulative functions, law, morals, religion; and the third, which studies the economic functions of the society. Besides this normal sociology, there is a pathological sociology of which criminology is the part farthest advanced. . . . These special studies [*sc.*, economics, etc., and criminology], however, do not exhaust the field of sociology. . . . There exists a general sociology which has for an object to study the general properties of social life. It is these particularly that are treated in the works of Comte, Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Le Bon, Gumplowicz, Siciliani, etc. But it must not be thought that it has been created *ex nihilo*. On the contrary, it finds its materials all prepared in the three special sciences just mentioned, and of which it is a kind of synthesis. . . . It is the task of general sociology to study the formation of the collective consciousness, the principle of the division of labor, the function and limits of natural selection and of the struggle for existence within soci-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

eties, the law of the heredity or of the continuity of the social evolution, etc., etc. Have we not here the materials for some fine [*belles*] generalizations?¹

The salient features, then, of this early exposition of our author's conception of the field and the relationships of sociology are these: (1) The phenomena occurring within society, religious, moral, political, economic, are to be considered under the aspect of their significance as collective facts, not merely as general facts. So far as they relate only to each individual in the social group they are of no value to the sociologist. So far as they relate to all of the group as a collective unity they are of value. This is the earliest statement by Durkheim of the nature of the social fact, which we have more fully discussed in Chapter III. Another way of expressing this early view is to consider such facts as social so far as they are "functions of the social organism". (2) There is a "pathological" sociology, studying abnormal social facts. (3) There is also a general sociology, a synthesis of the facts presented by the special social sciences.

Durkheim, while confessing a belief in the existence of a general sociology, has never emphasized it either in his discussions of the method and scope of sociology or in his treatment of sociological problems. Occasionally he mentions it with approval;² but his publications fail to reveal

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

² *E. g.*, *A. S.*, vol. i, p. iv. "It is a branch of sociology no less useful than the others, and if it lends itself more easily to the abuse of generality and of fancy, this is not a necessity of its nature. Nevertheless, we admit that our efforts will tend above all to call forth studies treating the most limited subjects, and belonging to special branches of sociology. For, since general sociology can be only the synthesis of these special sciences, since it can consist only in a comparison of their most general results, it is not possible except in the degree that these are advanced." And in the preface of vol. ii, of the *A. S.* (p. i) he repeats this idea.

anything that looks even at a distance like the general sociology such as has been put forward by the authors whom he cites in the excerpt just quoted. The nearest approach to it is *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique*, and that contains only a few fragments of what might be developed into a system of general sociology. As we shall see in the discussion of his methodology in Chapter VI, Durkheim practically changes his idea of pathological sociology; at least in regard to making crime a pathological social fact, as he seems to do in the excerpt we have just mentioned.

While in *Les Règles* Durkheim does not stress the problem of the scope of sociology, except in its relation to psychology, he treats the definitions of "social fact" at considerable length; the conception that he has of it is significant for the relation of sociology to the special social sciences, as we shall soon see.

"We come then," he says, "to the point of expressing in a precise way the domain of sociology. It consists only of a determinate group of phenomena. A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising on the individual."¹

What are the logical results of such a limitation of the social fact? Does it set apart for the special field of scientific activity of the sociologist any group of phenomena not already the subject-matter of social sciences? From the quotations that have been made it is clear that religious,² moral, and juridic³ facts, possessing as they all do the characteristics of collectivity, and of compulsory power, are included within the field of the strictly "social". Economic facts are essentially, though perhaps not so obviously,

¹ *Méth.*, p. 15, see also *ibid.*, p. 8, and *supra*, ch. iii, p. 58.

² *Cf. A. S.*, vol. ii, p. 23.

³ *Cf. A. S.*, vol. vii, p. 375.

as coercive as those of morality or of law. Phenomena of social morphology, as we saw before,¹ Durkheim also considers as belonging to this general class of phenomena. The facts of a truly scientific political science are social in the sense that our author uses this term. Since all phenomena that have occurred within society and have been recorded fall within the field of history, many social facts are, of course, included in the material of historical investigation. Thus it is clear, that, given the definition of "social fact" to which Durkheim is committed, the field of sociology is logically not clearly distinct from that of the special social sciences, but to some degree these fields must overlap. That overlapping may be so great as to constitute coincidence of areas.

In the essay, "*Sociologie et sciences sociales*," we have a comparatively recent and explicit discussion of Durkheim's views on the question.² The thesis of this essay is a double one; its two parts are: (1) "Sociology is, and can be, only the *corpus*, the system, of the social sciences." (2) "This *rapprochement* [*sc.*, of the social sciences] under a common rubric does not constitute a mere verbal operation, but it implies and indicates a radical change in the method and the organization of these sciences."³

As a preliminary to the defence of these propositions Durkheim discusses the views of Comte, Spencer, John St. Mill, Giddings, and Simmel, on the relation of sociology to the various social sciences.

Sociology, he says, was cradled by philosophy. Only a philosopher could create a science *de novo*. All of Comte's predecessors as well as his opponents were philosophers;

¹ *Vide supra*, ch. iii, pp. 62, 63.

² *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lv, 1903.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 465.

so it is natural that sociology should have arisen in the thought of the philosopher Comte. While over all natural facts, including those of society, Comte posited a reign of law, still, to him the various fields were very clearly distinct. Hence, sociology, being a science, had in common with other sciences only its positive method. Moreover, the few social sciences of that day, *e. g.*, economics, were far from being scientific. They were extremely ideological, and not inductive. Out of this condition of the social sciences arose Comte's disdain for them in general.¹

Spencer, too, was an ideologist and a philosopher. He made, however, two distinct advances on Comte's work; he reintegrated society with nature, made its evolution a part of cosmic evolution; and he introduced the idea of societies, as against the "society" of Comte. This permitted the introduction of classification of societies, a step necessary if a science was to be built up.²

Comte's path, as was logically inevitable, was soon shown to be a *cul-de-sac*. His one supreme contribution, the law of the three stages, could lead nowhere, for it was the grand conclusion, mis-placed at the beginning of the science instead of at its end. It did not present that "fecundity" and "continuity" characteristic of truly scientific conceptions. Comte's followers never got beyond it. The only progress in a science is a progress by specialization, and such progress was impossible in Comte's system.³

Sociology, in our time, Durkheim believes, has not progressed far beyond Comte. One tendency which is really a retrogression from Comte's position calls for notice. Modern sociologies are largely philosophic in method and

¹ *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lv, 1903, pp. 466-469.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 469-471.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 470-1.

content; in so far they are like that of Comte. But they nearly all attempt to explain society by a single fundamental principle: imitation, struggle for existence, race conflict, or physical environment. In that respect they fall short of Comte's ideal of a social synthesis which included all facts of social life; because the single fundamental principle, in itself alone, would lead inevitably to specialization. Modern writers have eliminated the tendency to specialization from sociology. "While each of the social sciences is limited," they say, "to a determinate category of social phenomena, sociology has for its subject-matter social life in general; it is as the general social science that it constitutes a distinct individuality."¹

What is meant by the word "general" as it is used in this title, "general sociology"?

There are two ways of interpreting it. A "general" science may be (1) a science concrete, synthetic, where the other sciences are abstract and analytic; "general" in the comprehensive sense, as including all the phenomena of society; (2) a science abstract, analytic, taking from the material of the other sciences the elements common to all, and being hence of a high degree of indefiniteness; an extensive use of the term.

The first definition is that held to by Mill.² According to Durkheim, Mill conceives of the field of sociology as one including all the states of a society in their coexistences ("correlations"), *i. e.*, the "static" problem; and in their successions, *i. e.*, the dynamic problem. Our author's objection to this conception of a general sociology is based not so much on theoretical as on practical considerations. He says:

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 472-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 473.

A whole so heterogeneous [*sc.*, the mass of material that Mill would include] could not be studied *en bloc* as if it were endowed with an objective unity. It is an infinite world of which one can have only an abbreviated conception. So far as one attempts to embrace it at a glance and in its entirety, one must be resigned to perceiving it broadly and summarily, *i. e.* confusedly. It is then necessary that each part of it be studied by itself; each is vast enough to serve as matter for a whole science. And so this general and unique science called sociology resolves itself into a multitude of distinct, although *solidaire*, branches.¹

Even the border regions between two of these branches are to be studied by the specialist in either one or the other of the two, and not by the "general" sociologist.²

Of the sociologists who use the word "general" in the second sense of the term, Giddings is chosen by Durkheim as representative.³ He believes the subject-matter of general sociology to be the universal, common elements of all social processes, economic, political, etc. It is not logically subsequent, but antecedent, to the special social sciences; it is the basis of them; "its far-reaching conclusions are the postulates of the social sciences." Against this view Durkheim advances three objections: (1) Logically antecedent or not, the materials for such a general science are those of the special sciences; (2) these elementary forms, which are not "primitive" but are "universal", are nowhere revealed in a pure isolation from their local variations; the lack, however, of a system of classification makes this isolation a matter of arbitrary determination; (3) the general sociologist will be dropping constantly

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 474.

² *Ibid.*, p. 475.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 476-9. See, also, Giddings, *Princ. of Sociology*, p. 33 *et seq.*

into the specialist's field to handle materials with which he is not competent to deal. All these inevitable shortcomings, due to a faulty method, make this type of general sociology merely a "methodical philosophy", such as that which Comte attempted.

Let us interrupt for a moment the development of Durkheim's thesis, in order to examine a little more closely his criticism of the view held by Giddings. This criticism is rooted in the profound difference between the psychological approaches of the two thinkers. Durkheim, as we saw in Chapter III, separates the social- from the individual-psychic. Now the "universal elements" of Giddings are individual-psychic entities; they are the elements common to all forms of association; association is rooted in, and built upon, the individual's psychic nature. For Durkheim the social, though of the psychic order, is not, except in the most vague way, dependent upon the individual's psychic processes. Thus Durkheim cannot account for any individual-psychic elements common to all phases of social life *as such*.

To resume Durkheim's argument. We have, besides these two conceptions of "general" sociology held by Mill and Giddings, still another, that of Simmel. For this writer the distinction between the special social sciences and general sociology is based on the differences between the "content" of society, *i. e.*, the phenomena occurring within it, and the container, *i. e.*, the association itself within which these phenomena appear. Association is the sole entity expressly social, and sociology is the science of association in abstracto. The form, or container, is not the social structure, but the system of relations between parts, including such things as the division of labor, competition, domination, subordination, etc.

Our author criticises this conception on the following

grounds: by what right, he asks, does Simmel separate containers from contained? Both are aspects of the same whole. Furthermore, there is no clear definition of the sociological field.¹

Summarizing then the weaknesses of "general sociology" as conceived of by these various writers: this science has not marked off any definite portion of the field of research; each worker attempts to cover it all; and this necessarily results in a semi-philosophic kind of generalization. The practical result is that sociology is marking time and getting nowhere.

To take the position assumed by Durkheim on this question does not mean, he assures us, that the

idea of a positive science of societies, comparable to biology, should be abandoned. Quite on the contrary, this idea maintains its value even to-day, and it must be utilized resolutely. Only, in order to be fertile, it must be applied to the appropriate material, *i. e.* the totality of social facts without exception. We may not isolate this or that aspect of this totality to make of it the special object of a new science [*sc.*, general sociology]; any more than biology [*sc.*, "general"] may treat one part of biological phenomena rather than another. Sociology is nothing if it is not the science of societies considering at the same time their organization, their functioning, and their development. All that enters into their constitution or into the course of their development belongs to the sociologist. Such a multitude of phenomena cannot be studied, evidently, except through a number of special disciplines, among which social facts are apportioned, and which complement each other. Consequently, sociology can be only the system of the social sciences.²

¹ *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lv, 1903, pp. 480-1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 485. See also *A. S.*, vol. i, pp. i, iv; *A. S.*, vol. ii, pp. i, ii; *Suic.*, pp. vi, vii, viii.

What does it mean, to call the special social sciences branches of sociology? "To integrate them in sociology is not merely to impose on them a new generic name, it is to show that they should change their direction [*s'orienter dans un sens nouveau*]. The problem is to impregnate the detail of facts . . . with that notion of natural law, the extension of which to the social realm in general is the great glory of Comte."¹ In this way the sociologist continues in the spirit of Comte and Spencer, though not with their method. This would be a very difficult task were it not for the fact that in the past fifty years the workers in the special social sciences have been orienting themselves in a sociological direction, without formally assuming the name of "sociologists".² They show this tendency in many ways.

History, for example, no longer picks out the individual, peculiar, and isolated phenomena which are difficult to subject to any conception of ordered sequence, but it studies institutions, the permanent elements of society, which afford material for comparisons in time and space. Comparative jurisprudence applies the scientific method to another field. Economics has ceased to be purely ideological, *a priori*, universal, and has become inductive; it studies the facts in their local and temporal variations. Besides these there have arisen new branches of social science. Anthropology—ethnology, *Kulturgeschichte*, comparative study of religions, comparative ethics—all these have seized upon the synthetic method of science. And while these syntheses are often only descriptive, and sometimes frag-

¹ *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lv, pp. 485-6.

² Cf. Durkheim's review of Ed. Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums*, in *A. S.*, vol. xi, p. 12, "Cette culture, M. M. l'appelle anthropologique: mais le mot importe peu à la chose. Au fond, c'est bien de sociologie qu'il s'agit."

mentary and incomplete, they are steps in the direction of greater harmonizations. What has materialized out of all these researches is that the generality [*sc.*, uniformity] of social phenomena testifies that they depend essentially upon general causes, which, wherever they are present, produce always the same effects, with an inevitability equal to that of other natural causes.¹ We must consider statistics a branch of science as old as sociology. "Statistics prove the existence of general and impersonal forces by measuring them. . . . The material of social life where it appears to be most fluid, acquires thus [*sc.*, in statistical rates] a consistency and a fixity which quite naturally demands scientific investigation".²

This process of "sociologizing" the social sciences has been, then, an application of scientific methods to the data of social life. It is still unfinished. There are still imperfections in the social sciences which require correction. These needs Durkheim summarizes as follows:

(1) The want of a sufficiently wide and effective recognition of the interdependence and unity of all social phenomena as a working hypothesis; (2) the tendency of the specialist needlessly to multiply entities [*cf.* the "judicial consciousness" of Post] and to satisfy themselves with facile explanations and naïve "*simpliciste*" formulae; (3) the tendency to interpret all social phenomena in terms of one "*specialisme*" [as in the "economic" or the "religious" interpretation of history]; (4) the tendency of contiguous special sciences to overlap [like those of religion and law, or geographical sociology and demography]; (5) the tendency of the special sciences to move at random without adequate conception of a definite purpose,

¹ *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lv, pp. 486-491.

² *Ibid.*, p. 492.

³ *Cf.* Criticism of Ratzel in *A. S.*, vol. ii, p. 531 *et seq.*

and hence not only to waste effort, but to leave important areas of the sociological field uncultivated.¹

We may summarize in Durkheim's own words what he conceives the true problem of the sociologist to be.

So, although they [the special social sciences] tend more and more to orient themselves in a sociological direction, this orientation remains still, at many points, undecided and unconscious of itself. To labor to make it precise, to accentuate it, to render it more conscious, is the urgent problem of sociology. . . . For, from the relations that will arise between them [*sc.*, the special social sciences] will be derived common doctrines, which will be the soul of the organism thus constituted, and will become the subject-matter of a renovated and revived social philosophy, one as positive and progressive as the sciences themselves of which it will be the crown.^{2 3}

The periodical publication appearing from the editorial hand of our author and called the *Année Sociologique* is of some significance at this point, for it illustrates practically the application of Durkheim's ideas as to the field of sociology and its relation to the other social sciences.

This series began in 1898. Ten volumes were published at intervals of about a year, the last of these appearing in 1907. Since that time two volumes have appeared, one covering 1906-1909, and the latest, 1909-1912. Its scope was, until the eleventh volume, that of an annual presenting one or two reports of researches, and a very

¹ "On the Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and to Philosophy," *Sociological Papers*, 1904, pp. 199-200.

² *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lv, pp. 496-7.

³ Another expression of his conception of sociology and its scope is a citation by him, with his expressed approval, of the definition of sociology as "the science of institutions, their genesis and functioning," given by MM. Fauconnet and Mauss, in the *Grande Encyclopédie*; see Méth., xxii.

large number of reviews of that current literature in the social field which had appeared during the preceding year. A careful scheme of classification of this literature was followed from the beginning. The last two volumes, however, have omitted the original studies and have confined themselves to reviewing. A new, separate series, *Les Travaux de l'Année Sociologique*, now includes the works that under the first plan would have appeared in the *Année Sociologique*.

The purpose of this latter publication was twofold: (1) not merely to review and summarize strictly sociological works; but as it was stated in the Preface to the first volume:

What the sociologists have, we believe, a pressing need of, is to be regularly informed of researches made in the special sciences, the history of law, of customs, of religion, social statistics, the economic sciences, etc., for it is in them that are found the materials out of which sociology must be constructed. . . . Our enterprise may be useful in another way, it may serve to draw toward sociology certain special sciences which hold themselves too aloof, to their great hurt and to ours.¹

(2) To illustrate the sort of work which must be done in sociology, in the way of specialization, by publishing the reports of researches mentioned above. "We do not ask of these works that they conform to any definite formula; it is sufficient that they have a definite object and that they be done methodically".²

¹ *A. S.*, vol. i, pp. i-ii.

² *Ibid.*, p. iv. Durkheim is assisted in the work of reviewing by a large number of scholars. The reviews are nearly always signed. Our author has done a large part of this reviewing himself, and these reviews at his hand are frequently interesting in their bearing on his own theories.

Without wishing to intrude with what may seem a mere bibliographical list, the writer feels that it would be clarifying to the reader's conception of the views of our author as examined in this chapter, if Durkheim's classification of the literature of importance to the sociologist were here set forth; with, in addition, the list of the original articles published in the *Année*, and those now appearing in the *Travaux*.

Table of Contents of Année Sociologique, vol. xii.

FIRST SECTION. General Sociology.

- I. General conceptions of sociology; methodology.
- II. General treatises; various general questions.
- III. Collective psychology.
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- V. Civilization and types of civilization.

SECOND SECTION. Religious Sociology.

- I. General treatises; philosophy of religion.
- II. Religious systems of primitive societies.
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THIRD SECTION. Juridic and Moral Sociology.

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- VII. The law of contractual relations.
- VIII. The penal law.
- IX. Organization and procedure of the judiciary.
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FOURTH SECTION. Criminology and social (*morale*) statistics.
(Study of juridic and moral rules with regard to their functioning.)

- I. Social statistics (*statistique morale*) in general.
- II. Nuptiality, divorces.
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FIFTH SECTION. Economic Sociology.

- I. General studies. Method.
- II. Economic systems.
- III. Varieties of production (according to the kind of product).
- IV. Organization (*régimes*) of production (guilds, trusts, etc.).
- V. Forms of production (home, factory, small and large scale, etc.).
- VI. Value, money, prices.
- VII. Economic distribution classes.
- VIII. Organs of distribution (labor unions, poor-law systems, etc.).
- IX. Morphology of distribution.
- X. Elements of distribution (wages, profit, interest).
- XI. Relations between economic phenomena and other social phenomena.
- XII. Special "*economies*", agricultural, commercial, industrial.

SIXTH SECTION. Social Morphology.

- I. Geographic bases of the social life.
- II. Of population in general.
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- IV. Urban and rural distribution of the population.
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SEVENTH SECTION. Miscellaneous.

- I. Æsthetic sociology.
- II. Language.
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List of Original Articles Appearing in the Année Sociologique.

- Vol. I. Durkheim: La prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines.
G. Simmel: Comment les formes sociales se maintiennent.
- Vol. II. Durkheim: De la définition des phénomènes religieux.
Hubert et Mauss: Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice.
- Vol. III. Ratzel: Le sol, la société, l'État.
Richard: Les crises sociales et la criminalité.
Steinmetz: Classification des types sociaux.
- Vol. IV. Bouglé: Remarques sur le régime des castes.
Durkheim: Deux lois de l'évolution pénale.
Charmont: Note sur les causes d'extinction de la propriété corporative.
- Vol. V. F. Simiand: Essai sur le prix de charbon en France et au xix. siècle.
Durkheim: Sur le totémisme.
- Vol. VI. Durkheim et Mauss: De quelques formes primitives de classification. Contribution à l'étude des représentations collectives.
Bouglé: Revue générale des théories récentes sur la division du travail.

- Vol. VII. Hubert et Mauss: Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie.
- Vol. VIII. H. Bourgin: Essai sur une forme d'industrie. La boucherie en Paris au xix. siècle.
 Durkheim: Sur l'organisation matrimoniale des sociétés australiennes.
- Vol. IX. A. Meillet: Comment les mots changent de sens.
 M. Mauss: Essai sur les variations saisonnières des sociétés eskimos. Essai de morphologie sociale.
- Vol. X. P. Huvelin: Magie et droit individuel.
 R. Hertz: Contribution à une étude sur la représentation collective de mort.
 E. Bouglé: Note sur le droit et la caste en Inde.

The works so far published under the direction of Durkheim in the series, *Travaux de l'Année Sociologique*, are the following:

Bouglé (C.): Essais sur le régime des Castes.

Hubert et Mauss: Mélanges d'histoire des religions.

Levy-Bruhl: Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures.

Durkheim: Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.

Halbwachs: La classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie.

CHAPTER VI

DURKHEIM'S METHOD

MUCH of Durkheim's methodology as well as of his sociological theory in general is summarized in *Les Règles*. This little book contains, he says, "the results of our methods of work (*pratique*), which we would here expound in their entirety and submit to discussion. They are, of course, implicitly contained in the book which we recently published on the 'division of labor' ".¹ In his defence of several positions assumed in *Les Règles* he calls it a "summary (*résumé*) of personal practice, necessarily limited, which ought of course to develop in proportion as one acquires a more extended and profound knowledge (*expérience*) of the social reality."² These rules are, from their methodological nature only provisional; for methods change as the science advances.³ Aside from his apparently changed concept of the individual mind as an independent entity, Durkheim has not discarded the ideas expressed in this manual of method; they seem throughout his work to hold for him the same validity as when first expressed. We may safely accept *Les Règles* as a statement of the guiding principles of his method.

Two phases of Durkheim's method have already been

¹ *Méth.*, p. 3.

² *Méth.*, Preface to the second edition, p. x.

³ *Ibid.*

examined: his definition of "social facts" and his principle of social causation.¹ There remain to be considered four other important elements of his practice. Briefly stated they are the following: the principles that should govern the observation of social facts; the distinction between the normal and the pathological in sociological study; the nature of social types; and the logical means for adducing positive proof in sociology.

(1) *The Principles for the Observation of Social Facts*

Every science is in its early phases ideological, says Durkheim.² By this he means that it then consists largely of a logical development of one or more leading concepts. Observed facts are utilized at best merely as illustrations of these leading principles, not as the material from which these principles are derived by induction.³ The constant tendency is to treat the concepts as if they were the actual concrete material of the science; they are confounded with the objective realities. Moreover, these concepts are frequently, if not usually, the simple, common (*vulgaire*) ideas about things;⁴ often enough involving inaccuracy as to fact; as, *e. g.*, those of the Ptolomaic system of astronomy. They are the "*notiones vulgares*", or "*praenotiones*" of Bacon.⁵ Besides this, no sooner is such a science created, than it is transformed into an art; or, more exactly, it starts as an art, with practical aims. Thus chemistry tried in its alchemistic days to find the philosopher's stone.

Nowhere is this ideological method so common and so seductive as in the social field.⁶ The psychic origin of social

¹ *Vide supra*, ch. iii.

² *Méth.*, pp. 20-21.

³ *Ibid.*, p., 21.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

phenomena, as it is ordinarily conceived, makes the derivation of such phenomena from ideas a simple and apparently logical process. Thus it seems easy to consider that the idea of contract lies at the basis of society.—Again, the enormous and complicated mass of facts in the social realm makes a summary and arbitrary view of its phenomena a simple way out of the difficulties of the problems it presents. In the social field especially we are in danger of accepting the “*praenotiones*” in the absence of scientific terminology and definition.

Comte and Spencer each attempted a science of society, but without success. Comte failed because, inconsistent with his intent to treat social phenomena as facts of the natural order, and as subject to “positive” methods of study, he tried to explain all social facts by means of his theory of the evolution of humanity.¹ Spencer was not successful because he arbitrarily set up juxtaposition and co-operation as the defining characters of society. Moreover, his “industrial” and “militaristic” societies are both ideological conceptions.² Out of these two writers’ definitions can be derived, by a process of deductive reasoning, all the characteristics of the society that they discuss. Beside these writers, whom Durkheim singles out as best illustrating this tendency, nearly all the other writers in the fields of ethics and economics have used this method. In ethics the utilitarian principle, or the categorical imperative, is set up as the principle of morality, and the concrete rules of conduct are then derived from one or the other.³ In economics the actual facts are used merely as illustrations of how the desire for riches works itself out logically in actual life; how the principle of value, derived not from

¹ *Méth.*, p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

facts, but solely by deductive processes, is illustrated in the market; and so on.^{1 2 3}

That these sciences in their early stages were to a large extent developed in practice, naturally weakened them in so far as their scientific value was concerned.

Now the radical need of the social sciences, according to our author, is to become "positive", *i. e.*, essentially, "inductive", "scientific" in the accepted sense of the term. Durkheim says: "This book is above all an effort to treat the facts of the moral life according to the method of the positive sciences."⁴ A necessary antecedent step in all such treatment is to eliminate hindering metaphysical presuppositions, as well as the "*prænotiones*" which are usually of even a more humble origin.⁵ For extreme libertarian metaphysics, of a sort to overthrow the principle of necessary causation, must be dropped or there can be no science of any sort. Moreover this rule (of eliminating metaphysical presuppositions) implies in itself no "metaphysical conception, no speculation as to the fundamental nature (*fond*) of things."⁶ This statement of Durkheim's implies at the most a desire on his part to avoid entangling philosophical alliances, for we see that his psychology is based on a metaphysical hypothesis. But this need not be held against him as an unpardonable offence against scientific

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 31-32.

² This criticism by Durkheim was noted in the discussion of social causation, *vide supra*, p. 59.

³ There are numerous other criticisms by our author, beside these stated in *Les Règles*; cf. *A. S.*, vol. i, p. 69; *A. S.*, vol. ii, p. 16; *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, "La Science positive de la morale en Allemagne," pp. 42, 276; *A. S.*, vol. x, p. 383 *et seq.*

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxvii.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Méth.*, p. xiii.

method; for, as a matter of fact, no science is wholly without a metaphysical background. It must at least have as a basis some "Erkenntnisstheorie", as Bergson has shown.¹

The fundamental principle of the Durkheimian "positive" method is to treat social facts as things (*choses*). "A thing is in fact whatever is given or offered to, or rather, imposes itself upon, the observation. To treat phenomena as things is to treat them as data constituting the point of departure of the science"; in other words, to study economic values—not economic "value"—to study "mores" not ethics (*morale*). Consistent with his psychology, as we have found it, social facts are to be studied apart from the conscious subjects in whose minds they must exist.² They are to be considered from without (*du dehors*). The objectivity of social facts is an objectivity shown by their persistence in consciousness; no mere willing can remove them or change them. As psychology has changed from the inexact introspective method to the exact experimental method in which psychical processes are measured scientifically, so sociology must change from its introspective, "psychological" (in the sense of "individual-psychological")³ method to an objective, "exterior" method. This change is easier for the sociologist than it was for the psychologist, because of the more objective nature of social facts.⁴

In the course of applying this principle of treating social facts as things, certain subsidiary rules must be observed.

The first of these is to eliminate (*écarter*) all the "*prae-*

¹ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 194.

² *Vide supra*, p. 61.

³ As explained in the discussion on social causation, *vide supra*, p. 67 *et seq.*

⁴ *Méth.*, pp. 37-39; also *vide supra*, p. 61. Cf. also Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 22-23.

notiones”,¹ *i. e.*, those conceptions formed outside the science, for other than scientific purposes; especially those to which sentiment is attached. These are very numerous in the sociological field.

The second rule is but the positive side of this injunction. It is this: never take for an object of study anything but a group of phenomena defined in advance by certain exterior characters common to all, and to include in the same research all phenomena included within that definition.² Now, this scientific delimitation of the fact to be studied is ultimately traceable to the non-scientific or “common-sense” definition of it; one frequently must start from that as a point of departure. But the crude definition must be scientifically qualified. It was a neglect of this simple rule that led to Spencer’s confusing the monogamy that he found at the beginning of social evolution with that which he discovered in modern societies. Durkheim says,³ they are not at all the same phenomena. The early “pairing” family was unregulated; modern monogamy is a legally enforced arrangement. Between these two types there is, therefore, only a specious resemblance. The use of the conventional every-day definition of monogamy, instead of a specific definition, was the basis of this error of Spencer’s.

The third rule is to eliminate as far as possible the personal equation, the individual judgment of the observer, by considering social facts “from a side where they present themselves isolated from their individual manifestations.”⁴

¹ *Méth.*, p. 40; *cf. Div. Tr.*, p. xlii.

² *Méth.*, p. 45.

³ *Méth.*, p. 48. For other statements of this principle of exact, scientific definition as a rule for the sociologist see: *A. S.*, vol. ii, pp. 1-2, “Puisque la sociologie religieuse, etc.,” p. 16, “Seule, la, etc.”; *Vie Rel.*, p. 6, “Par la,” etc., pp. 31-32, “Non pas que, etc.”

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 57.

The facts treated in sociology should be those having the highest degree of objectivity. Social currents are refractory material for the sociologist (except in so far as he can measure them indirectly through statistical rates, as, *e. g.*, the tendency to suicide).¹ Customs, laws, etc., are good material—as Durkheim has tried to show by his use of them in *La Division du travail*—because they are clearly objective and well defined, at least where they have been assembled in codes.

(2) *The distinction between normal and pathological*

Observation, if practiced merely as indicated in the rules just examined, necessarily confuses two diverse varieties of the species “social facts”: namely, those that ought to be and those that ought not to be; the normal and the pathological.² Durkheim disagrees with those who deny the normative function of science; for if science cannot declare what shall be the goal of human action, of what practical importance is it?³ If it cannot decide as to ends, how may it speak with authority as to means? The distinction between means and ends is a difficult one to draw; any means may become an end. The ideological method permits a solution of this dilemma;⁴ but since our author has set himself against that method, it is necessary to find some scientific way of solving the problem as to what is normal and what is not. This whole difficulty arises in the first place out of Durkheim's desire to consider science as having both a practical and a “scientific” function.⁵

In the search for a criterion of normality we find a number of standards suggested. Absence of pain, adaptation

¹ *Méth.*, p. 13 and *Suic.*, p. 360.

² *Méth.*, p. 59; *cf.* also *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxix and *Div. Tr.*, 1st ed., p. 33.

³ *Méth.*, p. 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62; also *Div. Tr.*, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

to environment, survival value, perfect functioning, all these have been put forward. But pain may be absent in a mortal disease and may accompany a slight indisposition; "adaptation" and "perfect functioning" beg the whole question; "survival-value" can be measured only by a selective death-rate. How would a death-rate for social facts within a social group be determined? ¹ None of these will do because they all involve unjustifiable assumptions. What is needed here is an "objective, exterior, and immediately perceptible mark" ² of the normal. This mark is the "generality" of the phenomenon. "We shall call normal those facts which present the most general forms and we shall give to the others the name of morbid or pathological." ³

Thus we can have a "normal type," a sort of "abstract individual", constituted of "the most frequent characters of the species in their most frequent forms"; this "normal type" can then be said to be the "average (*moyen*) type" ^{4 5} Certain qualifications of this general definition must be noted. Normality is always relative to the species, and to certain stages of the individual or racial development, when the term is applied to living things. That which is normal for the mollusc is not normal for man; that which is normal for the child is not so for the old man; and the normal for the savage is not normal for the civilized man. ⁶ Durkheim adds, however, that morbidity (*maladie*) is "natural", in the sense of being a naturally caused phe-

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 62-68.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁴ Durkheim does not distinguish between the arithmetic average and the mode. Clearly he is using the term "average type" in the sense of the "modal type."

⁵ *Cf. Div. Tr.*, 1st ed., p. 34. A moral fact is normal for a given social type when it occurs in the average society of that kind.

⁶ *Méth.*, p. 71.

nomenon, even though it be not "normal";¹ a statement quite in accord with what we know of one great group of diseases, the zymotic. A special characteristic of the opposite of morbidity, namely, health (*santé*), is also to be noted; that is its desirability as compared with "*maladie*".² There is a good reason for this; on the whole, those characteristics are normal which have tended to survive; those are abnormal which have tended to disappear through selective processes. This is, however, an apparent acceptance in part of the "survival-value" criterion mentioned above as one of those rejected by our author.³

It is important for practical purposes that a reason for this "normality" (namely, the characteristic of generality, found within a given class of social facts) should be ascertainable; and in every case the normality should be logically checked up.⁴ These statements are illustrated in a situation such as this: a custom may persist into a period in which it is not *solidaire* with the conditions of the group that practices it.⁵ It is then normal in appearance only. A careful comparison of the present condition with the earlier one alone can reveal whether the normality of a custom of to-day is real or only specious.⁶ Durkheim summarizes his rules of method with reference to the normal and pathological as follows:

(1) A social fact is normal for a given social type, considered at a given phase of its development, when it is found in the average of the societies of that species [*espèce*] considered at the corresponding phase of their evolution.

(2) One can verify the results of the preceding method by showing that the generality of the phenomenon is bound up

¹ *Méth.*, p. 72.

² *Vide supra*, p. 133.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁵ *Méth.*, p. 74.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

with (*tient à*) the general conditions of the collective life of the social type considered.

(3) This verification is necessary when this fact is related to a social species which has not yet accomplished its integral evolution.¹

As an illustration of the use of this method, Durkheim submits the proposition that crime is not a pathological phenomenon; and that it may even be a useful factor in the social health (*santé*).² His argument may be summarized thus: crime is found in all societies; it is therefore normal. It may, however, become a pathological phenomenon when its quantity is abnormal. Its positive value rests on these considerations: crime (such as murder) could be made socially impossible only by increasing the social pressure against it to such a degree that no one could commit a criminal act. But this would mean increasing the pressure to such an extent that misdemeanors formerly only venial would now have the significance of crimes, because the social sentiments to which they would do violence would be as strong as those that had formerly reprehended the more serious offences against society. Murder would cease to exist; but lesser offences would now be as reprehensible as murder formerly was. Any society with so rigid a control would be quite incapable of progress. As a matter of fact, the criminal has occasionally been the useful social leader. Socrates was such a criminal. The variability of the individuals composing society explains the existence of crime, and it is also out of this variability that progress must be expected.³ It would seem better to say, not that crime

¹ *Méth.*, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 80-93.

³ Cf. *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxxix, p. 518-523, for Durkheim's defence of this position against the attack of Tarde, whose article is found *ibid.*, pp. 148-162, "Criminalité et santé sociale".

itself is useful, but that the condition of which crime is a symptom is a *sine qua non* of social advance.

(3) *The constitution of social types*

Normality is to be considered with reference to a certain type. What is our author's conception of a social type?

Historians treat each individual nation as a thing *sui generis*. Philosophers treat the individual nation as simply illustrating the fundamental principles of social life. Between these nominalistic and realistic ideas of social groups we may put a golden mean, the idea of a social species (*espèce*).¹

This problem may be attacked by the monographic method; but that necessitates choosing certain standards of classification, for otherwise the mass of monographs (even if complete) would be of no value. What shall these criteria of class be? How numerous shall they be made? It is clear that the larger the number of criteria of a species the more difficult will be its identification, and hence a small number is desirable.² If the nature of a society depends on the nature and number of its component elements, and on the mode of their combination, then it is clear that in the simpler units of society lies the clue to a proper system of classification.³

Durkheim points out that this method, followed by Herbert Spencer, has as a basis of classification a passing from the simple to the complex which is also the genetic principle of classification.⁴ Spencer's elementary unit is a "simple" society. "We cannot in all cases say with precision what constitutes a simple society. . . . Our only course is to regard as a simple society one which forms a

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 94-96.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 97-99.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁴ Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 63.

single working whole unsubjected to any other, and of which the parts co-operate with or without a regulating centre, for certain public ends.”¹

This is too loose a definition in Durkheim's estimation; for Spencer's classification masses Homeric Greeks, tenth-century fiefs, Chippewas, Coast Negroes, and Abyssinians in one class.² “Simple” should imply the “absence of parts”.³ Now the simplest social group is, in our author's estimation, the horde; defined in an earlier work⁴ as “a mass absolutely homogeneous, whose parts are not distinguished from each other, and consequently would not be arranged among themselves; which, in a word, would be lacking (*dépourvie*) both definiteness of form and organization.” It is an aggregation of individuals without a sub-aggregation intervening between it and the individual members. It is true, Durkheim admits, that precisely such a unit is not known in history; but we know a multitude of social groups formed directly out of these units by a single combination (*répétition*). The result of this single combination is the clan, which is everywhere the ultimate actual unit. This is an exception to Durkheim's principles of method. The unit of classification should be one that may be objectively studied. The “horde” is not such a unit. Then why use it?

The rest of Durkheim's system of classification is practically like that of Spencer. The former has “simple poly-segmentary” groups, mere aggregations of clans, like the tribe of the Australians; these combine into “polysegmentary societies, simply compounded”; these into “polyseg-

¹ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. i, part ii, pp. 537-8.

² Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 540.

³ *Méth.*, p. 102.

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, p. 149.

mentary societies doubly compounded".¹ Spencer has "simple", "compound", "doubly compound" groupings. The principle is exactly the same.² Besides this simple doubling and redoubling, Durkheim admits various other modes of compounding, in which groups of different stages of complication are united into new types of aggregation. Both these writers admit the approximateness of this system of classification,³ and rightly so, for it has all the virtues of a good classification except a basis in ascertained fact. Civilized nations, by the time they have become historical, are complicated far beyond the possibility of having any such simple scheme as this applied to them, and of primitive groups we have only the most fragmentary history on which to base any such genetic classification. For ~~y~~ Durkheim at least the scheme seems inconsistent with the profession that he makes of being a "positive" scientist. The qualifications that he finds it necessary to introduce into the system—*i. e.*, the degree of coalescence of the segments;⁴ the variability introduced by differences in environment together with the absence of a social heredity fixing the social type as the biological type is fixed—severally are tacit admissions of the weakness of the scheme.⁵

Normality, as we have seen, is, in Durkheim's view, always relative to the species, to the stage of development. As a logical outcome of that principle he repeatedly insists that the method of the "école anthropologique" (represented by Tylor, Frazer, Westermarck, Lang, Spencer, Crawley) is wrong, because it takes examples of the same social phenomena from widely scattered and enormously

¹ *Méth.*, p. 104.

² *Spencer, op. cit.*, pp. 539-542.

³ *Méth.*, p. 105 and *Spencer, op. cit.*, p. 542.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 106.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8.

diverse groups of mankind, and then compares these examples. On the contrary, it is our author's belief that

for the sociologist as for the historian, the social facts are a function of the social system of which they are a part; they cannot be understood if detached from it. . . . The comparative method would be impossible if there were no social types, and it cannot be usefully employed save within the interior of the same type.¹

Undoubtedly this is an important and useful principle. To be intelligible a social phenomenon must be considered in relation to its social context. This is thoroughly consistent with Durkheim's social psychology; and it is consistent also with the view held increasingly among psychologists and anthropologists, that the varying content of mind explains apparent differences in the mental activities of different social groups.² The method that Durkheim criticises rests ultimately on an assumption of a psychological uniformity, the form of which is so fixed and powerful that variation in environment cannot materially affect the nature

¹ *Vie Rel.*, p. 133. This opinion is repeatedly expressed by Durkheim in reviews of works by the members of the *école anthropologique* and others using their method. E. g.:

A. S., vol. ii, p. 534. Review of Von Mayr's *Statistik u. Gesellschaftslehre*.

A. S., vol. iv, p. 341. Review of Steinmetz, *Die neueren Forschungen zur Geschichte der menschlichen Familie*.

A. S., vol. v, p. 375-6. Roman rights of testation not comparable to those of the middle ages.

A. S., vol. vi, p. 352. Review of Crawley's *Mystic Rose*.

A. S., vol. x, p. 385. Review of Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*.

In *A. S.*, vol. xi, pp. ii-iii, Durkheim shows a new tendency in social classification, namely, to classify the types of civilization by the name of the group possessing them; e. g. as "Bantou", "Pueblo", etc.

² *Cf. supra*, p. 54.

of the products of the human mind. A further implication of this point of view is that whenever we find a certain custom, or culture element of any sort, we must assume that it has originated in one, and only one, way, irrespective of locality. It is assumed that there has been a uniform development of culture and civilization all over the world. Hence the importance which "survivals" have for many of this school which Durkheim attacks. For a "survival" is significant only in so far as the course of civilization has been approximately uniform the world over. If a capture symbol is in use in the marriage ceremony of a given group, civilized or not, and if there is no historical evidence of a stage of marriage by real capture in that particular group, then the symbol means nothing, unless we assume that that group passed through the same stages as another group which actually showed marriage by capture in historical times. This evolutionary hypothesis has been so severely attacked in recent years as to make an off-hand acceptance of it dangerous. Combined with it is of course the corollary that not only have certain elements developed always in a certain sequence, but that any given series of culture developments (such as art or technology) is accompanied at each phase by certain parallel series, invariably present in a certain corresponding

phase. That if $\begin{matrix} A & B & C & D & E \\ R & S & T & U & V \end{matrix}$ are two series of successive stages in two culture elements in one group of men, we must expect that in other groups we will find A with R, B with S, C with T, etc.¹

¹ The criticism of this method is summarized in Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, chs. vi, vii. As an illustration of the application of this critical principle see A. A. Goldenweiser, "Totemism, an Analytical Study," *Journal of American Folklore*, vol. xxiii, pp. 179-293, in which it is shown that the elements usually considered to be *solidaire* within the phenomenon called "totemism," are as a matter of fact

Despite the fact that Durkheim criticises the logical conclusions of this premise of uniform development, as they are shown in the unregulated choice of examples of one phenomenon from all kinds of social and cultural environments, he himself, implicitly and explicitly accepts the premise itself. His implicit acceptance of it is shown in his very system of classification. This is, as we have seen, quite Spencerian in its logical inevitableness of compounding and re-compounding. No hint is dropped as to the possibility of the splitting of a single group into two groups except in an allusion to colonization, which has no significance for the problem of classification as it stands in the text.¹ Yet the splitting is not only possible, but it has been demonstrated as a historical fact.²

Such an invariability of the development of social organization from the horde to the clan, to the simple polysegmentary groups, etc., is not significant for the sociologist except upon the assumption, that the development of culture, as well as of social organization, has necessarily been a linear one, everywhere uniform. The horde or the clan, considered as a social "species", means nothing unless it is correlated with certain culture-phases which are different from those of the next species—the tribe, or simple polysegmentary group. It is then manifestly inconsistent for our

quite different among different culture groups. That is, the elements called in their collective aspect by that term are not the same elements in Australia as on the Northwest Coast of North America. A criticism of Herbert Spencer's indiscriminate lumping of data from all over the world is to be found in an article by Dewey, "Interpretation of Savage Mind," *Psychol. Rev.*, vol. ix, p. 217. For a frank acceptance of the evolutionary standpoint in ethnology, see A. Lang, "Method in the Study of Totemism," *American Anthropologist, New Series*, vol. xiv, pp. 368-382.

¹ *Méth.*, p. 108.

² Boas, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

author to object to the logical conclusion (carried, it is true, farther than he himself carries it) of a premise that he himself holds. Durkheim's latest expressions¹ concerning the importance of the social environment should apparently lead to the abandonment of the rigid system of classification on which, in his earlier work, he rests his judgment of social normality.

We find good examples of the explicit statement of the evolutionary hypothesis in *La Vie religieuse*.

When one undertakes to explain a human fact [*chose*] taken at a given point of time—whether it be a question of a religious belief, a rule of morality, a juridic precept, an aesthetic technique, an economic régime—one must begin by going back to its most primitive and simple form, seeking to account for the characters by which it is defined at that period of its existence, then showing how it has, little by little, developed and become complicated, how it has become what it is at the given moment.² . . . If then, in the very low [*humblés*] societies which have been studied, we have really succeeded in seeing some of the elements of which are composed the most fundamental religious notions, there is no reason for not extending to other religions the most general results of our research.³

Elsewhere we find similar statements:

It is credible that the system [*sc.*, of classification] of the Zuni is in reality a development and a complication of the Australian system.⁴ . . . Primitive classifications do not then constitute exceptional singularities, without analogy to those in use among the most civilized peoples; they seem, on the con-

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 44.

² *Vie Rel.*, pp. 4-5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 594.

⁴ *A. S.*, vol. vi, "De quelques Formes primitives de classification", pp. 44-5.

trary, to connect themselves [*se rattacher*] without a break [*solution de continuité*] to the first scientific classifications.¹

In a criticism of Boas' statement that in the Kwakiutl tribe of British Columbia, the ordinary direction of change from metronymy to patronymy seemed to be reversed, he expresses a doubt as to the truth of that statement, assuming that the change must be always in a certain direction.² These expressions show that our author is certainly an adherent to the evolutionary hypothesis school which he criticizes so vigorously for being, as we see, a little more extreme than himself.

(4) *Methods of proof in sociology*

The method which, according to Durkheim, must be pre-eminent in the sociologist's technique is the comparative method.³ We have already seen how this method is to be safeguarded by exact definition and by considering normality always with reference to the type of the social group. Experiment, as Mill pointed out, is not feasible in social science.⁴ Durkheim's comment on this assertion of Mill, is that, since the latter said the same thing about the use of that method in biology and in physiological chemistry, his mere statement can now scarcely carry the weight it once did.⁵ Furthermore, Durkheim is fundamentally opposed to Mill's principle that one effect may be due to one of several different causes.^{6 7} This, he thinks, is a total negation of causality, reducing it to mere chronological sequence.⁸

¹ *A. S.*, vol. vi, p. 66.

² *A. S.*, vol. iii, pp. 338-9.

³ *Méth.*, pp. 153-4.

⁴ Mill, *A System of Logic*, bk. vi, ch. vii.

⁵ *Méth.*, pp. 154-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-6.

⁷ Mill., *op. cit.*, bk. iii, ch. x.

⁸ Cf. *Div. Tr.*, p. 35: "L'unité de l'effet révèle l'unité de la cause"; and *ibid.*, p. 50. "Un même fait ne peut avoir deux causes."

This criticism evidences a more or less metaphysical conception of causation, on Durkheim's part. For the scientist, chronological sequence, or concomitant variation are the only objective evidences of causal relations. Causality *per se* as an internal necessity cannot be objectively determined. That necessity may perhaps be recognized by a sort of Bergsonian "intuition", but not by "scientific" methods.

This principle of Mill's has been used by some sociologists, who have referred phenomena like crime, suicide, etc., each to several different causes. This is bad method, according to our author. But he himself has done that very thing, attempting, however, to conceal his use of the principle by an artifice of method. In *Le Suicide* he first gives a general definition of the phenomenon of suicide. Then in discussing the causes of suicide he makes it due on the one hand to the breakdown of group restraint, and on the other to intensity of group control over the individual.¹ Clearly here we have two causes, and diametrically opposed ones at that. But Durkheim's artifice is to differentiate between several kinds of suicide. The "egoistic" and "anomic" suicides are due to the breakdown of group control; while the "altruistic" kind (that of the patriot like Arnold von Winkelried, for example) is due to the intensity of social control. This certainly seems like a tacit admission of the truth of Mill's proposition. But as enunciated formally by Durkheim the proper principle is, "For a certain effect there is one cause".²

The various forms of logical procedure in the comparative method (as elaborated by Mill³) Durkheim does not value as of equal utility to the sociologist. The "method of residues"

¹ *Suic.*, b. ii, ch. ii, iii, iv, v.

² *Méth.*, p. 157; this principle is also consistent with the evolutionary hypothesis.

³ Mill, *op. cit.*, bk. vi, ch. vii.

is of little value, because it requires the elimination of all factors except one. With the enormous complexity of social phenomena this is practically impossible. The "method of agreement" and the "method of difference" are for the same reason not applicable to sociological material.¹ The "method of concomitant variations", however, is of great value for the sociologist.^{2 3} The elimination of all factors save one is not necessary in the use of this method. Moreover the simple fact of parallelism of trend in two phenomena, if the number of individual cases is sufficiently large, proves the existence of some kind of relation between them. This is a highly objective way of showing the existence of a causal bond of some sort. It may be that of the several variants to which the method is applied one is the cause; or they may all be the results of a single cause that does not appear in the group itself.⁴

The method of concomitant variations is the logical formulation of a method⁵ that has received much attention from the statisticians since the application of it to data of physical heredity by the late Sir Francis Galton in his *Natural Inheritance*. The Pearsonian coefficient, the coefficient of contingency, as well as other more or less simple mathematical devices have been applied not only in the biological field but also to sociological and economic data in the solution of problems of causation. Durkheim, however, in spite of his use of a simple mathematical form of the method of concomitant variations in *Le Suicide*, does not seem to have kept up with progress in this field. Naturally his absorption in the ethnological field accounts for the

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 158-9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

³ Cf. Giddings, *Prin. of Soc.*, p. 64, for advocacy of the use of the method of concomitant variations, and for a criticism of Mill.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 161.

⁵ Cf. Giddings, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

lack of emphasis of statistical method in the social sciences felt in his recent works. In this respect his *Les Règles* is now of course out of date, so rapidly has scientific method advanced in the last twenty years.¹

Mere concomitance is, however, meaningless, Durkheim warns us, unless interpreted with the aid of deductive reasoning.² This warning is always in place. Some strange results can be obtained by an application of this method to data without a deductive check. Even the most exact methods require checking; for it has been shown, for example, that there is a positive correlation between the prevalence of cancer in women and the sale of peanuts! Durkheim says that the absence of a logical reason for a causal nexus should drive the investigator to search for a third factor (if only two are actually involved in the problem) as the common cause of the other two.

Another reason for the usefulness of this method of concomitant variations is that it can be applied to cases in which relatively few facts offer themselves as a basis for investigation. These few facts may be most carefully scrutinized and criticized. A small amount of good material is thus better than a large amount of poor.

The sociologist finds the restriction to one method more than compensated for by the richness of the material that he may control. The enormous changeability of social life, with the mass of concrete evidences, both contemporaneous and historical, make him an envied man among the scientists.³

¹ Two references to statistics: *Rev. Phil.*, vol. lv, p. 492 (cited *supra*, p. 119) and *A. S.*, vol. ii, pp. 533-5.

² Cf. *Div. Tr.*, p. xlii.

³ Durkheim disagrees with the position of Mill who lumps this method (of concomitant variations) with the other three methods; see Mill, *op. cit.*, bk. vi, ch. vii.

This method our author has used most conspicuously in *La division du travail social*, and in *Le Suicide*. In the first he shows the inverse concomitant variation of the division of labor with reference to the ratio between the amount of "repressive" law to the amount of "coercive" law.¹ In the latter work a simple statistical form of the method is used to show how marital condition affects the rate of suicide.²

Finally the question arises as to which social groups are to furnish the materials for this method. For facts of great generality, with an abundance of statistical material, one society (nation, tribe?) will suffice to give us very useful results; as, for instance, in the case of suicide. In other cases, where the phenomena are not heterogeneous except in time, there should be comparison of several groups of the same "species", while facts of universal importance, family, property, marriage, must be studied not only in some given "species"³ but also in the "species" that have preceded it in the genetic classification, if a satisfactory explanation of their origin is to be attained.⁴ The most general statement of this point is as follows: "One cannot explain a social fact of some complexity, except on the condition of following its whole integral development through all the social species (*espèces*)."⁵ And he adds a further qualification: "To consider the societies, which one compares, at the same period of their development."⁵

Durkheim's sociological method, aside from his concep-

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 165.

² *Vide infra*, p. 172. Cf. also *Méth.*, p. 13 and *Suic.*, p. 360, on statistics as a means of measuring "social currents".

³ A translation of *espèce*, the general term Durkheim uses in talking about classes of societies.

⁴ *Méth.*, p. 169.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-1.

tion of social facts and of social causation, presents little that is new, or distinctive. He expresses the general desire of sociologists to be scientific, objective; and on this as with the social psychology, he takes a characteristically Durkheimian attitude. His criterion of the normal, namely, generality, is also consistent with his "objective" tendencies. His conception of the classification of societies is Spencerian; but in the methodology of proof he follows Mill with some minor modifications, as we have seen, but without notably improving on the work of the latter.

✓ Durkheim appears in his methodology as the logician rather than as the scientist. His is a method that is, in most respects, logically coherent; but its practicality is not always so evident. Nor can it be said that our author has avoided the pitfall of ideology against which he so urgently warns the sociologist. His choice of criteria of the social fact illustrates this failing. The social fact is one that presents clearly the characteristics of constraining power over the individual, and exteriority to the individual mind. A simple, straightforward definition, apparently; but when we go back of this definition we find it to be simply a concise statement of an elaborate system of psychological metaphysics. His system of sociology flows out of this definition, as we have seen, for the reason that it is a great major premise. This is the essence of ideological method. Another case of ideology is found in his theory of the causation of suicide. ✓ Since suicide is a social tendency it comes to the individual from without, with coercive force. Then why do not all individuals in the society commit suicide? Because the group is cohesive and powerful enough to protect them against it. It controls them in the opposite direction. In other words, the control by the group is the explanation of social facts, and is not a mere definition of them.

No one will deny the need of accurate definition in sociol-

ogy. But, in any science, definitions are the expression of the consensus of opinion of the workers in that science. An inch, for example, is the distance that has been agreed upon, by scientists, as an inch. Not until there is some agreement on the part of sociologists as to definitions will the view of the individual worker as to definitions be of more than philosophical significance. For science, as Durkheim has reminded us, is a social co-operation. In this respect sociology is not much worse off than economics, in which field continental areas of paper have been sacrificed in a barren logomachy. The only solution of the problem of a scientific sociology seems to lie in the idea of coöperation as to the fundamental definitions, and in the fertile principle on which Durkheim has laid so much stress, namely, specialization by the individual sociologists.

CHAPTER VII

DURKHEIM'S ETHICAL THEORIES

DURKHEIM'S earliest work in the field of morals is found in two articles: "*Les Études de science sociale*" and "*La Science positive de la morale en Allemagne*".¹ What is significant for our present interest in the first of these articles is Durkheim's very strong opposition to Spencer's and Coste's individualistic tendencies,² and, more especially, his conception of the regulative function of law, morals, and religion in society.³ In the second article we find Durkheim pointing out, with approval,⁴ the increasing emphasis by certain writers of the collective,⁵ rather than the individual side of phenomena occurring in social life; the solidarity of economic and moral phenomena; and the objective, in-

¹ The first appeared in the *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxii, the second in *ibid.*, vol. xxiv; they are, respectively, a critical review of Spencer, *Ecclesiastical Institutions* (part iv of the *Princ. of Soc.*); A. Regnard, *L'Etat, etc.*; A. Coste, *Les Questions Sociales contemporaines*; A. Schaeffle, *Die Quintessenz des Socialismus*; and a similar discussion of the social-economic theories of Wagner, Schmoller, Schaeffle, Ihering, Post, and of the *Ethik* of Wundt.

² *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxii, pp. 66, 76.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, p. 278.

⁵ Cf. *Revue Internationale de l'Enseignement*, vol. xiii, p. 437, in the article by Durkheim, "La Philosophie dans les universités allemandes", this statement: "But it is hardly to be contested that what we (the French) have at this moment the greatest need of is to re-awaken within us the taste (*goût*) for the collective life."

ductive treatment of social phenomena of all kinds, particularly those of the moral field. Therefore we may say that the ethical field has had from very early stages in his career an attraction for our author. The resemblances between his ideas and those of these writers has been commented on, as we saw above,¹ by Deploige, and also, *passim*, in this study.

Durkheim has put so much stress on the moral phenomena of social life that a discussion of his sociological theory without a treatment of this topic would be quite inadequate. Indeed, it is not always easy to distinguish in his thought between the strictly "moral" and the more general "social" fact. We recall that social facts are defined as "ways of thinking, acting and feeling, exterior to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by virtue of which they impress themselves on him."² Since, thereby, social facts include "juridic rules, moral regulations, religious dogmas, financial systems, etc.,"³ the field of social facts includes the field of ethical investigation, the science of morality, or whatever one wishes to call the study of human conduct.

The views of our author as to the phenomena which are called "moral" will be here examined with regard to four points:

- (1) The method of the study of moral phenomena;
- (2) The definition of moral phenomena;
- (3) The psychology of morality and its evolutionary aspects;
- (4) The practical side of his moral theories, with special reference to "syndicalist" theory.

(1) *The method of the study of moral phenomena*

The method which Durkheim uses in dealing with moral

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 83.

² *Méth.*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

facts has already been suggested.¹ It is intended as an objective, as a "positive" method, since it is, of course, to be used in the social field.² As psychology has freed itself from the introspective, ideological method and has become objective and strictly scientific,³ so also must the science of moral phenomena free itself. It must no longer use facts as mere illustrations of basic principles, but must derive these principles from an inductive study of the facts. It must be a "*science des mœurs*",⁴ rather than a philosophy of morality. It cannot, he says, weaken morality; for it questions not the validity of the moral reality, but the validity of the methods of studying the moral reality, of the explanations of it that have been given.⁵ This objective method in the study of ethical phenomena is now the generally accepted one, but in the days of Durkheim's earlier works it was just coming into use, as, for instance, at the hands of Spencer and Wundt. The names of only a few of the men who have used this method, *e. g.*, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Sumner, Paulsen, Dewey, indicate that the advances in this field have come about by a careful use of it.

(2) *The definition of moral phenomena*

The object of this science is variously denominated by Durkheim as "*faits moraux*",⁶ "*la réalité morale*",⁷ "*la morale*",⁸ "*les faits de la vie morale*",⁹ "*les mœurs*",¹⁰

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 127.

² *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxvii.

³ *Ibid.*, 1st ed., pp. 4, 15-20. (Omitted in later editions.)

⁴ Durkheim uses the term: "Science de la morale," *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, p. 284, and *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxvii; also the term: "Science des mœurs", in *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, p. 284; though this does not apparently occur so frequently as the former.

⁵ *Div. Tr.*, p. xlii and *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, p. 284.

⁶ *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxvii.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xli.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xxxviii.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. xxxvii, xlii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

These terms all express the objective nature of the material of the science that Durkheim desires to create. He says nothing about a "fundamental principle of morality" (such as has been the stock in trade of most moralists), except in criticism of this approach to the problem.¹

What is our author's definition of the moral fact which is the objective substance of this science?

"Moral facts consist of rules of action recognizable by certain distinctive characters."² What these characters are we can determine in part from phrases in which they are implied. "When a customary law (*droit coutumier*) passes to the state of a written law, . . . if the custom continued to function silently, etc.,"³ are such phrases. Here the genetic relation between custom and law is clearly expressed. The definition of law (*droit*) is put in these terms: "Every precept of law can be defined as a rule of sanctioned conduct."⁴ The connection between law and morals is here plainly indicated; and by comparison with the immediately preceding quotation it can be seen that there is a close connection between law, morality, and custom.⁵ But in "La Détermination du fait moral," a paper read by Durkheim before the *Société française de philosophie*, in 1906, the explicit definition of moral facts is made as follows:

¹ *Méth.*, pp. 30-31 also *Div. Tr.*, p. xliii.

² *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxvii.

³ *Div. Tr.*, p. 41; *cf.* also *ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁵ In a part of the first edition of *La Division du travail* (pp. 4-38) omitted in the second edition, Durkheim gives another definition of the "moral." Society, he says, takes steps to prevent aberration from conduct called moral; this social reaction follows necessarily, is predetermined, and is called a sanction. A moral fact consists then in a sanctioned rule of conduct. This sanction is the outward sign of the obligation accompanying the moral rule. The legal and moral are different only in the forms of sanction that apply to them.

All morality (*morale*) is presented to us as a system of rules of conduct. But all techniques are equally regulated by maxims prescribing to the agent how he shall conduct himself in certain circumstances. What differentiates moral rules from others?

(1) It will be shown that moral rules are invested with a special authority, by virtue of which they are obeyed because they command. . . . Obligation is then one of the first characters of a moral rule.

(2) But . . . the notion of duty implied in obligation does not exhaust the notion of the "moral". A certain desirability is another character, no less essential than the first. . . . It is this "desirable" character *sui generis* which is currently called the "good".¹ The moral reality, Durkheim continues, may be viewed in two lights: as objective and as subjective.² By the former is meant the body of morals as they are concretely existent within the social group, incorporated perhaps in a written code; and by the latter the individual manifestations of these objective, exterior elements of the moral reality.³ Only the former, the morals as objectively existent, come into the scope of our author's study.

We may ask further, wherein does the compulsion of the moral rule lie? ⁴ Violations of other rules, such as those of hygiene, are followed automatically by certain painful results, which might have been predicted by analysis. This is not the case with the results following violation of the moral rules. The results are not logically implicit in these rules. They are added to the rules; "synthetized" with

¹ *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, vol. vi, pp. 113-4.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 117-8.

³ Cf. with the distinction made *supra* between social facts and their individual manifestations, p. 60. This seems to be an illustration of what Durkheim means by "socio-psychic" facts.

⁴ *Bull. Soc. Phil.*, p. 120.

them; they are the so-called "sanction" attaching to the moral act. In other words, the act has no intrinsic quality that brings these results, as is shown by the fact that homicide is approved or disapproved by the same society under two different sets of circumstances. The "desirability" or "goodness" of a moral act is related to the pleasure that its performance frequently gives, despite the fact of its being done as duty, *i. e.*, under a form of compulsion.¹

This dual character of the moral fact is interestingly paralleled by the dual character of the "sacred", which is at once to be feared, or at least respected, and to be desired and loved.² The essential solidarity of the religious and the moral fact is historically and psychologically ascertainable;³ the slow progress of the ascendancy of the scientific method over the field of morals reveals how much of the conception of "sacredness" was attached to that of "rightness".⁴

The moral fact is not completely defined by these two characters of obligation and desirability. In fact they are but a minimum definition. There remains to be considered the end, the aim, of the action; the duty must be directed; but toward what?⁵ First of all, duties are directed only toward moral persons, toward rational beings. These are either the agent himself, or others than the agent.

No act looking solely to the preservation of the agent is moral, in the common conception of the term; and if the agent himself is not a moral end, how can any individual, or even a group of individuals, as individuals, be such an end? Is there then any personality that can serve as the objective

¹ *Bull. Soc. Phil.*, pp. 121-2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ *Cf. Div. Tr.*, pp. 60, 68.

⁴ *Bull. Soc. Phil.*, p. 126.

⁵ *Ibid.*

of moral action? Only the personality that we call the society.¹ Kant postulated the existence of God to make morality intelligible. So Durkheim (as he says) postulates a social personality to explain it.²

Morality begins only with life in the group; that group may be of any kind whatever, familial, corporative, civic, national, international. This conception explains the two basic characteristics of morality in this way: The obligatory character of the moral rule comes from the sense of helplessness and dependence which the individual experiences in the presence of the transcendent reality, the social mind.³ And since the individual mind is penetrated through and through by the social mind, so as to be a part of the latter, we have an adequate explanation of the "desirability" of the moral fact. For in doing the moral act, the individual is following a tendency which is a part of his mental content; and thus functioning normally, he gets pleasure from the act. The sacredness also of the moral is explained by the fact that it is a social product, and therefore has for the individual a superhuman value, which sets it apart from the individually originated facts, *i. e.*, from the profane.⁴

This summary makes apparent the fact that Durkheim's ethical theory is quite consistent with his general social psychology as examined earlier in this study. In fact, the "desirability" of the "moral" fact is the only characteristic dis-

¹ Durkheim says, in a footnote, *ibid.*, p. 127, "The outlines of this argument are taken from Wundt's *Ethik*." Cf. Durkheim's review of this work, *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxiv, p. 130.

² *Bull. Soc. Phil.*, pp. 128-9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-3.

⁴ For a discussion of the nature of the sacred and the profane and their relations to his psychology, see *supra*, p. 39. These ideas are discussed at length in "Le Problème religieuse et la dualité de la nature humaine," *Bull. Soc. Phil.*, March, 1913; and in *Vie Rel.*, bk. i, ch. i; bk. ii, chs. vi-viii.

tinguishing it from the more inclusive class of the "social" facts. This is quite in harmony with the concrete reality of every-day social life. The moral is not to be separated from the social by any hard and fast line. For example, when does the violation of convention become an immorality? When does the action of a social group become a convention? The lines of demarcation between the social, as typified in the conventional, and the strictly moral, are hard to draw with exactness.

(3) *The psychology of morality and its evolutionary aspects*

The material for this part of our discussion is found largely in the work which is generally the best known of Durkheim's productions, namely, *La Division du travail social*. The point of departure of this book, as stated in the "Preface to the first edition", is the "problem of the relation between the individual personality and the social solidarity. How does it occur, that, while becoming more autonomous, the individual depends more and more completely upon his society?"¹ The problem involved is one requiring a psychological analysis and an explanation, in terms of an evolutionary process, which shall agree with this analysis. Durkheim finds the answer to the question just propounded in a "transformation of the social solidarity due to a constantly increasing development of the division of labor."²

The division of labor is a phenomenon, not merely of economic, but of wider social significance; administrative work, scientific work, show it; and it has been discovered to be a useful term to apply to certain of the fundamental problems of physiology. Is it also a rule of human conduct? Is specialization enjoined by the social group upon

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. xliii.

² *Ibid.*

the individual? To this there is no clear answer; society demands that the individual be good for some thing; but it looks askance at his being good for only one thing.¹

The aim of *La Division du travail* is then to test the connection between the division of labor and the psychological position of the individual in the society. The problem is a three-fold one:

(a) To determine the social function of the division of labor;

(b) to determine its causes and conditions;

(c) to determine its pathological forms.²

(a) The social function of the division of labor.

By function is meant, not the system of vital movements exhibited by the agent, but the need which that agent satisfies; "function" in the sense of "rôle".

Civilization, although it may be considered a result of the division of labor, is not its function, *i. e.*, its moral end or aim; for civilization itself is unmoral. The true function of the division of labor is to make possible new forms of society, based on a new type of solidarity, whose very existence is dependent upon it. The increased production of goods is a part of this function, but only of secondary importance as compared with the larger social function. A simple example of this creation of a new type of society is the creation of the family, partly because of the physiological division of labor embodied in the differences between the two sexes. The more thoroughly the division of labor has entered into the social-economic relations of man and wife, the more stable, "solidaire", the family has become, for the number of permanent ties has been increased.³ This is one type of cohesion or solidarity.

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 4-7.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 25.

on his dependence

(Durkheim does not explicitly define this term "solidarity".) The other solidarity is that of likeness, or that which Giddings calls "likemindedness".

The psychology of these two kinds of solidarity is of two different types. In the solidarity of interdependence

the image of him who complements me becomes in my mind [*en nous-même*] inseparable from the image of myself, not only because it is frequently associated with the latter, but because it is its natural complement; it becomes then an integral and permanent part of my consciousness.¹ . . . This mechanism [*sc.*, of mental process] is not identical with that which lies at the base of those sentiments of sympathy of which resemblance is the source. Of course there can be no solidarity between me and the other, unless the image of the other unites itself to the image of the me.² But when the union results from the resemblance of the two images, it consists in an agglutination. The two representations become *solidaire* because, being wholly or in part indistinct, they blend [*se confondent*] and form a single one, and are *solidaire* only in the degree that they blend. On the contrary, in the case of the division of labor, the two images are outside each other, and are bound together only because they are different. Neither the sentiments nor the social relations arising out of them can be the same in both cases [*i. e.*, both types of solidarity].³

The bearing of this analysis on the general problem of the division of labor is indicated by Durkheim in these words: "The division of labor is a condition of the existence of our societies. By reason of it their cohesion is as-

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 25; in translating this passage the first person singular has been substituted for the first person plural of the original, because of the exigencies of the English version.

² *Cf.* Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 84 *et seq.*

³ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 25-6.

sured, and through it are determined the essential traits of their constitution.”¹ It is evident that the term “solidarity” is synonymous with “cohesion” of the individual members of the social group. The bonds that bind men together in a society are then proportional to the social solidarity; and as laws are the outward signs of such bonds, the degree of solidarity of a society may be measured by the number of such laws, in a rough approximation to accuracy.²

Durkheim has entitled the solidarity that springs out of likeness, “mechanical” solidarity (because the units are merely juxtaposed) and that springing out of the division of labor, “organic” (because the units are interdependent like the parts of a living organism). Mechanical solidarity is correlated with a certain psychological relation of the individual to the society; with a certain type of social organization, and with a certain objective manifestation in the form of “repressive” law, which will be defined later.

We have seen above that each of us has two consciousnesses; the one containing states of mind personal to us and characteristic of us as individuals; the other containing those states that are common to the whole social group.³ It is the solidarity of these two systems of states within the individual's mind that binds him to his society.⁴ The individual is bound to his social group with a strength that varies directly as: (1) the ratio between the volume of the common consciousness and the volume of the individual consciousness; (2) the average intensity of the states of the collective (*i. e.*, “common”) consciousness; (3) the degree of definiteness (*détermination*) of these collective

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 42.

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, p. 74.

states.¹ It is clear then that the individual personality can exist only at the expense of this type of solidarity. "The solidarity which arises in resemblance is at its maximum when the collective consciousness exactly covers our whole [sc., individual] consciousness and coincides with it at all points; but at that moment our individuality is nil."²

What happens when an act disturbs this solidarity; i. e., runs counter to a given element of this social consciousness? First of all, the very presentation of the opposite has the effect of stimulating the system of representations and emotions connected with the given element; this makes for a strong, possibly violent, reaction against the offensive act.³ Moreover the consciousness of each member (of the group so reacting) that his fellows share with him the possession of the common idea or emotion, tends to strengthen the idea of emotion within his own mind. Combined, these two tendencies of stimulation by opposition and by "consciousness of kind", strengthen enormously the reaction which the society exhibits against the disturbance of its mental consistency. This reaction, if emotional (*passionnel*),⁴ graduated in intensity according to the nature of the violation,⁵ applied through an intermediate body or organ of the group⁶ offended,⁷ is called punishment (*peine*). Any act drawing upon itself this punishment is called a crime. A crime differs from a mere moral offense in the fact that it violates the strong and definite states of the collective consciousness, while an immoral act is contrary to states of the collective consciousness possessing a lesser degree of

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 124-5. (105)

² *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100. 130

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62 et seq.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

strength and definiteness. The sanction is, in the case of the latter type of act, "diffuse", instead of "definite" as in the case of crime.¹ That type of law which defines and states the penalty of the criminal act is called in Durkheim's work, "repressive". This variety of solidarity, the rupture of which constitutes a crime, is best exemplified in the primitive society. Within this type of society there is the largest possible resemblance between the individual members, as to physical and psychic characters.² Among these peoples we find little or no division of labor. Their social organization is usually segmentary in character.³ Their laws are largely of the repressive kind; this is an indication of the mechanical solidarity that binds them together.⁴ All of their social activity is penetrated with religious elements;⁵ this religiosity is another evidence of the like-mindedness. Communal ownership of property also shows that the individual has not attained a high degree of importance in the social life; for private property implies a certain development of individuality.⁶

The "organic" solidarity, like the "mechanical" solidarity, has its psychological, morphological, and juridic correlations. In Durkheim's theory it is historically a development out of an earlier mechanical solidarity. The process of this evolution will be traced in brief fashion, in order to make clear the nature of this "end-product", the organic solidarity.

The morphological evolution consists in a change from the

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 45, 81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 149 *et seq.* also *vide supra*, p. 137.

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, p. 108 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-5.

segmentary type of society, in which the social group composed of like individuals is the unit (*e. g.*, the horde or clan discussed in the preceding chapter), to the village type where the population is still organized on a partially segmentary plan, but is now on a territorial rather than a kinship basis. The first division of labor is within the village group; but eventually there is a geographical division of labor with commerce and manufactures on a large scale; with great cities and ports. Specialization spreads to every phase of life. This type of society is "organized" in the sense that it is composed of occupational groups (*corporations professionnelles*) which are interdependent functional units. This is indeed the real essence of modern social organization.¹ This type of social organization increases *pari passu* with the decrease of the segmentary type of society; though it is never completely realized. Some elements of segmentary organization persist, and the functional unit never becomes the sole basis of the structural arrangement of societies; we continue to have national groups and other, smaller, territorial units.² But "it is permitted to look forward to the continuation of this double movement, and to foresee that a day will come when our whole political and social organization will have a basis, exclusively, or almost exclusively, professional."³

It is noteworthy that this idea of the coexistence of these two types of the organization of society, one based on the functional, and the other based on the territorial, or segmentary, principle, should be expressed by two students of society who approach their problems from quite different angles; namely, Giddings and Durkheim. The former's "social composition" refers to tribal, or in civilized so-

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 161-6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 166.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

cieties, to local, groups as units; his "social constitution" refers to the functional organization of societies.¹

The evolution which the psychological phase of social solidarity undergoes may be summarily stated in a sentence. ✓ Society loses its hold over the individual, who becomes thereby more autonomous. This takes place, in the terms used above, (a) by the decrease of the ratio of the volume of the collective consciousness to the volume of the individual consciousness, due to the disproportionate increase of the latter; (b) by the decrease in the intensity, and (c) by the decrease in the definiteness, of the states of the collective consciousness.² In the organic solidarity to which this process is the necessary antecedent, the individual depends, instead of directly on the society, indirectly on it, by being directly dependent on the functional unit of the society.³ Both these psychological situations persist in social life, just as the segmentary and the organic types of social organization persist together. Nor does the individual, freed from the society as a whole, thereby completely free himself from all social restraint; the professional group—the functional unit—of which he must be a part, controls, though not with so stern a hand, the activities of the individual.

The "organized" societies are not possible without a development of a system of rules which predetermine the functioning of each organ. In the degree that labor is divided, there are constituted a multitude of professional *morales* and laws [*droits*]. But this regulation nevertheless leaves the circle of action of the individual greater [than under the

¹ Giddings, *Princ. of Soc.*, pp. 153, 171; see also a review of this work in *A. S.*, vol. i, p. 149, by M. Bouglé.

² *Div. Tr.*, pp. 124-5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

regulation of the segmentary type of society]. First of all, the professional spirit [*esprit*] can have an influence only on the professional life. Beyond that sphere the individual enjoys the greater liberty, the origin of which we have just indicated. . . . In the second place, as these rules have their roots only in a small number of minds, but leave the society in its entirety indifferent, they have less authority as a result of their lesser universality. They offer less resistance to changes.¹

✓ We see, in this statement of Durkheim, the individual liberated, then, to a considerable degree; for the society as a whole has loosed its hold on him; while at the same time the functional group has not seized him in a correspondingly tight grasp. The significance of this fact will be noted later on in this chapter.

Pari passu with the decrease of the power of the collective consciousness—which in Durkheim's opinion can be measured with some degree of accuracy,—is the change from "repressive" to "restitutive" law. The latter type of law is that which regulates the coördinated activities of men in societies; which prescribes the individual's co-operative relations with his fellows, and delimits the field of his activities. It is the law of property, of administration, of trade, of constitutions, of the family. There is no penalty (*peine*) attached to the violation of this type of law, not even the penalty of censure through public opinion, unless the insistence by the society upon restitution, "*remise en état*",² be considered as a penalty. Strictly speaking this is no penalty; for such actions as this law considers do not offend the "strong states" of the collective consciousness. A study of the codes of peoples in

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 289-290.

² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

different stages of social development reveals a progressive decrease in the importance of the repressive, and a corresponding increase of this restitutive, law.¹ Durkheim considers this another proof of the decrease of the strength of the social consciousness as a whole.

(b) Causes and conditions of the division of labor.

- ✓ The causes of the increase in the division of labor, as our author sees them, are, first and foremost, the increase in the "moral density",² and in the volume, of societies, accompanied by the effacement of the segmentary type of society.³ The need of increasing happiness Durkheim refuses to consider as a cause of increased specialization, for happiness is not always its result. He assumes here the position held by many psychologists that the hedonic calculus has little motive power in human conduct;⁴ that pleasure is the accompaniment, not the cause, of certain kinds of action. The mechanism through which the increase in the division of labor is brought about by the increase in the moral density and the volume of the society, is the struggle for existence, which is of course heightened in severity by these two factors. "Specialize or perish!" is the alternative, and specialization follows.
- ✓ A secondary cause is the increase of the individual's autonomy; this is brought about largely by the decline of the segmentary type of society. This decline implies the increase of the size of the group within which social relations exist, and a consequent tendency to abstractness in its com-

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 79-149.

² Called "dynamic density" in *Méth.*, p. 141, and discussed above, *vide supra*, p. 74.

³ *Div. Tr.*, p. 237.

⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-9; also "Déterm. du fait mor." *Bull. Soc. Phil.*, vol. vi, p. 122.

mon ideas; for these ideas are shared by many more individuals and so tend to become more general. Coincident with this effacement of the segmentary organization of the society comes also a freeing of the individual from the restraints of tradition, for he leaves his native environment, and goes away, to become a stranger, and hence to be under slight restraint; especially if he goes to a city. All this has its influence on the division of labor, for it breaks down the power of the collectivity over the individual, which is the greatest bar to the progress of specialization.¹

The relation of the division of labor to the moral situation in society is thus made clear; it will be summarized a few pages below.² Another phase of Durkheim's ethical theory, its practical bearing, claims attention at this point. It is our author's opinion that a science of morality of a merely speculative aim would not be worth an hour's trouble.³ Science should aid us in "finding out in what direction we should orient our activity, in determining the ideal toward which we are confusedly driving."⁴ The science of morality will surely teach us a sane conservatism.⁵ It is the science of morality which reconciles science and morality; for at the same time that it teaches us to respect the moral reality, it furnishes us the means of ameliorating it.⁶ It is, then, quite consistent that the last section of the *Division du travail social* should be taken up with a discus-

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 267 *et seq.* An interesting discussion of the relation between Spencer's and Durkheim's ideas concerning the division of labor must be passed over at this point, for want of space.

² *Vide infra*, p. 170.

³ *Div. Tr.*, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xxxix.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xl.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xli; *cf.* "Déterm. du fait mor.," pp. 117, 136.

sion of "the abnormal forms" of the division of labor, and that this should lead up to discussions of actual remedies.

(c) The abnormal forms of the division of labor.

Three of the most notable cases of abnormal accompaniments of the modern division of labor are recurrent industrial crises,⁽¹⁾ the antagonism of labor and capital;⁽²⁾ and the decrease in the unity of science with the increase in the specialization of scientific work.¹ Durkheim is inclined to discredit the theory that these results grow necessarily out of the dispersive tendencies of the division of labor, and that (as Comte believed) a strongly neutralized government, and a philosophy of science can remedy the first two and the third, respectively.² Government cannot provide a solidarity which will prevent such abnormalities in the economic life of a people. The true reason for this "anomie", this condition of ill-regulated division of labor, is to be found in the fact that the decline of "mechanical" solidarity has not been accompanied by the rise of a correspondingly satisfactory "organic" solidarity; the condition necessary for the latter being lacking. This necessary condition is that the various parts (of the society) shall be in close and continued contact; such has not been the case.³ [Moreover, the narrowing of the horizon of the machine-tender in modern industry is abnormal; he should be able to see the significance of his work in its larger relations, which is at present an impossibility.⁴]

The class-struggle is a result of the division of labor; its direct cause is the fact that the lower classes are not satisfied with the function they are compelled to perform.⁵ In

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 344-347.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 350-2, 353-5.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 360-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 363-5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

order that the division of labor may produce solidarity, it does not suffice that each have his task, but it is also necessary that that task be suitable (*conviennne*).¹ This is unfortunately not the case. The whole trouble lies in the compulsory form that the division of labor has taken; this is a wholly abnormal phenomenon.² Each individual in society should do the work for which he is best fitted by nature. Social inequalities should, in other words, correspond to natural inequalities. The struggle for existence will continue to exist; but it ought to be regulated and made fair to all who must engage in it. It shall not be anarchical, but it shall be so organized as to make room for every quality of social value.³

Two important illustrations of institutions that tend to crystallize objective conditions of inequality in the struggle for existence are caste, and the inheritance of property.⁴ Equality of the struggle is necessary, not merely as justice, but for the practical reason that the bonds that hold the individual to his task and those that bind his task with that of others in the society should be strong. Contract, for instance, must be spontaneous and free; but mere legal freedom is inadequate, when the economic conditions of the contracting parties are such that one of them must contract or starve.⁵ There can be no just contract between inherited poverty and inherited wealth.⁶

Moreover, liberty is not inherent in natural conditions; it is rather the product of social regulation; and the task of the most advanced societies may be said to be the production of a state of justice through the process of regulation.⁷

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 368.

² *Ibid.*, p. 370.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 374-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 378.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 380-2.

The perfect functioning of the division of labor and the true organic solidarity it would bring with it, are impossibilities without this regulated freedom and objective equality.

In conclusion, Durkheim defines the moral as "all that is a source of solidarity."¹ The problem proposed at the beginning of *La Division du travail* is then solved. The division of labor is a moral phenomenon; just as the subordination of the individual mind to the social mind is a moral phenomenon. Morality is "*tout social*". An "individual morality" is an abstract conception corresponding to nothing in reality. "The duties of the individual toward himself are in fact duties toward society."² The duty of a man is to specialize, to do one task well; but at the same time he must foster the common sentiments and ideas; both these duties are elements of the moral life, tending to balance and to round it out.³

That other question (which "was the origin of the work")⁴ as to how the increase of personality of the individual could be reconciled with the individual's increased dependence on society, can now be answered. We have seen how, in successive ages the individual is slowly liberated from the uniformity of type which the larger social group, as the tribe, or the village, imposes on him. The very nature of personality is implied in the specialization of the social task. The personality ascribed to the individual in the segmentary society was no personality at all in this sense; it was simply the refracted mind of the society.⁵

The practical bearing of this discussion upon the actual

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. 394.

² *Ibid.*, p. 395.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xliii.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.

state of morality appears in the solution which Durkheim offers for modern economic and moral ills. In the "Conclusion" of *La Division du travail* he points out that modern morality, as well as modern economic life, is passing through a critical period. "Mores" and moral doctrine are alike in an indeterminate state. We know neither *what* we ought, nor *why* we ought. This is due to the fact that the individual has so rapidly freed himself from the sway of the society as a whole; and that the new organic type of society has not yet developed a new morality for him. The problem is in reality a dual one; to make stable and effective the moral code of the individual, and to make possible a harmonious functioning of the various interdependent units of our organic social life, in order to eliminate the "*anomie*" that we have found to be pervading the economic relations of classes and groups in our modern society.¹

Durkheim offers as a solution the development of the "*groupe professionnel*", the functional unit, of the society, as the moral-forming and economic-regulatory group. This view is set forth in the conclusion of the book, *Le Suicide*, and again in the "Preface" of the second edition of *La Division du travail*.

In the former work Durkheim introduces this idea in connection with his discussion of the remedies for the excessive rate of suicide common in most civilized countries. As we have seen,² there are three types of suicide, egoistic, anomic, and altruistic. Egoistic are those cases of suicide in which the individual's social group has lost its power over him so that he is no longer *solidaire* with it, and so falls an easier prey to the "*courants suicidogènes*" than those who are protected against them by membership in a strong

¹ *Div. Tr.*, pp. 405-6.

² *Vide supra*, p. 144.

social group. Anomic suicides are those that are due to the temporary rupture of the society's regulative control over the individual, as, *e. g.*, in a time of economic crisis. Altruistic suicides are those of soldiers dying for the glory of the flag, or the honor of the service. The last type is of comparatively slight numerical and practical importance. But the first and second urgently call for some preventive measures. These our author finds in a strong and stable social group whose regulation shall enfold the individual securely and continuously, which shall keep him *solidaire* with itself. What group shall this be? The state? It is not a suitable moral unit, as we shall see.¹ The religious society? Its strength seems waning in these days of free inquiry.² The family? It no longer has the permanence nor the collective strength it once showed.³

But the "corporation" or "groupe professionnel" (*e. g.*, the medieval guild) has existed in the past; it has flourished, disappeared, reappeared, in successive societies; it has, then, inherent social values, or it would not display this hardness.⁴ Since it is on the basis of functional units that society will inevitably be organized in the future,⁵ this seems at the least a possible group for the purpose in question. What are its qualifications as a moral group, *i. e.*, as a group fit to regulate the conduct of its members? It has had such a function at various times in the past. In Rome and in medieval Europe there were moral and religious elements in its organization; it frequently had special rites and patron saints.⁶ So far as the "corporation" is a part of the eco-

¹ *Suic.*, p. 429.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 431-2.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 432-4.

⁴ *Suic.*, pp. 434-5 and *Div. Tr.* pp. ix, x, xi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7 and *supra*, p. 163.

⁶ *Div. Tr.*, pp. xii-xv.

conomic world is has no direct moral significance; for this latter is not a world in which moral principles are paramount.¹ But the "*corporation*" has the possible elements of such a moral group; its members share ideas, interests, sentiments, occupation,² origin and culture.³ That is, they have enough common elements to stock a "collective consciousness". Moreover, the preponderance of the economic interests in the life of to-day⁴ gives the group expressing those interests a high psychological value. The "*corporation*" has the advantage over the family in this respect, that its smaller range of influence is more than balanced by its greater intensity of influence; while the family is becoming, at the same time, decreasingly permanent.⁵

The state is wholly inadequate as a moral group. It lacks the complexity which such a function would demand of it; and it is too far from the individual.⁶ Between the individual and the state there must be intercalated a series of secondary groups that can really touch the individual.⁷ Moreover, as the process of specialization progresses, the need of a small, responsive group, which can create suitable regulations for the conduct of its members, will increase.⁸ Territorial units would, in modern times, be less than useless for this purpose.⁹

The individual maintains his solidarity with society as a whole by being a member of a large functional group, and

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. iv.

² *Ibid.*, p. xv.

³ *Suic.*, p. 435.

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, p. iv.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xxxii and *Suic.*, p. 448.

⁷ *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxiii.

⁸ *Suic.*, p. 437.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 448.

his individuality is maintained because the local sub-group of his occupational unit is locally specialized. The very solidarity of the large society is dependent upon its divisions being functional in their nature.¹ The occupational group can develop a high degree of individuality; ² it can become a source of "warmth which fires and re-animates the hearts, opens them to sympathy, sinks the egoisms."³ It can be the source of those beneficial activities of education, recreation, and aesthetic life. This phase of activity is already carried out by certain "*syndicats*" or labor unions.⁴

This is all a program for the future. At present there exist only the rudiments of a professional morality,⁵ and the first attempts at a genuine "*corporation professionnelle*". The full moral value of this group is still to be developed.

When we look at the "*groupe professionnel*" on the economic side we see its possibilities here also, as well as its exceedingly rudimentary state. What we actually have are "*syndicats des ouvriers*" and "*syndicats des patrons*".⁶ These organizations are private, without legal authority, hence lacking all regulatory power over their members. Furthermore there is no regular contact between the two types; no form of association which shall regulate their mutual activities with authority. The two types are in a constant state of warfare; their mutual contracts are treaties, not laws. They embody one phase of that "*anomie*" that was mentioned a few pages above.

What can, or at least what ought, to be made of these organizations? First of all, Durkheim believes, they should

¹ *Suic.*, p. 449.

² *Div., Tr.*, pp. xvi, xvii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xxx.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. ii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xxxi.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

be made definitely recognized organs of the social life.¹ The professional or functional organization of society, which, as we saw, is inevitably coming, will demand such associations. The state cannot regulate the activities of the functional unit; the unit alone can and must do this work of regulation.² The differences and disputes between employers and employees must be settled by means of joint representation on the governing board of the "*corporation*".³ (Durkheim evidently conceives the "*corporation*" as composed of all the individuals who are connected with a certain industry, employers and employees alike.) The breakdown of the medieval "*corporation*" was due to its inability to become more than a local unit. When industry became national in its scope, it left the "*corporation*" an empty form.⁴ The new "*groupe professionnel*" must, to survive, fit modern needs; it must be, like modern industry, national and international in its extent.⁵ Its relations with the society as a whole must be regulated by a representative "organ" which shall act in harmony with the organ of the larger social life (the state, presumably). The two organs in their relations ought to remain distinct and autonomous, for each has functions that it alone can perform. If it is for the governmental assemblies to lay down the general principles of industrial legislation, it is impossible for them to diversify them according to the different sorts of industries. It is this diversification which constitutes a special task of the "*corporation*".⁶

Durkheim suggests, too, that the national "*corporation*" may ultimately be the electoral unit of society, just as the

¹ *Suic.*, p. 436.

² *Div. Tr.*, p. vi.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xxviii, footnote.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xxviii.

local "*corporation*" was formerly a political unit of the commune.¹ This idea of representation on the basis of functional units has lately been put forward by a number of political scientists.

Durkheim warns us that the "*corporation*" can be no panacea for economic and social ills. Justice, in economic distribution, will be as important as in the present régime. In fact it is necessary as a condition of the satisfactory functioning of the system which is here proposed.²

In thus proposing an organization of society on the basis of the functional group, Durkheim has, in part, at least, assumed the fundamental position of the French syndicalists.³

From a recent discussion of this labor movement in France the following points of resemblance and difference may be noted.⁴

The syndicalist believes in the class struggle as an essential element in social progress, hence as a good.⁵ Durkheim considers it an evil, an "*anomie*". The state has no place in this system.⁶ Durkheim, as we have seen, rather minimizes its regulatory power over economic functions. The syndicalist is, of course, for the abolition of the wage system and of private property.⁷ Durkheim does not go so far

¹ *Div. Tr.*, p. xxxi.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxxiv.

³ It is worth while noting that this idea of the need of strengthening the moral life by increasing the strength of the functional group was reviewed by Durkheim when it appeared in a book by A. Coste, *Les Questions sociales contemporaines*. This review has already been mentioned. It is found in *Rev. Phil.*, vol. xxii, pp. 73-4.

⁴ Levine, L., "The Labor Movement in France," *Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*, vol. xvi: especially chapter v, "The Doctrine of Revolutionary Syndicalism."

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 125.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 124, 130.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

—but points out the need of justice; and justice is, in his opinion, impossible in a contract between rich and poor. Again, the *syndicat* is fundamental in its nature, for it is the unit representing the largest interest of the worker. “The *syndicat* is a sphere of influence, which by the volume of its suggestion, and by the constancy and intensity of its action, shapes the feelings and ideas of the working-man after a certain pattern. In the *syndicat* the working-men in all ways are made to feel their group solidarity and their antagonism to the class of employers.”¹ It is then, a “moral milieu” in Durkheim’s use of that term, and fulfils his requirements for the “*corporation*”. Furthermore, the *syndicats*, being national in their scope,² fulfil another requirement of the Durkheimian “*corporation*”. At the same time they are sufficiently decentralized to fit in with his ideas as to how far the local needs of the group should be emphasized. “Direct action”³ Durkheim of course does not mention. The scheme of the organization of a society as a producing group on the basis of the producing unit⁴ is essentially like Durkheim’s idea. He endeavors to solve the problem of the employer by agreements between the employer and employee, by a sort of “*syndicat ouvrier-patroniste*”; while the syndicalist theory considers the employer as a temporary drag, to be eventually eliminated. Durkheim also retains the state—but its functions are not much more regulative than those of the “*Confédération générale du travail*” would be in the projected syndicalist society.

This comparison is in no wise intended to proclaim Durkheim as a syndicalist. It simply shows that there is surely a large amount of vitality in his idea of the functional organization of society, when the most striking labor

¹ Levine, L., *op. cit.*, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, p. 130.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

movement of modern times apparently embodies some of the principles of his theory. Both Durkheim and the syndicalist believe society to be animated by a group of internal forces, not by a set of forces outside it.

Several of Durkheim's ideas resemble somewhat those of the anarchist Kropotkin. The resemblance is limited to the insistence by both on the inefficiency of the state to regulate economic life;¹ on the unfreedom of "free" contracts between the weak and the strong;² on the possibility of voluntary action as a basis for solidarity. Both point out the fact that the state has survived the change to the modern industrial system, while the "free corporations" and communes have not.³ Kropotkin disbelieves strongly in the extreme division of labor and advocates a decrease of a specialization, with manual labor for all members of society. Durkheim, as we know, believes in the division of labor as a moral principle.

Kropotkin's theory would make the individual the ultimate source of morality. Durkheim's theory decentralizes morals as far as the "*corporation*", and emphasizes the latter as the ultimate morality-producing unit.

There remain for consideration several points concerning which Durkheim seems not altogether consistent.

"Social solidarity is a phenomenon which is entirely moral";⁴ this is a statement which seems not quite to fit with the definitions of "moral" facts made elsewhere by Durkheim. For example: "Moral facts consist of rules of action recognizable by certain distinctive characteristics."⁵ "All morality is presented to us as a system of rules of conduct."⁶ Solidarity is cohesion; it is not a rule or sys-

¹ P. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 161.

³ P. Kropotkin, *The State*, p. 33.

⁴ *Div. Tr.*, p. 28.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxxvii.

⁶ *Bull. Soc. phil.*, vol. vi, pp. 113-4.

tem of rules; it may be considered as one of the products of the working-out of such rules, and as the aim of such rules. But it is not entirely a "moral" phenomenon. There is no objection to admitting its "moral" function, *e. g.*, its relationship to things expressly "moral"; and this can perhaps explain away the inconsistency.

A more serious inconsistency is evident in the relationship between the third portion of *La Division du travail*, "Les formes anormales" and that rule (discussed in *Les Règles*) of distinguishing the normal from the pathological.¹

"A social fact," he says in *Les Règles*,² is normal for a given social type considered at a given phase of its development, when it appears [*se produit*] in the average of societies of that species [*espèce*], considered at the corresponding phase of their evolution."³ The "*formes anormales*" of the division of labor which Durkheim treats in *La Division du travail*⁴ are found in every advanced country of European civilization. To say that they are abnormal is to deny the likeness, according to the above definition, of European countries; and this would be an assertion difficult to prove without the use of a much finer scheme of classification than that which Durkheim has put forward. His position seems here quite inconsistent with his methodological premise.

The question arises, in connection with these "abnormal" forms, whether Durkheim is following the rule of his method which enjoins the study of "facts". He traces the evolution of the division of labor down to modern times; and when he has so far followed it, it turns out to be an idealism, an ideal. The actual facts are full of "*anomie*", are "abnormal". This "*anomie*" can be, and is, explained,

¹ *Méth.*, ch. iii.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³ *Cf. Div. Tr.*, p. 34, 1st ed.

⁴ *Vide supra*, p. 168.

as we have seen; nevertheless there is here a departure from the path of strict objectivity for which a tardy repentance can not atone.

A seeming inexactness of Durkheim's moral theory, as set forth in *La Division*, is somewhat modified by his later theories as to the relative extent of the social and individual minds.¹ The individual becomes more and more freed from moral restraint by the increase of the importance of the professional group, simultaneously with the decrease of the power of the segmentary group.² This constitutes that greater individualization, the correlation of which with the greater dependence of the individual on society, suggested the problem of the book.³ It is debateable whether this process of freeing the individual from moral restraint could, in the interests of the social group as a whole, be allowed to go as far as that. Durkheim offers a practical safeguard against this possible danger by suggesting the strengthening of the professional group as a moral unit, as if he were well aware of this shortcoming. But even such a strengthening is scarcely adequate. Since all morality is the product of group-life, and since the state is, as we have seen, impossible as a moral unit, the individual's life must be, morally, onesided. How can the professional morality guard the family-morals and those also that are connected with all the other non-professional activities of life? It would seem that there must persist a certain amount of the control by the society as a whole, or at least of the local segmentary group; weakened, it is true, but still effective.⁴

In Durkheim's most recent statement of the relation of the individual mind to the collective consciousness, this need which has just been pointed out seems to be met. This state-

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 44.

² *Div. Tr.*, p. 289.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xliii.

⁴ *Vide supra*, p. 164.

ment makes of the individual mind simply the "collective consciousness incarnated in the individual".¹ In other words, the individual mind is not freed from the moral control by the society after all, for the latter furnishes it with all its matter, and, *a fortiori*, with its moral content as well.

In conclusion of this discussion of Durkheim's ethical theories it may be pointed out that he is consistently sociological in his view of morality. To him morality is always a system of rules emanating from a group, and imposed upon its members. At the beginning of social evolution this group was the clan or tribal aggregation. It later became the village, and, ultimately, the nation. In the future it should be the professional or occupational group. But so far as the individual's acts are "moral" they are referable to his membership in a group of some kind. At present the transition from the morality of that group which was at first tribal and local, and is now national, to the morality of the professional group has not yet been accomplished. The result is obvious, both in theory and in fact: there has been a breakdown of morality which is of some significance and which can be repaired only by the speedy organization and strengthening of the functional group of the society.

¹ *Bull. Soc. phil.*, March, 1913, "Le Problème religieux, etc.," p. 74.

CONCLUSION

A GLANCE back over the course of this study may now be useful.

Durkheim's sociological theory may be very briefly summarized as follows. Upon the basis of a theory of the compounding of each type of mental state out of more elementary mental processes, Durkheim erects the system of states which he calls the social mind, as the product of a compounding more complex than any that takes place within the individual mind. The representations within this system, being syntheses of representations of different individual minds, are therefore necessarily outside of any individual mind. And because of their origin outside of the individual mind they have impressive power superior to those that are individually initiated. Hence the coercive character of "social facts", which are ultimately states of the social mind. Since scarcely any phase of the individual's mind is, or can be, free from the influence of socially originated forces, Durkheim has reduced the essentially individual side of the particular mind to a minimum of sensation and impulse. From this it is quite inevitable that the individual should not be an originative factor in the social process; and that sociology, "collective psychology", should be independent of "individual" psychology for its explanations. "Social facts," as defined by our author, are found within the field of each of the special social sciences; hence sociology becomes merely a method, and is not an autonomous social science with a field all its own. As for his method as a sociologist its sole distinction is found in

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those elements of it that are most closely attached to his social psychology. Morals are always group regulations; and the causes of their differences and their changes are to be sought in the varying social minds out of which they arise. In short, the whole system is, in its broad outlines, internally consistent; it follows logically out of the major premise of the compounding of states of consciousness. ✓

The emphasis that is being laid by other writers than Durkheim on the social origin of the content of the individual mind has been noted. While conservative opinion may disagree with the extreme statement that our author gives to this view, yet the tendency of sociologists is strongly in that general direction. Durkheim's emphasis on control as a criterion of the social has been shown to be one phase of this attitude. An American sociologist whose approach to sociological problems is in most respects radically different from that of our author, namely Giddings, has still expressed a view as to the subject-matter of sociology that is in marked degree comparable to that of Durkheim. He has defined it as "the science of the origin, the process, the extent, and the results of type control of the variations from itself;"¹ and again as "the science of the phenomena of discipline."² The work of other American sociologists, notably Ross, Cooley, and Sumner, also bears, in large part, directly upon this problem of the control relation between the individual and his group. Undoubtedly this relation is being more and more emphasized as the essentially social relation.

A question arises, in conclusion, which can have little significance except as a suggestion. Does Durkheim re-

¹ Giddings, "Social Self-control", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxiv, p. 578.

² *Ibid.*, p. 580.

flect, in his theories, the French social *milieu*? Two points may be mentioned. First there is the fact that the "society" of which Durkheim speaks is implicitly a group homogeneous as to nationality and race. Differentiations of a local nature are touched on, economic differentiations are stressed in his works, especially in *La Division du travail social*. But that is apparently the limit of the treatment in any large way of differences within the social group. This is quite intelligible if one remembers that there is in Europe no more racially homogeneous nation of her size than France. It is quite natural that a problem or a group of problems with which a sociologist is not at all familiar at first hand should never be emphasized in his theories. In striking contrast to Durkheim's tacit passing over of this phase of social relations, is the work of the Austrian, Gumpłowicz. Both his *Rassenkampf* and his *Grundriss der Sociologie* reflect in no uncertain lines the picture of Austro-Hungary with its German, Magyar, and seven different Slavic groups¹ in almost continuous and tumultuous disharmony.

The second point is one already commented on. Durkheim, as we have seen, looks forward to an ultimate organization of society on the basis of occupational groups. And it is in France that the syndicalist movement has made its most striking advances. It is precisely this group that has contributed to the store of schemes for a socialistic society the one of the organization of society on the basis of a functional, *e. g.*, occupational, grouping. Is it not possible that here, too, our author reveals himself as, perhaps unconsciously, *solidaire* with his nation; as a Frenchman as well as a sociologist?

¹ Balch, E. G., *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, ch. iii.

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